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More than a decade ago, Jacques Delors, former President of the European 
Commission, reflecting on how he sought to promote the third sector in 
his position as the head of the European Commission, emphasized the 
“poor recognition of the third sector” at the European Union level (Delors 
2004: 211). More than ten years later, recognition of the third sector in 
Europe is still poor.
Indeed, the third sector in Europe lacks a clear identity and there is no 
clear-shared understanding across Europe and within the European 
Union regarding what exactly the third sector is and what its role is in the 
European public space. A main reason for this lack of common identity 
is that the manifold self-organized citizen-based initiatives that make up 
the third sector are not sufficiently aware of being part of a sector sharing 
common attributes, values and what economists call a common “objec-
tive function” or underlying objectives, regardless of their specific field of 
activity.
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This lack of recognition, common identity and awareness has conse-
quences for the visibility and political legitimacy of the third sector at 
both the national and European levels, and is both a symptom and a 
cause of the knowledge gaps that afflict this sector. Although official sta-
tistical procedures have been developed at the international level to 
 generate systematic comparative data on key features of the scale, scope 
and impact of at least one of the main components of the third sector—
that is, nonprofit institutions—and volunteering, Europe’s statistical 
agencies have been slow to adopt these procedures and, therefore, slow to 
assess the contributions of even these major components of the third sec-
tor to Europe’s economy and society. Additionally, in spite of the impor-
tance of the third sector in Europe, limited awareness exists about the 
barriers that hinder the operation and impact of third sector organiza-
tions (TSOs) or about the steps that could be taken to eliminate or reduce 
them.
The project out of which this report emerged—the EU FP7-funded 
Third Sector Impact Project—mobilized the collaborative efforts of 12 
European research institutions along with dozens of stakeholders and 
external advisors in an ambitious effort to fill these knowledge gaps.
In order to make headway on this task, it was first necessary to clarify 
the concept of the third sector in its European manifestations. As noted 
in Chap. 2 of this book, like other social science concepts before it, such 
as “democracy,” “the state” or the “business sector,” the concept of a third 
sector is a contested one, with numerous competing terms and defini-
tions in circulation and serious questions in some quarters about whether 
it is even possible to think of this collection of entities and activities as a 
definable sector at all (Dekker 2004; Evers and Laville 2004). One reason 
for the confusion surrounding this concept is the enormous diversity of 
entities potentially embraced by it, and the wide variety of terms used to 
depict it. Included here are organizations variously referred to as volun-
tary organizations, nonprofit organizations, nonprofit institutions 
(NPIs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), associations, civil soci-
ety, social economy, solidarity organizations, cooperatives, mutuals, 
foundations, civil society and, more recently social enterprises (Salamon 
et al. 2004). Despite this diversity, our project managed to formulate a 
consensus conceptualization of a fairly broad common core of the third 
B. Enjolras
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sector in its European manifestations and to win significant buy-in to this 
conceptualization on the part of a fairly broad array of European academ-
ics and third sector stakeholders.
The conceptualization of the third sector is not a goal in itself, of 
course, but a necessary step toward gaining better knowledge of its scope, 
scale and special characteristics. This requires attention to multiple 
dimensions, however. Financial measures are important, but cannot be 
relied upon exclusively, since one of the distinctive features of this sector 
is that much of its activity is undertaken for other than purely remunera-
tive or financial objectives. Similarly, simple measures of the number of 
entities can be misleading since organizations in this sector vary massively 
in scale and complexity and some of the most important activity of this 
sector occurs outside of formal organizations. More suitable measures 
may therefore focus on the human resources that this sector engages, 
both as paid staff and as volunteers. And the focus must go beyond third 
sector aggregates to take account of important variations among coun-
tries and fields of activity. In each of these ways, our project made signifi-
cant progress, developing a first empirical estimate of the scope and size 
of the European third sector as identified in our consensus conceptualiza-
tion, and documenting as well the variations evident among different 
European regions and third sector components.
In line with the emphasis in the recent, widely read Stiglitz report 
(2009) on broadening our systems for measuring societal activity beyond 
simple economic measures to encompass multiple dimensions of wellbe-
ing, the designers of the call that led to this project specified that our goal 
should go beyond measuring the size of the third sector and should 
encompass as well an assessment of this sector’s political, social and eco-
nomic impacts. Because the project did not have the resources to under-
take new empirical research on this topic, our focus here was to lay the 
groundwork for such research by analyzing the work that has so far done 
on various dimensions of third sector impact (TSI), to summarize what 
is known and to point the way to the more thorough and systematic 
approach that is needed.
In addition to clarifying the concept of the third sector, gauging the 
scope and scale of this sector, and assessing what is known about the sec-
tor’s broader social and political impact, this project also sought to deter-
 Introduction 
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mine whether there are barriers that might be impeding the impact that 
the sector could have and to suggest ways to reduce any barriers that 
might exist. As will become clear in the body of the report, our research 
uncovered two broad sets of barriers: first, those essentially internal to the 
sector’s organizations relating to the recruitment and training of  personnel 
and intra-organizational dynamics; and second, those external to the sec-
tor’s organizations relating to the political, economic, legal and social 
environment within which the sector’s organizations and volunteer per-
sonnel operate. In both arenas, our research discovered enormous strains 
resulting from market pressures, changing government policies as well as 
broader cultural and demographic transformations. Fortunately, some 
organizations have found resilient ways to cope with these challenges, but 
some of these pose real risks to the historic functions of this sector.
In a time of social and economic distress and enormous pressures on 
governmental budgets, the third sector and volunteering represent a 
unique “renewable resource” for social and economic problem- solving 
and civic engagement in Europe, not as an alternative to government, but 
as a full-fledged partner in the effort to promote European progress. At 
such a time and in such a context, a better understanding of the third sec-
tor and the role it can play in the future of Europe is all the more crucial. 
Providing that understanding in a straightforward and accessible way is 
the goal that this short volume seeks to achieve. To do so, the three chap-
ters that follow lay the groundwork for this task by explaining what the 
third sector is; estimating this sector’s size, scope and regional variation; 
and assessing, as far as possible given the available data, its socioeconomic 
impact. The last two chapters then focus on the future of the third sector 
in Europe—its challenges and opportunities, the developmental trends 
and barriers it is facing, the strategies organizations are pursuing and the 
strategy that sector actors and governments can usefully pursue in response.
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Beyond Nonprofits: In Search 
of the Third Sector
Lester M. Salamon and Wojciech Sokolowski
In calling for a study of the scope, scale and impact of the third sector in 
Europe, the authors of the tender that led to the present book wisely 
emphasized that “stock-taking presupposes conceptual clarification,” and 
set the project out on a search for a consensus conceptualization of the 
uncharted social space beyond the market, the state and the household 
thought to encompass the third sector. While there was some agreement 
about what this sector was not, however, there was no clear agreement 
about what it included, or what it should be called. An earlier first step 
toward clarifying the boundaries and content of this twilight zone focused 
on what is widely considered to be at its core—the set of institutions and 
associated behaviors known variously as associations, foundations, chari-
table giving and volunteering; or collectively as nonprofit, voluntary, vol-
untary and community, or civil society organizations and the volunteer 
L. M. Salamon (*) • W. Sokolowski
John Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA
e-mail: lsalamon@jhu.edu
8 
activity that they help to mobilize (Salamon et al. 2004, 2011). Even this 
was a herculean conceptual task, however, given the bewildering diversity 
and incoherence of the underlying realities this concept embraced. But 
no sooner did a consensus form around how to define this core than a 
chorus of critics surfaced calling attention to an even wider network, not 
only of institutions and individual behaviors, but also of sentiments and 
values they claimed had legitimate claims to be considered parts of the 
third sector domain, at least in Europe if not the entire world (Evers and 
Laville 2004). And now, perhaps not surprisingly, a know-nothing per-
spective has surfaced in some quarters challenging the entire objective of 
conceptualizing and mapping this twilight zone on grounds that it is 
certain to serve chiefly the nefarious and anti-democratic objectives of 
state actors and therefore cause actual harm and offer little benefit to the 
institutions and individual behaviors included or those who benefit from 
their activities (Nickel and Eikenberry 2016: 392–408).
Against this background, the task to be undertaken in this chapter—to 
take the next steps in clarifying the composition and boundaries of the 
twilight zone of institutions, activities and behaviors that lies beyond the 
market, the state and the family—may appear to be a fool’s errand, 
unlikely to succeed and likely to tarnish the reputations of its authors and 
cause harm to its putative beneficiaries even if it does achieve its goal. 
While we certainly concede that conceptualizing and mapping what we 
here term the “third,” or the civil society, sector can serve the control 
objectives of states, we believe equally strongly that they are at least as 
likely to empower, legitimize, popularize and validate the behaviors and 
institutions that operate in this social space and potentially lead to public 
policies supportive of these institutions and behaviors, rather than only 
harmful ones.
More than that, we believe that clear and understandable conceptual 
equipment remains one of the sorest needs in the social sciences, and 
nowhere more than in the somewhat embryonic field of third sector stud-
ies. Indeed, as one of us has written in another context: “The use of con-
ceptual models or typologies in thinking is not a matter of choice: it is the 
sine qua non of all understanding” (Salamon 1970: 85). Political scientist 
Karl Deutsch made this point powerfully in his Nerves of Government, 
when he wrote: “we all use models in our thinking all the time, even 
L. M. Salamon and W. Sokolowski
 9
though we may not stop to notice it. When we say that we ‘understand’ 
a situation, political or otherwise, we say, in effect, that we have in our 
mind an abstract model, vague or specific, that permits us to parallel or 
predict such changes in that situation of interest to us” (Deutsch 1962: 
12). It is for this reason that Deutsch argues that “progress in the effec-
tiveness of symbols and symbol systems is thus basic progress in the 
 technology of thinking and in the development of human powers of 
insight and action” (Deutsch 1962: 10).
Anyone who has followed the development of understanding of the 
third sector in all of its manifestations must recognize this need for “basic 
progress in the technology of thinking” in this field. Accordingly, this 
chapter describes an effort undertaken by a team of scholars to take the 
next step in conceptualizing this broad sphere of social activity. More 
specifically, it presents a consensus definition of what for the sake of con-
venience we refer to as “the third sector” and that later in this chapter we 
will propose referring to as the TSE sector for reasons that will become 
clear there.
This conceptualization took advantage of the widespread bottom-up 
investigation carried out in more than 40 countries scattered widely 
across the world in the process that led to the conceptualization of the 
“nonprofit sector” in the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector 
Project, but supplemented this with a similar bottom-up investigation 
carried out in the context of this project in a broad cross-section of 
European countries—north, south, east and west—to tap understand-
ings of the broader concept of a “third sector” and its various regional 
cognates, such as social economy, civil society and social entrepreneur-
ship. Building on these bottom-up processes, a consensus conceptualiza-
tion was hammered out through a vigorous set of discussions among 
representatives of 11 research institutes, and then further reviewed by the 
project’s advisory board, sector stakeholders and participants in two aca-
demic conferences. The goal was to provide as broad a consensus concep-
tualization as possible, and one that could provide a basis for systematic 
comparisons among European countries and between them and coun-
tries in other parts of the world, and that could be institutionalized in 
existing official statistical systems and used to generate reliable data on 
this sector on a regular basis.
 Beyond Nonprofits: In Search of the Third Sector 
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To introduce this proposed conceptualization, the discussion here falls 
into five sections. Section 1, which follows, describes the basic challenge 
that stands in the way of developing a coherent, common conceptualiza-
tion of the third sector that can work in a wide assortment of countries 
and regions, and explains why it might be important for this sector to 
overcome these challenges. Section 2 then outlines the strategy we 
employed to find our way around these challenges with the help of a team 
of colleagues. In Sect. 3, we summarize the major conclusions that emerged 
from the fact-finding and discussion processes undertaken in pursuit of 
this strategy. In Sect. 4, we present the key elements of the much-broad-
ened consensus definition of the third sector that resulted, focusing first 
on the institutional components of this sector and then on the individual 
activity components. The final section outlines the next steps that will be 
needed to move toward the development of basic data on the third sector 
so conceptualized—both in Europe and more broadly—and the progress 
that has been made in this direction as of this writing.
1  The Challenge
1.1  A Diverse and Contested Terrain
The starting point for our conceptualization work was naturally the exist-
ing diversity of views over whether something that could appropriately be 
called the “third sector” actually exists in different parts of the world and, 
if so, what it contains. Even a cursory review of the literature makes it 
clear that the “third sector,” and its various cognates, is probably one of 
the most perplexing concepts in modern political and social discourse. It 
encompasses a tremendous diversity of institutions that only relatively 
recently have been perceived in public or scholarly discourse as a distinct 
sector, and even then only with grave misgivings given the apparent blur-
ring of boundaries among its supposed components.
Some observers adopt a very broad definition that, in addition to orga-
nizations, includes the actions of individuals and societal value systems 
(Heinrich 2005). Others prefer more narrow definitions, focusing, for 
example, on “nongovernmental” or “nonprofit” or “charitable” organiza-
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tions. Other definitions fix the boundaries of this sector on the basis of 
such factors as the source of organizational income, the treatment of orga-
nizational operating surpluses, who the organizations serve, how they are 
treated in tax laws, what values they embody, how they are governed, 
what their legal status is, how extensively they rely on volunteers, or what 
their objectives are (Salamon and Anheier 1997a, b; Salamon 2010; Evers 
and Laville 2004; Alcock and Kendall 2011; Cohen and Arato 1994; 
Edwards 2011; Habermas 1989). These conceptualizations also identify 
this sector using different terms—including civil society sector, nonprofit 
sector, voluntary sector, charitable sector, third sector and, more recently, 
social economy, social enterprise and many more (Teasdale 2010).
Underlying these different perspectives is the fact that conceptualiza-
tion of the third sector is a contested terrain, a battlefield where different 
and often opposing views vie for ownership of the concept and its ideo-
logical, cultural, and political connotations (Chandhoke 2001; Defourny 
et al. 1999; Fowler 2002). Diverse and often conflicting interest groups—
from left-wing social movements to conservative think tanks—claim pro-
prietorship of the third sector concept because of the emotively desirable 
connotations it evokes, such as public purpose, freedom of association, 
altruism, civic initiative, spontaneity or informality. Regional pride also 
figures into the definitional tangle. When scholars in one major project 
focused on “nonprofit institutions” as the core of the third sector, col-
leagues in Europe accused it of regional bias and pointed to cooperatives 
and mutual associations as also appropriate for inclusion, notwithstand-
ing the fact that it was often difficult to distinguish many of these latter 
institutions from regular profit-distributing corporations. Many popular 
perceptions of third sector activities appear to share an underlying ideo-
logical position that places a premium on individual entrepreneurship and 
autonomy, and opposes encroachment on that autonomy by state author-
ities, while others see this sector as a source of citizen empowerment 
(Howell and Pearce 2001; Seligman 1992). The third sector thus becomes 
the carrier of a wildly diverse set of ideological values—an expression of 
individual freedom, a buffer against state power, a vehicle for citizen pro-
motion of progressive policies, a partner of government in the delivery of 
needed services and a convenient excuse for cutting government budgets.
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1.2  A Sector Hidden in Plain Sight
One reflection of this conceptual confusion is the treatment of third sec-
tor institutions in the basic international statistical systems, such as the 
System of National Accounts (SNA), which guides the collection of eco-
nomic statistics internationally, and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) standards for labor force surveys, which guide the collection of 
data on employment and work. Although considerable data is actually 
assembled on third sector institutions, such institutions have long been 
largely invisible in these existing official statistical systems. This is so 
because the concepts used to organize these statistical data have not, until 
very recently, recognized even nonprofit institutions, let alone other 
potential third sector institutions, as a class around which data should be 
reported. Rather, in the System of National Accounts, these institutions 
are allocated to the corporations, government or “nonprofit institutions 
serving households” sectors based on whether they (a) produce goods or 
services for sale in the market, (b) are controlled by government1 or (c) 
are financed wholly or mostly by charitable contributions from house-
holds. Since many potential third sector institutions, such as nonprofits, 
cooperatives, mutuals and social enterprises, do produce goods and ser-
vices that are often purchased in the market or on government contracts 
(e.g. health care, education, day care), they get assigned to the corpora-
tion’s sector in national economic statistics, where they lose their identity 
as third sector entities. Other NPIs judged to be “controlled by” govern-
ment get allocated to the government sector in economic statistics. The 
only nonprofit institutions that have been visible in these statistics are 
thus the so-called nonprofit institutions serving households (NPISH), 
which are not market producers, not controlled by government, and thus 
either purely voluntary or supported only by charitable gifts. But this 
turns out to be a very limited slice of third sector institutions.2
1 The language used in the SNA includes entities that may be institutionally separate from govern-
ment but are “controlled by government,” where “controlled by” is defined as more than receipt of 
government funding.
2 For more information on institutional sectoring, see 2008 SNA Chap. 4. Although a 2008 revi-
sion of the SNA provided an explicit recommendation that statistical agencies separately identify at 
least the nonprofit components of the various institutional sectors into which NPIs are allocated 
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When it comes to volunteer work, the situation has been even more 
problematic. Although the System of National Accounts makes provision 
for inclusion in basic economic statistics of volunteering done through 
organizations, it values that volunteer work at the actual cost to employ-
ers, which, for all practical purposes, is zero. In the case of direct volun-
teering, that is, volunteering done directly for other individuals or 
nonfamily households, the value of this volunteering is counted only if it 
leads to the production of goods that can be valued at the market cost of 
comparable products. But direct volunteering that produces services is 
treated as “household production for own use” and is consequently con-
sidered to be “outside the production boundary of the economy” and 
therefore not counted at all. While quite robust labor force surveys are 
regularly conducted in virtually all countries, they have historically not 
asked about volunteer work, and the handful of countries that do ask 
about such work—through labor force or other specialized surveys—
have done so using significantly different definitions and questions, mak-
ing comparisons across countries—and often even over time within 
countries—almost impossible. Similarly, time-use surveys (TUSs) ask for 
both kinds of volunteering defined in accord with the SNA conceptual-
ization outlined above. To date, some 65 countries have implemented 
TUSs. The problem is that results are often reported at such a high aggre-
gation level that volunteering is not visible in the reporting.
1.3  Why Address this Challenge? The Case 
for Better Conceptualization and Data
To be sure, as some critics have noted, there are certainly risks in having 
governments, or any other entity, in possession of data on third sector 
institutions and volunteer effort (Nickel and Eikenberry 2016). But aside 
from the fact that in most countries much of such data is already in gov-
ernment hands as a by-product of registration, incorporation or taxation 
requirements, making such data public can also bring important benefits 
and to report on them separately from other units (SNA 2008, para. 4.35), this recommendation 
has not been adopted by Eurostat in the European System of Accounts, which governs the assembly 
of economic statistics in Europe.
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to third sector organizations (TSOs), volunteering and philanthropy. For 
example, such data can:
• Boost the credibility of the third sector by demonstrating its consider-
able scale and activity. As it turns out, that scale and breadth of activity 
are orders of magnitude greater than is widely recognized, justifying 
greater attention to this sector and its needs;
• Expand the political clout of third sector institutions by equipping 
them to represent themselves more effectively in policy debates, and 
thereby help them secure additional resources to support their work;
• Validate the work of third sector institutions and volunteers, thereby 
attracting more qualified personnel, expanded contributions and more 
committed volunteers;
• Enhance the legitimacy of the third sector in the eyes of citizens, the 
business community and government;
• Deepen sector consciousness and cooperation by making the whole of 
the sector visible to its practitioners and stakeholders for the first time; 
and
• Facilitate the ability of the third sector to lay claim to a meaningful 
role in the design and implementation of policies of particular concern 
to it, including those involved in the implementation of the recently 
adopted UN Sustainable Development Goals and embodied in the 
UN’s 2030 Development Agenda.
At the end of the day, the old aphorism that “what isn’t counted doesn’t 
count” seems to hold. At the very least, other industries and sectors act in 
ways that seem to confirm the truth of this aphorism. They are therefore 
zealous in their demand for reliable data about their economic and other 
impacts. When existing official data sources fail to provide this, they 
mobilize to insist on it. This was the recent experience, for example, with 
the tourism industry, which, like the third sector, finds its various com-
ponents—airlines, cruise ships, hotels, theme parks, national parks, res-
taurants and many more—split apart among sectors and industries in 
existing statistical systems, making them invisible in toto. To correct this, 
the tourism industry mobilized itself to pressure the official overseers of 
the System of National Accounts to produce a special handbook calling 
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for the creation of regular Tourism Satellite Accounts by national statistical 
agencies and then mustered financial support to encourage the imple-
mentation of this handbook in countries around the world, precisely the 
objective that has already been successfully pursued for the nonprofit 
institution component of the third sector, and now, through the present 
report, is being proposed for a broader “third or social economy” sector, 
the TSE sector for short, embracing not only nonprofit institutions, but 
also social economy, social enterprise and civil society and volunteering 
elements.
2  Overcoming the Challenges: 
The Approach
To overcome the challenges in the way of formulating a meaningful con-
ceptualization of the third sector and thereby allow this sector to secure 
the benefits that this can produce, we utilized a five-part strategy.
2.1  Establishing the Criteria for an Acceptable 
Conceptualization
As a first step in this process, decisions had to be made about the type of 
definition at which the conceptualization work was aiming. This was nec-
essary because different types of definitions may be suitable for different 
purposes. In our case, the hope was that we could formulate a definition 
capable of supporting empirical measurement of the sector so defined. 
This meant that a basic philosophical conceptualization would not suf-
fice. Rather, we needed one that could identify operational proxies that 
could translate the philosophical concepts into observable, operational 
terms capable of being verified in concrete reality. This led us to five key 
criteria that our target conceptualization had to embody:
• Sufficient breadth and sensitivity to encompass as much of the enor-
mous diversity of this sector and of its regional manifestations as pos-
sible, initially in Europe, but ultimately globally.
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• Sufficient clarity to differentiate third sector entities and activities from 
five other societal components or activities widely acknowledged to lie 
outside the third sector: (a) government agencies, (b) private  for- profit 
businesses, (c) families or tribes, (d) household work and (e) leisure 
activities. Defining features or legal categories that embraced entities 
or activities with too close an overlap with these other components or 
activities thus had to be avoided.
• Comparability, to highlight similarities and differences among coun-
tries and regions. This meant adopting a definition that could be 
applied in the broadest possible array of countries and regions. This is 
a fundamental precept of comparative work. The alternative would be 
equivalent to using different-sized measuring rods to measure tall peo-
ple and short people so that everyone would come out seeming to be 
the same basic height.
• Operationalizability, to permit meaningful and objective empirical 
measurement and avoid counterproductive tautologies or concepts 
that involved subjective judgments rather than objectively observable, 
operational characteristics. Although underlying conceptual or philo-
sophical concepts would be needed to characterize the in-scope com-
ponents, operational proxies for them would have to be found in order 
to facilitate actual identification and measurement
• Institutionalizability, to facilitate incorporation of the measurement of 
the third sector into official national statistical systems so that reliable 
data on this sector can be generated on a regular basis as is done with 
other major components of societal life.
2.2  The Concept of a “Common Core”
In order to adhere to the comparability criterion, the project had to 
settle on a conceptualization that could be applied in a broad range of 
countries, including the Global South and not only the industrialized 
North. To achieve such comparability in the face of the great diversity 
of concepts and underlying realities, the work outlined here set as its 
goal not the articulation of an all-encompassing “definition,” but rather 
the identification of the broadest possible “common core” of the third 
sector. Central to the concept of a “common core” is the notion that 
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particular countries may have elements in their conceptions of the third 
sector that extend beyond the common core. This makes it possible to 
identify a workable common conceptualization of the third sector with-
out displacing other local or regional concepts around which research, 
data- gathering, policy development and other notions can be organized. 
Countries or regions can thus use the common core for cross-national 
comparative purposes and still report on a broader concept in country 
reports, so long as care is taken to label the different versions 
appropriately.
2.3  Retention of Component Identities
Consistent with the concept of a modular approach centered on a 
common- core conceptualization of the third sector is the need to pre-
serve the component identities of the types of institutions and behaviors 
ultimately identified as belonging to the third sector. This approach opens 
the door to documenting the significant variations in the composition of 
the third sector in different locales and avoids lumping quite different 
collections of institutions and behaviors together in one misleadingly 
undifferentiated conglomeration.
2.4  Building on Existing Progress
Fortunately, our work was not completely “at sea” in setting out to con-
ceptualize the third sector. Some important progress had already been 
made in clearly differentiating one set of likely third sector institutions—
that is, associations, foundations and other nonprofit institutions (NPIs)—
and one broad set of likely third sector individual activities—that is, 
volunteer work—in the official international statistical system.
2.4.1  Institutional Components
So far as the first is concerned, the United Nations Statistics Division in 
2003 issued a Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National 
Accounts (UNSD 2003) that incorporated an operational definition of 
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NPIs into the guidance system for international economic statistics and 
called on statistical agencies to produce so-called satellite accounts that 
would better portray this one important potential component of the 
third sector in official national economic statistics. According to this UN 
NPI Handbook, such nonprofit institutions could be identified and dif-
ferentiated from other societal actors on the basis of five defining struc-
tural or operational features. In particular, they were:
• Organizations, that is, formal or informal entities with some meaning-
ful degree of structure and permanence, whether legally constituted 
and registered or not;
• Nonprofit-distributing, that is, governed by binding arrangements pro-
hibiting distribution of any surplus, or profit, generated to their stake-
holders or investors;
• Self-governing, that is, able to control their own general policies and 
transactions;
• Private, that is, institutionally separate from government and therefore 
able to cease operations on their own authority; and
• Noncompulsory, that is, involving some meaningful degree of unco-
erced individual consent to participate in their activities.
2.4.2  Individual-Action Component
Likewise, the International Labour Organization, in 2011, issued a 
Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work (International Labour 
Organization 2011) that established an internationally sanctioned defini-
tion of this form of work, which is one form of individual activity widely 
considered to be a component of the third sector. Specifically, volunteer 
work is defined as “unpaid non-compulsory work; that is, time individu-
als give without pay to activities performed either through an organiza-
tion or directly for others outside their own family.”3
3 The original version of the ILO Manual stipulated that the volunteer work must be only for per-
sons outside the volunteer’s “household,” but this exclusion was broadened in a 2013 ILO regula-
tion to outside the volunteer’s “family,” although no guidance has been provided on how to define 
“family” for this purpose. This change has the effect of narrowing somewhat the definition of vol-
unteer work.
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The institutional units and activities identified by both definitions are 
clearly separated from for-profit businesses, government agencies and 
household activities. These definitions thus served as useful starting 
points from which to set out on a search for defining elements of a 
broader third sector concept. This search began in Europe because of 
research findings in that region suggesting that these initial components 
were not sufficient to embrace the full common core of the third sector 
concept in this vast and diverse region, but attention was paid to other 
possible components in other parts of the world as well.
2.5  A Bottom-up Strategy
Finally, to build a common-core, consensus conceptualization of the 
third sector broad enough to encompass all relevant types of institutions 
and behaviors in-scope of this sector, yet operational and clear enough to 
distinguish in-scope entities from ones that bear stronger resemblance to 
the other sectors, we devised a bottom-up strategy carried out as part of 
the larger FP7/TSI research project aimed at defining and measuring the 
third sector in Europe. With the aid of the research partners in this larger 
project and an agreed-upon research protocol, we reviewed existing lit-
erature and conducted interviews to identify national and regional con-
ceptualizations of the third sector and its component parts in five sets of 
European regions,4 assessed them against a potential consensus definition 
of the third sector flowing out of broader work and literature, and then 
analyzed the resulting observations to find whether common understand-
ings could be discerned in these conceptualizations and manifestations.
This methodological approach was carried out in a collaborative and 
consultative manner allowing the project’s partners to present and discuss 
4 For the purpose of this project, detailed literature review and consultation was undertaken sepa-
rately in five regions of Europe: the Nordic region, embracing Norway, Denmark, and Sweden; 
Northern Europe, embracing the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Austria; Anglo-Saxon U.K. 
and Ireland; Southern Europe, embracing France, Spain, Italy, and Portugal; and Central and 
Eastern Europe, including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, and the 
Czech Republic. Simultaneously, similar inquiries were launched into the relevant characteristics of 
several possible institutional and individual manifestations of the third sector. For more information 
on the Third Sector Impact Project (TSI), see the project website: www.thirdsectorimpact.eu.
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their unique regional perspectives and concerns at every stage of the 
investigation, and working to reconcile them with the overarching objec-
tive of developing a consensus conceptualization of the third sector that 
could be effectively applied both to the different regions of Europe, and 
more generally as well. Every proposed conceptual component was 
 thoroughly reviewed by all project partners and tested against both the 
agreed criteria and the known realities on the ground. The results were 
then reviewed in a series of practitioner workshops and academic semi-
nars, which served to help refine wording and clarify concepts. The 
upshot was a broad consensus on key features of the resulting conceptu-
alization and operational features.
3  Key Findings and Implications
Two major conclusions flowed from this bottom-up review process.
3.1  Enormous Diversity
In the first place, this review confirmed the initial impressions of enor-
mous diversity in the way the term “third sector” is used, and in the range 
of organizational and individual activity it could be conceived to embrace 
even within Europe, let alone in the world at large. Indeed, the range of 
variation was quite striking.
At one end of the spectrum is the UK, which holds to the concept of 
“public charities,” as recently articulated in the Charities Act of 2011, but 
with its real roots in the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601. This concept is 
rather narrow and, though broadened a bit in recent legislation and pol-
icy debate, remains confined to a historically evolved concept of charity 
(Kendall and Thomas 1996; Alcock and Kendall 2011; Garton 2009; Six 
6 and Leat 1997). To be seen as having charitable purposes in law, the 
objects specified in organizations’ governing instruments must relate to a 
list of 12 particular purposes specified in the Charities Act of 2011, and 
be demonstrably for the public benefit. Not all nonprofit organizations 
(NPO) are considered charities in the UK, though broader concepts such 
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as “third sector,” “civil society,” “voluntary and community sector,” “vol-
unteering” and “social economy” are sometimes used for policy purposes, 
but have no legal basis and no clear definitions (UK Office of the Third 
Sector 2006). The term “social economy” was not widely recognized in 
the UK until the 1990s (Amin et al. 2002) and is not widely used. In 
recent years, a robust “social enterprise” sub-sector has emerged, consist-
ing of entities that use market-type activities to serve social purposes, but 
these take a variety of legal forms. In short, there is no commonly accepted 
concept of a third sector in the UK, and the plethora of terms and con-
cepts in use raises questions about whether a coherent conceptualization 
of the third sector is possible, even in a single country, let alone across 
national borders. At the very least, different definitions may be appropri-
ate for different purposes.
By contrast, in France and Belgium—as well as throughout Southern 
Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) and in parts of Eastern Europe, 
the Francophone part of Canada, and throughout Latin America—the 
concept of “social economy” has gained widespread attention.5 In con-
trast to conceptions prevailing elsewhere in Europe—which underscore 
organizational features like charitable purpose, volunteer involvement or 
a nonprofit distribution constraint—the social economy conception 
focuses on social features, such as the expression of social solidarity and 
democratic internal governance. In its broad formulations, the concept of 
social economy embraces not only the voluntary, charitable, or nonprofit 
sectors, but also cooperatives and mutuals that produce for the market, 
and newly created “social cooperatives” that are even more clearly socially 
oriented.6 Since many cooperatives and mutuals have grown into enor-
5 In its Latin American manifestations, the term “social and solidarity economy” is used more 
widely. See, for example, Mogrovejo, Mora, and Vanhuynegem (2012).
6 The Social Economy concept has also been recognized in political and legal circles, both national 
and European. Thus, for example, the European Economic and Social Committee issued an 
Opinion on 1 October 2009 on “Diverse Forms of Enterprise,” and the European Parliament 
issued a Report of 26 January 2009 on Social Economy. In December 2015, the Council of the 
European Union issued a “Conclusion” identifying the social economy as “a key driver of social and 
economic development in Europe” and encouraged “Eurostat and national statistical authorities” 
to “consider developing and implementing satellite accounts in their respective statistics aimed at 
establishing the effective contribution of the social economy to economic growth and social 
 cohesion” (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union 2015). To date, however, 
Eurostat, the European Statistical Agency, has not incorporated the concept of the “social econ-
 Beyond Nonprofits: In Search of the Third Sector 
22 
mous commercial institutions, the social economy concept thus blurs the 
line between market-based, for-profit entities and the nonprofit—or 
nonprofit-distributing—entities that are central to many northern 
European and Anglo-Saxon conceptions of what forms the heart of the 
third sector.
Yet another conception of what constitutes the third sector can be 
found in Central and Eastern Europe, where the broad overarching con-
cept of “civil society” is widely used in public discourse. Civil society 
consists of formal organizations and informal community-based struc-
tures as well as individual actions taken for the benefit of other people, 
including improvement of the community or natural environment, par-
ticipation in elections or demonstrations, informal or direct volunteering 
and general political participation.7 More narrow terms—third sector or 
nonprofit sector—are used to denote the set of organizations with differ-
ent legal forms, including associations, foundations, cooperatives, mutual 
companies, labor unions, business associations, professional associations 
and religious organizations. The use of various terms changed during the 
political transformation following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. The 
term “nonprofit sector” was very popular in the beginning of the trans-
formation. However, accession to the EU introduced the concept of 
social economy in this region as well. Recently, the very broad and inclu-
sive term “third sector” has been gaining popularity. It includes all kinds 
of civil society activities that have permanent or formal structure, includ-
ing cooperatives and mutuals that allow profit distribution.
Other countries fall on a spectrum among these various alternatives. 
Some countries hew close to the “British” end of the spectrum, focusing 
on structured organizations that adhere to a nondistribution of profit 
constraint. This is the case, for example, in Germany and Austria, where 
the term “nonprofit organization (NPO)” is common, though the con-
omy” into its statistical system, nor has the United Nations Statistical Division recognized such a 
grouping as a distinct sector around which data should be organized. Rather, cooperatives and 
mutuals are considered “market producers” and, as such, are grouped with for-profit companies in 
the corporation sector of national accounts.
7 For discussion of the “civil society” concept, see Edwards (2009); Pollack (2004); Zimmer and 
Priller (2007); Chambers and Kymlicka (2002); Edwards (2011); Seligman (1992); Cohen and 
Arato (1994).
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cept of “civil society” has also gained some traction in these countries. 
However, the values expressed by various actors in this latter sphere are 
frequently contested (Chambers and Kopstein 2001; Heins 2002; Teune 
2008). And this term does not normally extend to the service-providing 
NPOs mentioned above. The boundaries between civil society and the 
NPO sector are often blurred, and “civil society,” “third sector” and 
“NPO sector” are often used synonymously (Simsa 2013), while research 
under the title of civil society is frequently limited to references to NPOs. 
In recent years, the term “social entrepreneurs” has gained importance—
meaning innovative approaches to mainly social problems, with high 
market orientation, not necessarily nonprofit, not necessarily involving 
voluntary elements, and where financial gains can be at least as important 
as social mission. Cooperatives and mutuals, because they can distribute 
profit, would not be included in the concept of a third sector in Austria 
or Germany, though these institutions do exist as parts of the commercial 
sector. In the Netherlands as well there is also no single overarching con-
cept of the third sector, but three mid-range conceptualizations—partic-
ulier initiatief (private initiatives); maatschappelijk middenveld (societal 
midfield); and maatschappelijk ondernemerschap (social entrepreneur-
ship)—are used instead. These correspond roughly to nonprofit associa-
tions providing various services, advocacy groups and social ventures.
Likewise, there is no a single overarching concept of the third sector in 
the Nordic countries. Instead, different historically evolved types of insti-
tutions are commonly identified—voluntary associations, ideal organiza-
tions, idea-based organizations, self-owning institutions, foundations, 
social enterprises, cooperatives, mutual insurance companies and banks 
and housing cooperatives. Some of these have a legal basis while others do 
not. For-profit producer, sales or purchasing cooperatives, consumer 
cooperatives and housing cooperatives have important roles in certain 
markets in Scandinavia. Cooperatives in the Nordic countries typically 
distribute profit at a fixed rate according to each member’s stake. The 
cooperative form expanded in the inter-war period in an attempt to 
reduce the economic crisis, but Norway did not establish a law on coop-
eratives until 2008. Sweden has a category of “economic associations” 
(ekonomiska föreningar) and has recently developed the cooperative form 
in areas where the government until recently has been the main supplier. 
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However, “social economy” is not widely used and most cooperatives are 
viewed as profit-distributing institutions. The Nordic countries stand 
out, however, with respect to the emphasis they place on volunteer work 
in culture, sports and recreation.
One other institutional element identified in several countries as 
potential components of the third sector are so-called social enterprises. 
As noted, these are enterprises that use market mechanisms to serve social 
purposes. Examples include catering firms that sell their products on the 
market but choose to employ mostly disadvantaged workers (e.g. persons 
with previous drug habits or arrest records), using the business to help 
rehabilitate these workers and prepare them for full-time employment 
(Nicholls 2006; Bornstein 2004). Special legal forms, such as “Community 
Interest Companies” in the UK and “Benefit Corporations,” or “B-Corps” 
in the USA, have been created for such enterprises in some countries, but 
not all such enterprises have chosen to seek such legal status, preferring to 
organize under laws that apply to NPOs or to organize as regular for- 
profit businesses (Lane 2011; and cicassociation.org.uk/about/what-is- 
a-cic).
3.2  Considerable Underlying Consensus
Despite the considerable disparities in conceptualizations of the social space 
connoted by the concept of a “third sector” even in this continent, it is good 
to remember that the third sector is not the only societal sector that has 
faced the challenge of dealing with diversity in finding a suitable conceptu-
alization of itself. Certainly, the business sector has every bit as much diver-
sity as the third sector, with multiple legal structures, radically different lines 
of activity, gross variations in scale, complex interactions with government 
funding and regulatory regimes and widely divergent tax treatments. Yet, 
scholars, policymakers and statisticians have found reasonable ways to con-
ceptualize this complex array of institutions and distinguish it from other 
societal components, and popular usage has bought into this formulation.
And fortunately, as it turns out, a somewhat surprising degree of consen-
sus also surfaced in the responses to our field guide search for clarification of 
the elusive concept of the third sector in its European manifestations, and it 
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seems possible to imagine this consensus applying more broadly as well. The 
discussion below outlines four important components of this consensus.
3.2.1  Wide Agreement on Three Underlying Common 
Conceptual Features
Most importantly, while there was disagreement about the precise insti-
tutions or behaviors that the concept of the third sector might embrace, 
the review surfaced a considerable degree of consensus about some of the 
underlying ideas that the concept of a third sector evoked in Europe (and 
very likely beyond it). Three of these can be easily identified. They con-
nect the third sector concept, by whatever term used for it, to three key 
underlying ideas:
 1. Privateness—that is, forms of individual or collective action that are 
outside the sphere or control of government;
 2. Public purpose—that is, undertaken primarily to create public goods, 
something of value primarily to the broader community or to persons 
other than oneself or one’s family, and not primarily for financial gain; 
exhibiting some element of solidarity with others; and
 3. Free choice—that is, pursued without compulsion.
3.2.2  NPIs are in
Second, there was general agreement that whatever else it embraces, the 
concept of the third sector certainly embraces the set of institutions 
defined in the United Nations Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the 
System of National Accounts as NPIs, or nonprofit institutions. As spelled 
out in that NPI Handbook, these are institutions or organizations, whether 
formally or legally constituted or not, that are private and not controlled 
by government, self-governing, nonprofit-distributing (viewed as a proxy for 
public purpose), and engaging people without compulsion. The defining 
elements of this component of the third sector have been tested already 
in more than 40 countries and incorporated into the latest (2008) edition 
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of the methodological guidelines for the official System of National 
Accounts that guides the work of statistical agencies across the world. 
Several partners in the TSI Project reverted to this basic set of institutions 
in defining the core of the third sector concept.
3.2.3  More than NPIs: Cooperatives and Mutuals
While there was widespread agreement that nonprofit institutions are 
appropriately considered part of the “common core” of the third sector 
concept, there was also considerable agreement that they could not be 
considered to constitute the whole of it.8 Rather, other types of institu-
tions also needed to be considered. Most obvious were the cooperatives 
and mutuals that form the heart of the social economy conception so 
prominent in Southern Europe, but that are present in other parts of the 
continent and in other regions as well.
The problem here, however, was that some types of cooperatives and 
mutuals have grown to the point where they are hard to distinguish oper-
ationally from for-profit businesses, particularly if some type of limita-
tion on the distribution of profit is taken as a proxy for the pursuit of 
public purpose, as suggested above and as used effectively in the identifi-
cation of in-scope NPIs. This applies particularly to such organizations 
operating in the insurance and financial industries, but extends to some 
production cooperatives as well. Because of this, there was considerable 
resistance to embracing all cooperatives and mutuals within the common 
core concept of the TSE sector in Europe. What is more, there is little 
sign that it would be possible to convince statistical authorities to include 
these heavily commercial cooperatives and mutuals as parts of a construct 
eligible for being carved out of the corporations sector and incorporated 
into a TSE, satellite account.
8 This perspective is also echoed in a variety of other accounts. See, for example, Van Til (1988); 
Evers and Laville (2004); Chambers and Kymlicka (2002); Defourny (2001: 4).
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3.2.4  More than NPIs: Social Enterprises
A similar situation surrounds the relatively recent concept of “social 
enterprises.” This type of enterprise that mixes social purpose with mar-
ket methods has recently gained considerable prominence in a number of 
European countries, such as the UK, France and the countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe, as well as in parts of Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
More even than cooperatives and mutuals, however, these entities raise 
difficult definitional challenges since they seek market returns and are 
often organized under laws that apply equally to for-profit businesses. In 
some countries, such as the UK, to be sure, special legal categories have 
been established for such entities to acknowledge their mixture of social 
and commercial objectives and activities, as noted earlier. In Italy, for 
example, a special class of “social cooperatives” has been established for 
enterprises that operate market production facilities but are required to 
employ a minimum of 30 percent of their workers from among persons 
who exhibit one of a list of legally defined forms of disadvantage. In other 
countries, as well, the cooperative form is also used for such enterprises 
while elsewhere they organize as NPOs.
There was general agreement that at least some cooperatives, mutuals 
and social enterprises belong within a concept of a TSE sector. But the 
fundamental problem facing the inclusion of these entities is the question 
of how to differentiate the units that should be properly included from 
those that ought to be excluded due to the fact that they are in fact fun-
damentally functioning like for-profit businesses and therefore legiti-
mately considered part of the corporations sector in national accounts 
statistics. This required us to translate the concept of “public purpose” 
into operational terms that could perform this differentiation function 
and thus yield a consensus operational definition of the TSE sector amal-
gam that is consistent with our philosophical principles.
3.2.5  More than Institutions: The Individual Component
The prominence of two other key concepts within the body of thought 
associated with the “third sector” in Europe made it clear that confining 
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the concept of the third sector to any particular set of institutions would 
not do full justice to the TSE sector concept in Europe (or elsewhere): (a) 
first, the concept of “civil society”—with its emphasis on individual citi-
zen action, involvement in social movements, and the so-called public 
sphere, especially in Central and Eastern Europe; and (b) second, the 
emphasis on voluntarism as an important component of the third sector 
concept in the Nordic countries, the UK, and Italy. Accordingly, it was 
important to include individual activities of citizens within our 
 conceptualization of the third sector. But clearly not all citizen actions 
could be included. Here, again, distinctions were needed to differentiate 
activities citizens engage in for their own enjoyment or as part of their 
family life from those carried out on behalf of others.
The task here was greatly simplified, however, by the existence of the 
International Labour Organization Manual on the Measurement of 
Volunteer Work, which offered an operational definition of volunteer 
work that includes many of the activities that could easily be interpreted 
as manifestations of civil society, including participation in demonstra-
tions, other forms of political action, as well as other activities under-
taken without pay for the benefit of one’s community, or other persons 
beyond one’s household or family.
3.2.6  Conclusion: Portraying the Third Sector Conceptually
Four more-or-less distinct clusters of entities or activities thus emerged 
from our bottom-up review process as potential candidates for inclusion 
within our consensus conceptualization of the third sector in whole or in 
part: (i) NPOs, (ii) mutuals and cooperatives, (iii) social enterprises and 
(iv) human actions, such as volunteering and participation in demonstra-
tions and social movements that are undertaken without pay.9
However, not all of the entities in each of these clusters seem appropri-
ate to include within a concept of the third sector. This is so because 
many of them too significantly overlap with other institutional sectors, 
9 It should be noted that the individual activity undertaken to or through TSE sector institutions is 
recorded as work associated with these institutions, whereas the direct individual activity that meets 
the project’s definition is associated with the household sector.
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that is, government, for-profit businesses and household activities—from 
which the third sector must be distinguished in order to stay true to our 
basic philosophical conception of a set of institutions or activities that are 
private, primarily public serving in purpose, and engaging people without 
compulsion. This bottom-up review thus made it clear that formulating a 
consensus definition of the third sector required finding a way to differ-
entiate those elements of these institutional and individual components 
that are “in-scope” of our proposed TSE sector from those that are 
 “out- of- scope” by virtue of being much closer to for-profit businesses, 
government agencies or household activities.
Figure 2.1 provides a pictorial representation of the conceptualization 
task that the project thus faced. The circular line marks the hypothesized 
boundary of what we can term the TSE sector, and differentiates the 
institutional and individual-action components that are in-scope of this 
sector from those that are out-of-scope. Several features of our conceptu-
alization task stand out starkly in this figure:
• First, the triangle in the middle represents the nonprofit institution set 
of entities that forms the core of the TSE sector. The centrality of this 
Fig. 2.1 Conceptualizing the third sector: a graphic representation
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set of institutions to the TSE sector concept reflects the fact that the 
total prohibition on the distribution of profits under which these 
organizations operate in most European countries, coupled with their 
noncompulsory character, provides an exceptionally clear operational 
guide to the fact that these organizations embody the “public purpose” 
feature considered so central to the TSE sector concept. The central 
notion here is that a set of institutions in which individuals participate 
of their own free will without expectation of receipt of any distribu-
tion of profit must be perceived by them as serving an important pub-
lic purpose. This roots the public purpose criterion in the actual 
behavior of a country’s people rather than being imposed from out-
side. Except for a relative handful of NPIs created by governments and 
fundamentally controlled by them, almost the entire class of NPIs 
consequently falls within the scope of this TSE sector, and the defining 
features of in-scope NPIs could thus serve as the starting point for 
building our “consensus definition” of the TSE sector.
• Also notable in Figure 2.1 are the dotted lines separating NPIs from 
cooperatives, mutuals, social enterprises and activity without pay. 
These are intended to reflect the fact that some cooperatives, mutuals 
and social enterprises are also NPIs, and that some volunteer work 
takes place within NPIs.
• Thirdly, the conceptual map also makes clear that the TSE sector is 
quite broad, potentially embracing cooperatives, mutuals, social enter-
prises and volunteer work in addition to the many types of NPIs. It 
does so, however, in modular fashion, separately identifying the differ-
ent types of entities rather them merging them into one undifferenti-
ated mass, thereby making it possible for particular stakeholders to 
gain insight into their particular types of organizations and making 
clear some of the bases for variation in the size and structure of the 
TSE sector in different regions.
• Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the figure graphically illustrates 
the significant conceptual and definitional work that still remains, since 
not all cooperatives, mutuals, social enterprises or individual activity 
can be considered in-scope of the TSE sector. This is so, as noted earlier, 
because they do not all embody the philosophical notions that underlie 
the common understanding of what truly constitutes the TSE sector. 
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The task that remained, therefore, was to identify a set of operational 
features that could be used to differentiate the in-scope cooperatives, 
mutuals, and social enterprises from those that are out- of- scope. It is to 
our approach for completing this task that we therefore now turn.
4  Toward a Consensus Operational 
Conception of the TSE Sector
To carry out this task, we began with the existing consensus definitions of 
the NPI sector and volunteer work, respectively, and searched for ways to 
refine them to incorporate portions of these other potentially in-scope 
institutional and individual-action components while still adhering to 
the criteria of breadth, comparability, operationalizability and institu-
tionalizability that we had set for ourselves at the outset. The resulting 
process was iterative, which means that it consisted of a series of rounds 
in which partners were asked to provide their input on a set of proposed 
operational characteristics, on the basis of which the defining features 
were modified or tweaked and submitted for additional review.
Two sets of hypothesized operational features emerged from this itera-
tive review process: one for institutional units and one for individual 
human actions. The discussion below outlines these two sets of features 
separately and indicates how they came to be operationalized. Taken 
together, the result is a consensus operational definition of the TSE sector 
that rests on the firm ground of a bottom-up investigative process focus-
ing on actually existing conceptualizations and manifestations of the 
third sector concept in many different European countries and regions, 
and that seems likely to work as well in other regions of the world.
4.1  Institutional Components
Following the strategy outlined above, we started our search for in-scope 
operational features of the institutional components of the TSE sector 
from the definition of the NPI sector already worked out and incorpo-
rated into the United Nations’ Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the 
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System of National Accounts (2003) and subsequently integrated into the 
2008 revision of the core System of National Accounts. This was possible, 
in part, because NPIs, at least those not controlled by government, have 
features that serve as useful embodiments of all three of the crucial philo-
sophical notions central to the third sector concept—privateness, public 
purpose and uncoerced participation.
The first and third of these were reflected in the definitional require-
ment that in-scope NPIs be self-governing entities that individuals are 
free to join or not join voluntarily, and that are private, that is, institu-
tionally separate from government, and not controlled by government, 
even though they may receive substantial financial support from govern-
ment. The second was reflected in the fact that nonprofits are prohibited 
by law or custom from distributing any profits they may earn to their 
investors, directors or other stakeholders, and must operate under a “cap-
ital lock” that stipulates that any assets they accumulate must be dedi-
cated to another nonprofit entity in the same or similar field in the event 
they cease operation or undergo a transformation into a for-profit entity. 
Along with the noncompulsory feature, this prohibition on the distribu-
tion of profit serves as a convenient and workable proxy for the notion of 
public purpose.10
With this as a starting point, it was an easy jump to realize, based on 
the input from our bottom-up investigation, that the other potential in- 
scope institutional components of the TSE sector could be identified by 
relaxing just one of the key operational features of in-scope NPIs: the 
feature requiring complete limitation on the distribution of organiza-
tional profits to directors or other stakeholders. This is the case because 
virtually all organizations primarily engaged in the production of public 
goods or public benefits of any kind, one of the defining features of true 
TSE sector entities, willingly accept some limitation on their pursuit of 
profit in order to stay true to their public-purpose mission. Many such 
organizations provide their goods or services at reduced cost or free of 
charge. Others engage individuals with disabilities or other barriers to 
employment, which can affect their productivity and increase costs. Still 
10 Employees of nonprofits are free to receive compensation for their work from the nonprofits, but 
such compensation must be reasonable and not excessive.
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other organizations cross-subsidize certain members or participants based 
on their need rather than their ability to pay for goods or services because 
serving these individuals, rather than maximizing profits, is central to 
their missions. All such practices significantly limit the ability of these 
organizations to generate and distribute profits. Relaxing the nonprofit dis-
tribution constraint to include organizations that can distribute some 
 surpluses generated by their activities, but by law or custom are “significantly 
limited” in the extent of this distribution, can thus provide a suitable proxy 
for the concept of public purpose that is central to our philosophical concept of 
the third sector and hence offers the operational basis for differentiation 
between in-scope and out-of-scope cooperatives, mutuals, and social enter-
prises that we are seeking.
Still needed, however, was a further clarification of what it means to 
be “significantly limited” in the distribution of profits. For this, it was 
necessary to examine existing practice in a wide range of countries, 
from which a number of more specific and concrete specifications were 
derived.
Out of this set of considerations emerged a consensus definition of the 
institutional components of the third sector that focuses on five defining 
features, each of which is translated into operational terms. An institu-
tional unit—whether a NPO, an association, a cooperative, a mutual, a 
social enterprise or any other type of institutional entity in a country—
must meet all five of these features to be considered “in-scope” of the 
third, or TSE, sector.
In particular, to be considered part of the TSE sector, entities must be:




• Totally or significantly limited from distributing any surplus they earn to 
investors, members or other stakeholders.
More specifically, each of these features was translated into operational 
terms as follows.
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4.1.1  The Organization Feature
Organization means that the unit has some institutional reality. To be 
considered an organization, a unit need not be legally registered. What is 
important is that it possesses a meaningful degree of permanence, an 
internal organizational structure, and meaningful organizational 
 boundaries. Informal organizations that lack explicit legal standing but 
involve groups of people who interact according to some understood pro-
cedures and pursue one or more common purposes for a meaningfully 
extended period (e.g. longer than several months) are included. Groupings 
that lack even these minimum features of permanence and understood 
operating procedures (e.g. ad hoc social movements or protest actions) 
can still be considered parts of the third sector under the individual-
action component of the TSE sector discussed below.
4.1.2  The Private Feature
To be considered private, the organization must not be controlled by 
government. The emphasis here is not on whether the organization 
receives its income from government, even when this income is substan-
tial; nor does it depend on whether the organization was originally estab-
lished by a government unit or exercises government-like authority (e.g. 
issuing licenses to practice particular professions). The ultimate test of 
not being controlled by government is the ability of the organization’s 
governing body to dissolve the organization on its own authority. This 
attribute distinguishes TSE organizations from businesses and nonmar-
ket NPIs that are controlled by government units.11
11 The Satellite Account on Nonprofit and Related Institutions and Volunteer Work developed under the 
auspices of the UN Statistical Division further specifies five factors to be considered in deciding 
whether an organization is controlled by government as follows:
 1. If the government has the right to appoint the officers managing the TSE organization under its 
constitution, articles of association or other enabling instrument.
 2. If the enabling instrument or a contractual agreement between a government and an organiza-
tion contains provisions other than the appointment of officers that effectively allow the govern-
ment to determine significant aspects of the general policy or program of the organization;
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4.1.3  The Self-governing Feature
To be self-governing, the organization must bear full responsibility for 
the economic risks and rewards of its operations. The need for this defin-
ing feature arises from the interconnectedness of various institutional 
units through legal ownership. Following SNA procedures, we distin-
guish between legal and economic ownership and put the emphasis on 
the latter rather than the former. While a TSE organization may be cre-
ated by a corporation, it is not considered to be controlled by that corpo-
ration so long as it retains full responsibility for the economic risks and 
rewards entailed in its operations. Entities that assume the economic risks 
and rewards for their operations are “self-governed” and thus institution-
ally separate from other units that may legally own them. Such self- 
governed units are allocated to economic sectors based on their own 
economic activities rather than those of the units that may legally own 
them. Thus, a for-profit business that is fully responsible for the eco-
nomic risks and rewards of its operations is not in-scope of the TSE sec-
tor even though it is legally owned by a unit that is in-scope. Likewise, a 
TSE unit that is fully responsible for its economic and risks and rewards 
is still treated as in-scope of the TSE sector satellite account, even if it is 
legally “owned” by a for-profit corporation.
 3. If receiving government funding determines significant aspects of the general policy or program 
of the organization; A TSE organization may be mainly financed by government and still not 
controlled by government if the organization is able to determine its policy or program to a 
significant extent;
 4. If an organization must seek the approval of government before assuming risk or voting itself out 
of existence or if it is controlled by government or depends on government to shield it from risk.
A single indicator could be sufficient to establish control in some cases, but in other cases, a 
number of separate indicators may collectively indicate control. A decision based on the totality of 
all indicators will necessarily be judgmental in nature.
Borderline cases include organizations created by political processes but that operate quasi-inde-
pendently of the agencies that established them (so-called GONGOs) as well as organizations that 
implement government-created responsibilities to oversee certain areas of economic or professional 
activity, such as regulating who can practice a profession, arbitrating labor-management relations, 
and so on. Such organizations may operate in close relationship with government authorities such 
that it may be difficult to decide whether they are institutional parts of government. The ultimate 
test is whether the leadership of such entities can dissolve the units on their own authority. If not, 
the entities are out of scope of the TSE sector as defined here.
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4.1.4  The Noncompulsory Feature
To be considered noncompulsory, participation with the organization must be 
free of compulsion or coercion, that is, it must involve a meaningful degree of 
choice. Organizations in which participation is dictated by birth (e.g. tribes, 
families, castes), legally mandated or otherwise coerced, such as community 
service volunteering required to meet a court penalty or fulfill a military obli-
gation, are excluded. Organizations in which membership is required in 
order to practice a trade or profession, or operate a business, can be in-scope 
so long as the choice of profession or business is itself a matter of choice.
This feature, combined with the limited profit-distribution require-
ment outlined below, serves as a proxy for a public-interest purpose, since 
organizations in which individuals freely choose to participate, but from 
which they can expect to secure only limited profit or none at all, must 
be organizations that serve some public purpose in the minds of those 
who are involved with them.
4.1.5  The Totally or Significantly Limited Profit-distribution 
Feature
To meet this condition, organizations must be prohibited, either by law, 
internal governing rules, or by socially recognized custom12 from distribut-
ing either all or a significant share of the profits or surpluses generated by 
their productive activities to their directors, employees, members, investors 
or others. This attribute distinguishes TSE sector organizations from cor-
porations, which permit the distribution of surpluses generated to their 
owners or shareholders. TSE organizations may accumulate surplus in a 
12 The reference to “socially recognized custom” refers to situations, common in a number of coun-
tries, where the formal body of laws governing nonprofits may be very limited for various reasons 
but where prohibitions on the distribution of profits to members or investors are firmly settled in 
social experience. This is consistent with 2008 SNA’s (para 4.6) reference to a “legal or social entity” 
in its definition of an “institutional unit.” Formal legal status typically stipulates what the organiza-
tions registered under it can legally do. If an organization is registered as a “non-profit” “non-stock” 
or “tax- exempt” entity, this not only establishes its legal status as an institutional unit, but also 
implies prohibition on profit distribution. By the same principle, “socially recognized custom” not 
only establishes the existence of an organization, but it also specifies what kind of organization it is, 
which may establish expectations about what happens with its surplus.
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given year, but that surplus or its significant share must be saved or plowed 
back into the basic mission of the agency and not distributed to the orga-
nizations’ directors, members, founders or governing board. In this sense, 
TSE organizations may be profitmaking but unlike other  businesses they 
are nonprofit-distributing, either entirely or to a significant degree.
This condition embraces the full nondistribution-of-profit feature 
used to define “nonprofit institutions,” but broadens it to embrace orga-
nizations that permit some distribution of profit (e.g. cooperatives, mutu-
als and social enterprises), but still restricts it to those of these entities 
that are required by law or custom to place some significant limit on such 
distribution. While the prohibition on distribution of any profit is self- 
explanatory, the determination that an organization has a significant 
limitation on profit distribution is based on the following four indicators, 
as shown in Fig. 2.2 and elaborated more fully below:
SIGNIFICANT LIMIT ON 
SURPLUS DISTRIBUTION
THRU EITHER:
4.1.5(d) No distribution of
surplus in proportion to
capital invested or fees paid
(A) Total nondistribution OR (B) Significantly limited profit
distribution thru:
4.1.5(a) Explicit social mission
AND
4.1.5(b) No distribution of more
than 50% of surplus AND
4.1.5(c) Capital lock AND
Fig. 2.2 Criteria for determining significant limit on surplus distribution for TSE 
in-scope institutional units
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4.1.5(a) Public-purpose mission. To be considered in-scope of the TSE 
sector, an organization must be bound by law, articles of incorporation, 
other governing documents or settled custom to the pursuit of a social 
purpose. What constitutes a public or social purpose may vary widely 
among countries and over time, but the central concept is that the 
organization is legally committed to a mission that prioritizes the 
production of public goods or other social or environmental benefits 
of value to broadly defined communities over the maximization of 
profit. Various attempts have been made to characterize the concept 
of public purpose with special terms, such as “charitable” or “in the 
public interest,” but these carry different meanings in different places 
and eras. Core concerns revolve around concepts of health, welfare, 
education, public safety, human and civil rights, overcoming inequal-
ities, promoting employment, protecting human and civil rights and 
pursuing justice. The key, though, is to free organizations from the 
requirement to pursue profit maximization over the commitment to 
improving human or animal welfare, the environment or social 
solidarity.
4.1.5(b) Significant and binding limitation on distribution of prof-
its. Important as a clear commitment to a public purpose is to the 
identification of organizations in-scope of the TSE sector, because of 
the diffuseness of conceptions of “public purpose,” this is at best a 
“necessary” but “not a sufficient” determinant of public-purpose activ-
ity. In the case of NPIs, this is achieved through the prohibition on 
distributing any profits, but since cooperatives, mutual societies and 
social enterprises are permitted to distribute some of the surpluses gen-
erated by their activities, a suitable alternative is to require some “sig-
nificant” limitation on their profit distribution as a comparable 
tangible indicator of their meaningful pursuit of public purpose. The 
key test is that the limitation must be sufficient to differentiate in- 
scope entities clearly from for-profit firms. What that standard should 
be may be taken from the international consensus that appears to be 
emerging with respect to social enterprises, institutions that are even 
more like for-profit corporations than are cooperatives and mutual. 
Several recent European laws thus stipulate that to be considered true 
“social enterprises,” organizations must dedicate to the organization’s 
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social mission, and therefore not distribute, at least 50 percent of any 
profits they might earn. This standard might appropriately be applied 
to cooperatives and social enterprises as well.
In all these cases, however, some adjustment of this specific figure may 
be appropriate where the valid social mission of the units involves 
activities that have the effect of reducing the amount of profit earned. 
This could be the case, for example, where part of the social mission of 
the organizations is to subsidize the cost of products or services by sell-
ing them below market prices to members, or employ substantial 
numbers of persons suffering from some disability or chronic disad-
vantage, thus boosting the costs of training and social support. Such 
subsidies or extra costs could be considered part of the retained earn-
ings in support of the organizations’ social mission.
4.1.5(c) Capital lock. In addition to the requirement for a total or 
significant limitation on the distribution of profit, in-scope TSE units 
must also operate under laws, explicit governance provisions or, where 
such formal provisions were not in place when the organization was 
originally established, set social customs establishing a “lock” on any 
surplus retained. Such rules prohibit the distribution of the retained 
surplus and any other assets owned by the organization to its owners, 
directors or other stakeholders, in the event of the organization’s dis-
solution, sale or conversion to “for-profit” status. Rather, any such 
retained surplus or assets must be transferred to another entity set up 
for a similar social purpose and subject to the same requirements as 
those in-scope of the TSE sector.
4.1.5(d) Prohibition on any distribution of profits in proportion to 
capital invested or fees paid. This prohibition is one of the defining 
features of cooperatives and mutual societies that differentiates them 
from other market producers (e.g. joint stock corporations) that typi-
cally distribute surpluses in proportion to invested capital or fees paid. 
This prohibition does not apply to payment of interest on invested 
capital so long as the interest does not exceed prevailing market rates 
or rates on government bonds. The purpose of this indicator is to dif-
ferentiate cooperatives that primarily serve some social or other public 
purpose from those primarily seeking returns on invested capital. 
Prohibition of profit distribution in proprtion to capital invested 
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applies only to coops; social enterprises by definition are not coops 
within the framework of the UN Handbook.
Each of these requirements is based on existing laws or customs in 
existence in some European countries, among at least some cooperatives, 
mutuals or social enterprises, though each may need further refinement 
once the range of practice is further analyzed. Thus, for example, to be 
designated as a “social cooperative” in Italy, organizations must maintain 
a labor force 30 percent of which must be people with certain specified 
special needs. The prohibition on the distribution of profit on the basis of 
investment or fees reflects one of the defining features of “social coopera-
tives” found in a prominent analysis of European cooperatives (Barea and 
Monzón 2006). And social enterprise laws in Belgium and France set the 
“no more than 50 percent” standard as the limitation on distribution of 
profit required for designation as a social enterprise in these countries.
All four of these indicators should be met to qualify as an entity subject 
to a “significant limitation on profit distribution.” A decision based on 
the totality of these indicators will necessarily be judgmental in nature as, 
in some cases, some of these indicators may carry a different relevance 
and thus weigh differently on the final decision than others.
Summary. Taken together, therefore, this set of operational features 
meets the criteria we set for an acceptable conceptualization of the third 
sector that is at once broader than the nonprofit sector, consistent with 
the consensus philosophical precepts of the third sector concept that 
emerged from our bottom-up investigation and operationalizable enough 
to be integrated into existing statistical machinery. In the process, these 
features make it possible to foster the development of official “satellite 
accounts” on a TSE sector that is much broader than the one called for in 
the 2003 UN NPI Handbook, yet sufficiently differentiated from other 
institutional units to be integrated into national accounts statistical sys-
tems and win the support of national accounts officials. Reflecting this, 
the United Nations Statistics Division, working with one of the present 
authors, has approved for international review pending submission for 
final approval at a meeting of the United Nations’ Statistical Commission 
at its next meeting, a proposed Satellite Account on Nonprofit and Related 
Institutions and Volunteer Work that embodies this conceptualization
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In-scope under this core definition of the TSE sector are thus:
 1. Virtually all NPIs as defined in the UN Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions 
in the System of National Accounts. This includes not only NPISH, but also 
“market NPIs” assigned to the corporations sectors in the System of 
National Accounts, so long as they embody the definitional features of 
NPIs. The only exceptions are those NPIs that are controlled by govern-
ment (including official state churches) and units nominally registered as 
NPIs that de facto distribute profits (e.g. in the form of excessive compen-
sation of directors or key stakeholders). Particular types of organizations—
for example, hospitals, universities and cultural institutions—may be 
organized as “third sector” organizations in some countries and as govern-
mental institutions or for-profit institutions in others. Indeed, all three 
forms of such institutions can exist in particular countries, but this defini-
tion makes it possible to determine which of these are truly NPIs and 
which not. Borderline cases can include political parties (in some coun-
tries, they may be controlled by government) and indigenous peoples’ 
associations (in some countries their membership may be decided by 
birth or the organizations may exercise governmental authority).
 2. Some, but very likely not all, cooperatives and mutuals. Cooperatives that 
are organized as nonprofits, or social cooperatives that operate under legal 
requirements stipulating a minimum of at least 30 percent of employees 
or beneficiaries that exhibit certain “special needs,” would be clearly in-
scope. So are other types of cooperatives and mutuals that meet the sig-
nificantly limited profit-distribution feature. As a general rule, cooperatives 
and mutuals in northern European countries (such as Belgium, Germany 
or the Scandinavian countries) tend to lack such clear limitations on their 
distribution of profits and are therefore likely to be out-of-scope of the 
TSE sector. By contrast, southern European countries (Bulgaria, Greece, 
Hungary, Italy, Malta, Spain and Portugal) more often impose conditions 
on cooperatives and mutuals that have the effect of significantly limiting 
their distribution of profit. These cooperatives are more likely to be in-
scope of the TSE sector so long as they meet the operational criteria for 
limited profit-distribution identified above. By contrast, market-oriented 
cooperatives that operate as profit-distributing businesses and are free to 
distribute all profits are out-of-scope. As a general rule, cooperatives and 
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mutuals in the financial services sector, such as banks and mutual insur-
ance companies, would likely be out-of-scope since they have typically 
evolved into large-scale businesses that are hard to distinguish from regu-
lar, profit-seeking companies.
 3. Social enterprises that are registered as NPIs, social or mutual activity 
cooperatives, community benefit corporations in the UK, special 
B-Corps in the USA or other countries, and entities operating as offi-
cially designated social cooperatives or social economy institutions in 
Belgium or France are likely in-scope of the third sector as identified 
here. So, too, are enterprises that belong to social enterprise networks 
that require the pursuit of significant social or environmental benefits. 
Social enterprises registered as regular corporations are either border-
line cases or out-of-scope, as are companies that operate corporate 
social responsibility programs but otherwise have no significant limi-
tation on their generation or distribution of profits.
Finally, all privately owned for-profit businesses, and all government 
agencies and units controlled by them, are out of the TSE scope.
4.2  Informal and Individual Components
In addition to organizations, the TSE sector embraces a variety of individual 
and informal activities. That portion of such activity undertaken to or 
through organizations is naturally recorded as part of the workforce of the 
in-scope organizations. Strictly speaking, the additional portion is the por-
tion done directly for individuals or other families. In both cases, however, 
the task here is to differentiate the in-scope individual activities from normal 
leisure activities and recreation and from unpaid household activity, such as 
performing household chores, or helping members of one’s close family.
Fortunately, much of the work of operationalizing this border has 
already been done and captured in the Manual on the Measurement of 
Volunteer Work issued by the International Labour Organization in 2011, 
and subsequently further ratified at the 19th International Conference of 
Labour Statisticians in 2013. The resulting conceptualization views the 
individual activity considered in-scope of the TSE sector as a form of 
unpaid work, thus differentiating it from activity one does for one’s own 
or one’s family’s enjoyment, edification or quality of life. Under the 
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resulting official, internationally sanctioned definition, volunteer work is 
thus defined as “unpaid, non-compulsory work; that is, time individuals 
give without pay to activities performed either through an organization 
or directly for others outside their own household or family.”
We adopt this recommended definition here as suitable for identifying 
the individual activity considered in-scope of the TSE sector, with one 
difference: the TSE sector includes all direct volunteer work but only that 
organization-based volunteer work done through TSE organizations. 
Volunteer work carried out through government agencies or for-profit 
corporations are therefore not in-scope of the TSE sector.
More specifically, individual activities in-scope of the TSE sector as 
volunteer work under this definition must exhibit the following opera-
tional features:
They produce benefits for others and not just, or chiefly, for the person performing 
them. The test here is whether the activity could be replaced by that of a 
paid substitute. Thus, for example, time spent playing the piano for one’s 
personal enjoyment would not be considered a TSE sector activity, 
whereas playing the piano for residents of a nursing home would qualify.
They are not casual or episodic. Rather, the activity must be carried on for 
a meaningful period of time, typically defined as an hour in a certain 
“reference period.” Helping an elderly person across the street one time 
would thus not qualify as volunteer work, but serving as the unpaid 
crossing guard at a school would.
They are unpaid. That is, the person performing them is not entitled to 
any compensation in cash or kind. Although this feature is straightfor-
ward and self-explanatory, its application may be problematic in those 
circumstances where people performing these activities receive some-
thing of value that is not formally defined as compensation or wages. 
This may include token gifts of appreciation, accommodations, reim-
bursement of expenses or stipends. Under provisions embodied in a new 
regulation on the measurement of work issued by the ILO, receipt of 
pay that is less than one-third of the normal pay for a particular job does 
not disqualify such an activity from being in-scope of the TSE sector.
The activity is not aimed at benefiting members of one’s household or their 
close family or families (e.g. next of kin—brothers, sisters, parents, 
grandparents and respective children).
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The activity is noncompulsory, which means it involves a meaningful ele-
ment of individual choice. To be considered noncompulsory:
• The person performing the activity must have the capacity to choose 
whether or not to undertake it.
• This excludes activities undertaken by minors or the mentally 
challenged.
• The person performing the activity must be able to cease perform-
ing it at any time if they so choose. If not, the activity is not 
noncompulsory.
• Performing the activity is not required by law, governmental decree 
or other legal obligation.
• If performing the activity is required to practice a trade, profession or 
similar economic activity or to complete educational requirements, 
then there must be a meaningful element of choice in the selection of 
that trade, profession, economic activity or educational program.
• Responding to a social norm or religiously inspired sense of per-
sonal obligation does not violate this noncompulsory feature.
Summary. The human action in-scope of the TSE sector under this 
definition is quite broad. It includes all uncompensated work performed 
either directly for people outside of one’s close family or through an in- 
scope TSE organization to (i) improve a community; (ii) organize public, 
cultural, or religious events; (iii) promote public health, safety, or 
 education; (iv) provide emergency relief or preparedness; (v) clean up the 
environment or rescue animals; (vi) help a person in need with food, 
assistance, or companionship; (vii) take part in, or organize, a demonstra-
tion or advocacy campaign; (viii) uncompensated pro-bono work under-
taken in a professional capacity (e.g. legal or emotional counseling, review 
of scientific papers for publication, arbitration, etc.).
Forms of human action that are out of the scope of the TSE sector include 
all forms of legally mandated public service, such as volunteer work in lieu of 
compulsory military service, court-ordered community service, as well as 
public service requirements to fulfill mandatory educational requirements 
(e.g. volunteering required to graduate from high school); all forms of 
uncompensated training activities whose main purpose is the acquisition of 
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occupational skills by the person performing them; and all activities linked to 
common crime (e.g. criminal gang involvement or acts of street violence).
All forms of employment-related activities and all forms of household 
activities (household work, socializing, leisure, etc.) are out-of-scope by 
definition, as is pro-bono technical assistance to the members of one’s 
own household in any other way.
5  Conclusion and Next Steps
This chapter has offered a consensus conceptualization of a third/social 
economy/civil society or TSE sector—embracing institutional and 
individual- action components—that is rooted in an intensive review of dif-
ferent conceptions of third sector realities in the various regions of Europe as 
well as previous similar inquiries in other regions of the world. It is also one 
that can meet the standard of being institutionalizable in the major official 
statistical systems for measuring the size and scope of different sectors and 
forms of work globally. Indeed, this conceptualization has already been 
accepted by the United Nations Statistics Division for inclusion in a new 
version of the original 2003 United Nations Handbook on the Measurement 
of Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts, now renamed the 
Satellite Account on Nonprofit and Related Institutions and Volunteer Work.
Armed with this officially sanctioned conceptualization, statistical 
agencies in Europe (and elsewhere) will be equipped to generate system-
atic comparative data on a broad common core of institutions and forms 
of individual behavior that can reliably be considered to be within the 
scope of a broadened TSE sector that is clearly consistent with the funda-
mental philosophical conception of what a TSE sector consists of and 
with the central principles of the System of National Accounts. At the 
same time, the “modularity” of this framework allows the separate iden-
tification of the different components that are of interest to various stake-
holders and more or less relevant to particular regions.
In the chapter that follows, we take up this challenge by offering a pre-
liminary attempt to apply this conceptualization to the TSE sector in 
Europe in order to generate at least a tentative picture of the scope, scale 
and economic weight of the TSE sector that this conceptualization reveals.
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The Size and Composition 
of the European Third Sector
Lester M. Salamon and Wojciech Sokolowski
Armed with this conceptualization of the third or social-economy (TSE) 
sector we are now in a position to estimate its dimensions and contours. 
But which dimensions can provide the most relevant description of this 
sector? Conventional economic measures, such as the monetary value of 
the sector’s contribution to the national economy (the so-called Gross 
Value Added or GVA), may not be the best measure because a very sub-
stantial part of the TSE sector’s contribution to economy and society is 
provided at below market prices or free of charge and relies on unpaid 
volunteer labor. Likewise, the number of organizations, another measure 
widely used in popular accounts, is also misleading due to vast differences 
in the size of organizations. A sector with a relatively small number of 
large or mid-sized organizations can carry more weight than one with 
many very small organizations, yet simple counts of organizations may 
disguise this. What is more, existing listings of organizations are notori-
ously unreliable because they tend not to be updated and fail to delete 
defunct organizations in a regular way.
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Previous research (Salamon et al. 2004) has identified the following 
five dimensions as more revealing of important dimensions of the third 
sector and as providing the most useful basis in terms of which to  compare 
a country’s TSE sector to its counterparts in different countries and to 
other segments of its own society and economy:
 1. Workforce size, both paid and volunteer. For reasons cited earlier, this 
variable provides a better measure of the level of activity that this sector 
accounts for than does the economic value of its output. Because such 
entities often engage part-time workers as well as full-time ones, simple 
headcounts can be misleading. Accordingly, this variable has to be mea-
sured in FTE terms, that is, a person working half time for a third sec-
tor organization (TSO) would be counted as one-half of an FTE 
worker. Similarly, a volunteer who works on average eight hours a week 
each week of the year would count as 1/5th of a full-time worker.1
 2. Workforce composition. Unlike the business or government sectors, the 
TSE relies extensively on both volunteer and paid employment. 
Therefore, it is important to generate information on both forms of 
labor, and to be able to differentiate between the two. What is more, 
it is important to measure both volunteer work that is channeled 
through organizations and that provided directly to other individuals. 
This is so because in some countries organizations with paid staff are 
rare, but robust third sectors heavily reliant on volunteers may still be 
present and highly active.
 3. TSE sector activities, which can be most conveniently measured by the 
shares of the TSE sector workforce in different activity fields. To facili-
tate comparison between TSE activities and those of the other sectors, 
we have used classification structures that have been developed to por-
tray the composition of the other sectors as well.
 4. TSE Sector revenue sources. TSE sector organizations receive their rev-
enue from three kinds of major sources: government payments 
1 Since volunteers and some paid workers work part-time or episodically, we converted all employ-
ment data into FTE workers. This was done by dividing the total hours of paid or volunteer work 
in a given reference year by the number of hours considered to represent “full-time work,” which 
we assume to be on average 1760 hours. This number varies from country to country and it is 
generally lower in high-income countries of Western Europe than in medium-income countries of 
Eastern Europe.
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(including grants, contracts and reimbursements for services rendered 
to eligible parties); market sales of goods and services and member-
ship dues paid by private parties; and philanthropic donations from 
private individuals, foundations and corporations. Unfortunately, 
existing international statistical systems, such as the System of 
National Accounts, obscure these different revenue streams by treat-
ing government grants along with philanthropy as transfers, and gov-
ernment contracts and vouchers as market sales.2 Accordingly, great 
care must be taken to adjust the data to clearly reflect these three dis-
tinct sources;
 5. TSE sector institutional composition. As noted in Chap. 2, the TSE sec-
tor as currently conceived includes at least four distinguishable com-
ponents: in-scope NPIs, cooperatives and mutuals, social enterprises 
and direct volunteering, that is, volunteering not mediated by organi-
zations.3 As will become clear below, however, these are not wholly 
distinct categories, since some cooperatives, mutuals and social enter-
prises are also NPIs. This requires some careful adjustments to avoid 
double counting, since some data sources are not clear about this.
 6. The average annual growth of the TSE active workforce, including both 
paid and volunteer workers, and its comparison to the growth of over-
all employment in the economy.
In developing the measures of these five dimensions of the TSE in the 
European Union and Norway, we utilize the following data sources:
 1. A comprehensive study of nonprofit institutions in over 40 countries, 
including 20 European countries, carried out under the auspices of 
the Johns Hopkins University Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project 
(CNP)4;
2 Salamon, Lester M., S.  Wojciech Sokolowski, and Associates. (2004). Global Civil Society: 
Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector, Volume Two. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
3 Volunteer work carried out through organizations is also included, but its full-time equivalent 
amount is included in the count of NPI workers and those cooperatives and mutuals that are also 
NPIs.
4 For a description of this project and its methodology, see Salamon et al. 2004. For an analysis of 
its results in the light of prevailing theories, see Salamon et al. 2017.
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 2. A report on the social economy in the European Union prepared by 
the International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, 
Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC)5;
 3. Nonprofit Institution Satellite Accounts and similar reports issued by 
the statistical agencies of Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal and Sweden;
 4. Time Use Surveys (TUSs) and other surveys in several European 
countries.6
It must be noted, however, that the estimates of the size and contours 
of the European TSE sector offered here are necessarily highly prelimi-
nary. This is so because the data available on the key components of this 
sector remain grossly incomplete and, even where available, seriously out 
5 José Luis Monzón Campos and Rafael Chaves Ávila, The Social Economy In The European Union, 
Brussels: European Economic and Social Committee, 2012. An update of this report was prepared 
in preliminary form and presented to the European Economic and Social Committee in June of 
2017, but a final report with final estimates was not available as of the time this volume went into 
production. Based on the preliminary data, however, the basic estimates presented here would only 
be marginally affected by the updated estimates.
6 Included here are the following sources: Miranda, V. (2011), “Cooking, Caring and Volunteering: 
Unpaid Work Around the World,” OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, 
No. 116, OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/5kghrjm8s142en; Erstellt vom Institut für inter-
disziplinäre Nonprofit Forschung an der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien (NPO-Institut), Freiwilliges 
engagement in österreich, Wien, 2009, http://www.bmask.gv.at; Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 
Wolontariat W Organizacjach I Inne Formy Pracy Niezarobkowej Poza Gospodarstwem 
Domowym—2011 (Volunteering Through Organizations And Other Types Of Unpaid Work 
Outside Own Household—2011, Warszawa, 2012; Pennerstorfer, A., Schneider, U. & Badelt, C. 
in: Simsa, R., Meyer, M. & Badelt, C.: (Hg.): Handbuch der Nonprofit-Organisation. Stuttgart 
2013 (5. überarbeitete Auflage); oje, T. P., Fridberg, T., & Ibsen, B. (2006). Den frivillige sektor i 
Danmark. Omfang og betydning (Rapport 06:19). København: Socialforskningsinstituttet. 
Retrieved from: http://www.sfi.dk/Admin/Public/DWSDownload.aspx?File=%2fFiles%2fFiler%2
fSFI%2fPdf%2fRapporter%2f2006%2f0619_Den_frivillige_sektor.pdf; Kaminski, P. (2005). 
Table1. The NPS in France, 2002 (version INSEE). Le compte des Institutions Sans But Lucratif 
(ISBL) en France (Année 2002). Paris: l’Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Économiques (INSEE); Nagy, R., & Sebestény, I. (2009). Table A 10 in Methodological Practice 
and Practical Methodology: Fifteen Years in Nonprofit Statistics (Hungarian Statistical Review 
Special Number 12). Budapest: Hungarian Central Statistical Office. Retrieved from: http://www.
ksh.hu/statreview; ISTAT. (2014). Nonprofit institution profile based on 2011 census results. 
Rome: Istituto nazionale di statistica. Retrieved from: http://www.istat.it/en/files/2014/10/
Nonprofit-Institution-Profile-based-on-2011-Census-results_EN_definitivo.pdf?title=Nonprofit+
institutions+profile+-+9+Oct+2014+-+Full+text.pdf;
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of date. Although a special Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the 
System of National Accounts was issued by the United Nations Statistical 
Division in 2003, only six EU countries plus Norway have seen fit to 
implement this Handbook. Similarly, while the Statistics Department of 
the International Labour Organization issued a Manual on the 
Measurement of Volunteer Work in 2011, only three countries in Europe 
have implemented it, leaving us dependent on TUS data that covers only 
18 of the 27 EU countries. The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit 
Sector Project generated solid data on nonprofit institutions in 20 of the 
27 EU countries, but these data were collected between the mid-1990s 
and the 2000s and have been updated for only a handful of the countries 
since then, making it necessary to rely on inevitably imperfect methods 
for “aging” the data. Systematic data on social enterprises are available on 
only a handful of countries, and even these use widely different defini-
tions, and the data available on cooperatives make it difficult to deter-
mine what share meet the in-scope criteria for inclusion in the third 
sector and also what share are actually recorded as nonprofit institutions 
in various data sources.
Fortunately, a revised version of the UN NPI Handbook has been 
developed and is available for implementation. This Satellite Account on 
Nonprofit and Related Institutions and Volunteer Work adheres closely to 
the definition of the TSE sector offered in this report and therefore offers 
the hope of generating more reliable data on the European third sector 
than is currently available. But it remains to be seen whether European 
statistical and policy officials will support implementation of this impor-
tant new piece of statistical machinery.
While preliminary, however, the data presented here offer a solid first 
approximation of the scale and contours of the European TSE sector 
carefully defined in operational terms consistent with official national 
accounts concepts and based on the best data and estimating techniques 
available. For a detailed description of the various data sources and esti-
mating procedures used, see Annex B.
To present these estimates, the balance of this chapter falls into three 
sections. In the section that follows, we report our estimates of the aggre-
gate dimensions of the TSE sector in 28 EU countries and Norway. In 
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the second section, we examine regional variations in the scale and com-
position of the TSE sector to the extent permitted by the data. These 
latter findings, in turn, pose the puzzle that the final section of this chap-
ter will seek to unravel.
1  The Contours of the European TSE 
Sector: The Aggregate View
1.1  An Enormous Economic Engine
Perhaps the major aggregate finding that has emerged from the data 
examined here is that, contrary to many popular assumptions, the 
European TSE sector is an enormous economic force, outdistancing most 
major industries in the scale of its workforce. Taken together, as of 2014, 
the latest date for which data are available, the European TSE sector 
engages an estimated 29.1 million FTE workers (paid and volunteer) in 
the 28 EU countries and Norway. The European TSE sector thus accounts 
for slightly more than 13 percent of the European workforce. This is sig-
nificant because any industry that accounts for 5 percent of the employ-
ment of a country is considered to be a major industry. What is more, in 
the fields in which they operate, the TSE sector turns out to account for 
an even larger employment share.
Put somewhat differently, with over 29 million FTE workers, the 
European TSE sector has the third largest “workforce” of any industry in 
Europe, trailing only trade and manufacturing, but outdistancing the 
construction and transportation industries by 2:1, and the financial ser-
vices industry by nearly 5:1 (see Fig. 3.1).
1.2  Volunteer Engagement
A second striking characteristic of the European TSE Sector is its engage-
ment of volunteers in addition to paid employees. In fact, of the over 29 
million FTE workers in the TSE sector in Europe, 55 percent—a total of 
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16 million FTE workers—are volunteers (Fig. 3.2). This means that the 
European TSE sector employs more FTE volunteer workers than there 
are FTE workers of any sort employed in any major European industry 
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Of these 16 million FTE volunteer workers, nearly 7 million work 
through nonprofit organizations and the balance, roughly 9.0 million 
FTE volunteer workers, volunteer directly to help friends and neighbors 
outside of their own households or families. Clearly, this ability to 
 mobilize a veritable army of volunteers is another potent measure of the 
reach and power of the TSE sector.
1.3  What does the European TSE Sector Do?
Not only are TSE sector organizations important in economic terms, but 
they are also important socially, politically and culturally. Indeed, third 
sector actors perform a multitude of social functions. For one thing, they 
are service providers, delivering significant shares of such services as 
health care, education, environmental protection, disaster relief and eco-
nomic development promotion. Beyond this, however, they function as 
policy advocates, as promoters of a sense of community, as guardians of a 
crucial value emphasizing the importance of individual initiative for the 
common good and as vehicles for giving expression to a host of interests 
and values—whether religious, ethnic, social, cultural, racial, professional 
or gender-related (Salamon 2014a, b).
To gain some insight into the activities and functions that the 
European TSE sector performs, we classified the activities of the TSE 
sector workforce into three major categories: service, expressive and 
other functions.7 The service function entails activities in education, 
social services, health care and housing and community development. 
Direct volunteer action, which by definition involves help to other 
households, is considered a service activity in this report. The expressive 
function comprises activities in culture and recreation, membership 
organizations—including labor unions—business and professional 
organizations, environmental organizations and religious congrega-
tions. Finally, the other function includes activities of charitable foun-
dations, international organizations, as well as activities not elsewhere 
classified. Given the limitations of the existing data, more detailed 
7 See Appendix 1 for the methodology used in this estimation.
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classification of TSE sector activity by industry is not possible at this 
time. As Fig. 3.3 shows, we estimate that the overwhelming majority 
(72 percent) of TSE sector workforce activity is devoted to the service 
functions of the sector. At the same time, a substantial 24 percent of 
the activity goes into expressive functions.
1.4  Revenue Structure
The revenue structure of the civil society sector differs markedly from 
what many observers tend to believe. While charitable giving attracts the 
most public and media attention, it turns out to account for a relatively 
small share of TSE sector revenue. Thus, as shown in Fig. 3.4, taken all 
together, charitable contributions—from individuals, foundations and 
corporations—account on average for only about 9 percent of overall 
TSE sector revenue in Europe. By contrast, private fee income, which 
includes private payments for goods and services, membership dues and 
investment income, accounts for a much larger 54 percent of income on 
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Fig. 3.3 European TSE sector workforce activity, by function in 29 countries, 2014
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reimbursements for services rendered to eligible private parties in such 
fields as health care or education, make up the balance of about 37 per-
cent of TSE sector revenue.8
1.5  Institutional Structure
The final dimension of the European TSE sector that deserves attention 
is its institutional structure. As previously noted, this includes four ele-
ments: NPIs, cooperatives and mutual societies, social enterprises and all 
direct volunteer activities.9
8 These estimates do not include any payments for direct volunteer action, which, if any, we assume 
to be insignificant. We furthermore assume that all income of cooperatives and mutual societies 
and social enterprises comes from market activities, and thus is considered to be fee income. 
Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to estimate the monetary values of these revenue streams 
at this time. For more information about this estimation methodology, see Annex 1.
9 As previously noted, organization-based volunteering is treated here as an attribute of the organi-
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Several complications attend the separate depictions of these four 
components, however. For one thing, some cooperatives and mutuals 
are subject to a full nondistribution of profit constraint and thus are 
considered to be NPIs. Based on data available in at least one European 
country—France—we estimate that about 11 percent of the total 
recorded employment in cooperatives and mutuals is actually working 
in entities that are also NPIs. To avoid double counting, we have 
counted the workers in such cooperatives and mutuals as cooperative 
and mutual workers and adjusted our estimate of NPI employment 
accordingly. In addition, to ensure consistency with our definition of 
in-scope cooperatives and mutuals, a number of estimations had to be 
employed in countries where existing data for making the necessary 
distinctions was not available. Fortunately, solid statistical data were 
available in some countries that facilitated these estimates, as detailed 
more fully in Appendix 2.
Secondly, as already noted, reliable data on social enterprises, particu-
larly those that meet our in-scope criteria, are unavailable on most coun-
tries. However, in a number of countries, special legal or technical 
categories have been adopted to identify such enterprises. Included here 
are entities that are legally registered or otherwise designated as “Work 
Integration Social Enterprises (WISE),” “sheltered employment estab-
lishments” or, in the case of the UK, “Community Interest Companies 
(CIC).” While it is not entirely clear how fully these designations line up 
with our definition of in-scope social enterprises, we were sufficiently 
encouraged that they provide a reasonable proxy to rely on them. Even 
so, data on employment in these forms of enterprises were available for 
only nine EU countries.10 In the remaining countries, no such designa-
tions or other sources of data were available, though, as will become clear 
below, it was possible to make some rough imputations of the scope of 
such employment in the other countries.
Finally, in the case of volunteers, as previously noted, the portion of 
total FTE volunteer work that is carried out through other institutions is 
included in the data on the workforce of these other institutions and 
10 See section “Social Enterprises” of Appendix 2 for more details.
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broken out separately there. The direct volunteer work, that is, that vol-
unteer work that is not mediated by other organizations but is carried out 
directly for persons outside the volunteer’s family or household is reported 
separately.
Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the TS workforce among the four 
components: direct volunteering, NPIs (excluding those that are coop-
eratives), cooperatives and mutuals (including those that are also NPIs), 
and social enterprises (including those that may be either cooperatives or 
NPIs), but only for the countries on which data are available.
It is clear that NPIs still engage the majority (59 percent) of the TSE 
sector workforce, and about 87 percent of the organizational component 
of the TSE sector. Of this NPI workforce, however, 40 percent is made 
up of FTE volunteers.
By contrast, cooperatives and mutual societies account for a much 
smaller 9 percent of the TSE sector workforce even with the coopera-
tives operating as NPIs included. In the case of social enterprises, their 
share of total TSE employment cannot be estimated precisely for rea-
sons mentioned earlier, but it is likely to vary only between 1.0 and 2.1 
percent, depending on whether we include only the nine countries in 
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Fig. 3.5 Institutional structure of the European TSE Sector in 29 countries, 2014
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social enterprise employment in the other countries at the average rate 
for the countries for which data are available.
The final component of the TSE sector—direct volunteer action—
accounts for a significant 31 percent of the FTE TSE sector workforce, 
and if the volunteers operating through nonprofit organizations are 
included, the overall volunteer share of total TSE sector’s FTE employ-
ment would stand at 55 percent.
1.6  Longitudinal Changes
One final notable dimension of TSE activity has been its recent dyna-
mism. Although we have longitudinal data on only one TSE institutional 
component, the nonprofit institutions (NPIs), and on only 12 EU coun-
tries, these limited data show that the TSE sector has recently been in the 
midst of significant growth in these countries—growing at a rate that 
exceeds the growth of overall employment in the economy.11 Thus, paid 
employment in the NPI sector grew at an annual average rate of 3.4 per-
cent in the 12 EU countries on which comparative time-series data are 
available (Fig.  3.6). By comparison, as also shown in Fig.  3.6, total 
employment in these 12 countries grew at an annual rate of only 0.6 
percent.
Moreover, NPI employment growth outdistanced total employment 
growth in all but one country (Denmark). A particularly dramatic differ-
ence took place in Spain, where the NPI employment was growing at the 
annual rate of 6.6 percent between 2008 and 2013, while total employ-
ment shrank by 3.5 percent per year in the same time period.
2  A Diverse Sector: Regional Variations
Important though these aggregate features of the TSE sector are, how-
ever, they can be misleading. As one old joke puts it: even a statistician 
can easily drown in a creek that is on average 5 inches deep. Behind the 
11 We are indebted to Karl-Henrik Sivisend for assistance in assembling the data reported here. For 
a complete summary of sources, see Appendix 2.
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averages often lie some significant cross-national and regional variations. 
And that is certainly true of the European TSE sector, as our discussion 
in Chap. 2 above made clear.
To make sense of these variations, it is useful to examine them at the 
regional level. For this purpose, we have divided the EU countries into 
four regional groupings, which we term Northern Europe, Southern 
Europe, Scandinavia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Table 3.1 depicts 
the breakdown of European countries among these four regional clusters. 
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well, and even within particular countries, but our data do not at this 
stage permit us to go below the regional level.
2.1  Regional Variations in Overall TSE Sector Scale
A useful starting point for this discussion of regional variations in the 
contours of the TSE sector is with the sector’s basic scale. Countries 
differ, of course, in the size of their populations, so it is natural that 
larger countries will have larger TSE sector workforces than do smaller 
ones. To draw valid comparisons, therefore, we focus not on the abso-
lute numbers, but on the share that the TSE sector workforce repre-
sents of the total number of people employed in each region. As Fig. 3.7 
shows, that share varies from a high of 15 percent in the Northwestern 
European countries to a low of 9.5 percent in Central and Eastern 
Europe.12
12 See Appendix 2 for the values for individual countries.
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2.2  Regional Variations in the Institutional 
Composition of the TSE Sector Workforce
These overall disparities in the relative size of the TSE sector among 
regions are overshadowed, moreover, by the much larger disparities in the 
composition of the third sector in the different European regions. This is 
fully consistent with our discussion of regional variations in Chap. 2 
above, but still deserves emphasis here. Thus, as shown in Fig. 3.8, in 
Central and Eastern Europe, 70 percent of third sector employment takes 
the form of direct volunteering. By contrast, employment in NPIs—both 
paid and volunteer—accounts for a much smaller 22 percent. This con-
trasts sharply with Northwestern Europe, where 60 percent of the TSE 
sector employment is in NPIs, much of it in paid positions, while employ-
ment in coops accounts for about 12 percent, social enterprises for less 
than 1 percent, and direct volunteering a relatively small 27 percent. This 
testifies to the still-embryonic nature of the more formal third sector 
institutions in the formerly Soviet-dominated territories and their much 
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Southern Europe is different again, with an exceptionally high 16 percent 
of TSE sector employment in cooperatives, 1 percent in social enterprises, 
a similarly quite high 33 percent in direct volunteering, and a relatively 
low 50 percent of employment in NPIs.
2.3  Regional Variations in European TSE Sector 
Functions and Revenue Patterns
Other dimensions of the European third sector—the scope of activity by 
field and the revenue structure—also vary considerably by region. Due to 
data availability limitations, however, we can only examine these varia-
tions on a much smaller set of European countries and on a smaller set of 
institutions—that is, only for the NPI components of the TSE sector and 
only for the 20 countries covered by the Johns Hopkins Comparative 
Nonprofit Sector Project. As Fig. 3.9 shows, the distribution of service 
and expressive activities of NPIs is very different in the Scandinavian 
countries than it is in Northern and Southern Europe. Thus, in the 
Scandinavian region, 57 percent of nonprofit FTE employment is 
*Excluding cooperaves NPIs* Coops SEs** Direct vol.
29 countries 59% 9% 1% 31%
North-Western
Europe 60% 12% 0% 27%
Scandinavia 71% 6%2% 21%
Southern
Europe 50% 16% 1% 33%
Central/Easter
n Europe 22% 8% 70%
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**9 countries only (data for Central/Eastern N/A
Fig. 3.8 Institutional composition of EU TSE sector workforce, by region, 2014
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devoted to expressive functions and only 40 percent to service ones. By 
contrast, in Northern and Southern Europe, these proportions are 
reversed, with over 60 percent of TSE sector effort devoted to service 
provision and a much smaller 31–35 percent devoted to expressive func-
tions. This reflects the much greater reliance on government for service 
provision in the Scandinavian lands and the long-standing tradition of 
nonprofit involvement in advocacy and sport activities there.
Similar disparities characterize the revenue structure of NPIs across 
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ket sales, membership dues and interest earned) is the dominant rev-
enue source for NPI entities in the Scandinavian countries, accounting 
for 57 percent of NPI revenue, whereas government is the dominant 
source in Northwestern Europe outside of Scandinavia, with a similar 
57 percent of revenue coming from governmental sources in this 
region. Lacking both substantial government and fee income, NPIs in 
Central and Eastern Europe rely disproportionately on philanthropy, 
which accounts for 19 percent of NPI income, twice the share that it 
provides to the much larger NPI sectors in Scandinavia and Northern 
Europe.
2.4  Summary
As this section has shown, behind the aggregate picture of the European 
third sector lie some enormous cross-regional variations. What is more, 
these variations apply to each of the dimensions of the TSE sector that we 
have been able to examine, and often in apparently confusing ways. What 
has caused these variations? Is it possible that these variations hold the 
key to explaining what it is that determines the size, shape, functions and 
financing of the TS sector across Europe? It is to this intriguing set of 
questions that we turn in the next section.
3  Explaining Cross-national Variations 
in TSE Sector Dimensions13
Cross-national dimensions in different manifestations of TS activities 
have not, of course, totally escaped public scrutiny. Public officials, 
journalists, foundation officers, civil society activists and volunteers 
have long had hunches about different levels and manifestations of third 
sector activities among countries and regions, even though they have 
13 This section draws heavily on Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, and Megan Haddock, 
Explaining Civil Society Development: A Social Origins Approach. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2017.
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lacked solid empirical verification. Yet, the popular explanations of these 
differences are at best unconvincing and often misleading.
Perhaps the most popular explanation links these cross-country differ-
ences in the manifestations of TS activities to different cultural values and 
sentiments. The key element of this line of argument is that social institu-
tions such as civil society organizations result from the development of 
certain values, attitudes and norms of behavior, many of which are sup-
posedly rooted in religious convictions and teachings. Societies that 
espouse norms and values favorable for charity, self-governance or altru-
ism will have stronger nonprofit and philanthropic sectors than societies 
in which such impulses are weaker.
Variants of this argument can be found in the academic literature as 
well. For example, Banfield attributed the backwardness of southern Italy 
to a prevalent, but dysfunctional, moral code that he termed “amoral 
familism” that impeded cooperation among families or clans and thus the 
growth of associational ties. Fukuyama proposed a similar cultural 
 explanation of the sources of civil society growth, emphasizing the cul-
tural value of “trust.” Societies exhibiting high levels of trust create self- 
governing associations in both business and social life, whereas 
low- trusting societies rely on familial ties while the management of pub-
lic affairs is carried out by a centralized authority (the state). “A thriving 
civil society,” Fukuyama therefore explains, “depends on a people’s habits, 
customs, and ethics—attributes that can be shaped only indirectly 
through conscious political action and must otherwise be nourished 
through an increased awareness and respect for culture.”14
Another line of argument, developed by American economists and 
popularized by the spread of the neoliberal ideology during the past 30 
years, attributes these differences to the degree of heterogeneity of 
demand for public goods. According to this theory, the inability of the 
market to supply the level of collective goods that citizens demand neces-
sitates that such goods are paid for by public funding rather than through 
ordinary market transactions. However, when the demand for public 
14 Edward Banfield. (1958). The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York: Free Press.; Francis 
Fukuyama. (1995). Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: The Free 
Press.;
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goods is diversified due to different preferences of different socio-demo-
graphic groups, it is difficult to obtain the level of political consensus 
needed to secure sufficient public funding for such goods. According to 
this theory, this set of circumstances leads to the growth of the nonprofit 
sector to supply the collective goods that neither the market nor the state 
can provide. This theory thus predicts that the lower the level of hetero-
geneity in a population, the higher the level of government provision of 
public welfare services, and therefore the lower the level of TS develop-
ment needed to provide the “collective goods” that citizens demand. In 
other words, the third sector should be less prominent where government 
spending is highest, and vice versa.15
Neither of these theories is very consistent with the findings reported 
here, however. So far as the cultural theories, and their religious ground-
ing, are concerned, Europe, and especially the European Union  countries, 
show a remarkable degree of cultural and religious similarity by global 
standards. All these countries share virtually identical religious roots—
the Greco-Roman civilization and Christianity. Virtually every European 
country’s religious tradition emphasizes the importance of social solidar-
ity, altruism, helping others, civic virtues and engagement in public 
affairs. Clearly, a factor that is so ubiquitous can hardly be counted on to 
explain the enormous variations that exist in the manifestations of the 
TSE sector in Europe. Indeed, countries with very similar religious tradi-
tions, such as Italy, Ireland and Poland, all predominantly Catholic 
nations, have very different levels of TSE sector activities, especially with 
regard to their organizational component. Portugal and Spain share not 
only the same religion, but also the same cultural tradition, yet they differ 
markedly in their TSE sector manifestations.
This, of course, does not mean that cultural norms, values and ideolo-
gies play no role in TSE sector development, but that the relationship 
between the ideological influences and TSE is far more complex than the 
cultural sentiments theories claim. On the one hand, the norms and val-
ues can constrain even powerful social interests. At the same time, 
15 Burton Weisbrod. (1977). The Voluntary Independent Sector. Lexington: Lexington Books; Henry 
Hansmann. (1987). “Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations.” In Walter W. Powell (ed.), 
The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook, pp. 27–42. New Haven: Yale University Press.
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whether particular values or norms gain support or legitimacy can be 
influenced by their consistency with group interests. Max Weber recog-
nized this latter point in his concept of “elective affinity,” the tendency of 
social actors to lean toward cultural norms and values that align with 
their predispositions and group interests ([1904–05] 1958, see also 
Howe, 1978). Thus, according to Weber, Protestant religious doctrines 
emerging in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe gained ground in 
important part because they were more aligned with the economic inter-
ests of wealthy merchants than the traditional Catholic teaching renounc-
ing worldly possessions.
This suggests that rather than being treated as general influences with-
out observable causal links to particular social groupings or specific insti-
tutional outcomes, the cultural and ideological influences must be linked 
to the power and actions of specific social actors. For example, the long- 
standing Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity, holding that social issues 
ought to be addressed by the social unit closest to the family, including, 
of course, the parish, provided a convenient template for conservative 
elements to use in resisting worker pressures for expanded state-provided 
social welfare protections in nineteenth century Germany by channeling 
such protections through politically “safe,” religiously affiliated, non-
profit organizations. Hence, as will be explained more fully later in this 
chapter, this created a pattern of TSE development that we term “welfare 
partnership.”
With regard to the economic theories linking the rise of the third sec-
tor to a combination of market failure and government failure that con-
strains government social welfare spending and leads to increased reliance 
on nonprofit groups, the evidence presented here roundly refutes them. 
Indeed, far from being more limited, the European third sector is much 
larger and more robust in precisely those regions—Northwestern Europe 
and Scandinavia—where government social welfare spending is higher. 
This refutes both these market failure/government-failure theories and 
the common perception that Western European countries have built 
“welfare states.” In fact, what they have built are “welfare partnerships” in 
which governments have turned massively to nonprofit organizations to 
deliver state-funded social welfare services. This has been possible because, 
unlike the USA, most European countries have developed what Lijphart 
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terms “consensus democracy,” which differs from the winner-take-all 
image embodied in the government-failure theory by making provision 
for proportional representation of minority interests.16 This makes it pos-
sible to build consensuses among various interest groups and thereby 
generate support for a much broader array of public goods than the 
hypothesized “median voter” might want and eliminates the binary 
“either-or” choice between government or third sector provision by 
designing cooperative arrangements that engage both. This may explain 
why the inverse relation between government social welfare spending and 
the size of the civil society sector predicted by the economic theory turns 
out to be powerfully refuted by much of the cross-national data we have 
assembled.
How, then, are we to account for the significant differences in TSE 
sector size and contours among the different European regions? Drawing 
in part on Robert Putnam’s influential study of the significant variations 
in the scope and scale of the nonprofit sector in Southern and Northern 
Italy, which Putnam links to different social class power relations in these 
different regions,17 the two authors of this chapter have developed a 
broader “social origins” theory of third sector development that links the 
development of the third sector to different configurations of power rela-
tions among social groupings and institutions in various countries during 
the period of industrialization and modernization (Salamon et al. 2017). 
Thus, for example, in countries where industrial and commercial ele-
ments were able to diffuse the influence of conservative landed elites and 
consolidate their own political and economic power during the period of 
industrialization, they were able to impose national policies favorable to 
their economic interests in limited government involvement in economic 
and social affairs, and reliance on markets and private initiative in address-
ing the social problems resulting from industrialization. The consequence 
was the emergence of a “Liberal pattern” of civil society development, 
characterized by fairly substantial TSE sector institutions, but mostly 
16 Lijphart, Arendt. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty 
Six Countries. New Haven: Yale University Press.
17 Robert Putnam. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
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dependent on private sources (fees and charity) for their support. In 
Europe, this pattern is most visible in the UK and Switzerland.
In countries where industrialization and the partial liberalization of 
social relations led to the substantial growth of a working class and of 
organizations representing its interests, but not to the point of displac-
ing the dominant position of landed and/or industrial or commercial 
elites, a decidedly different pattern emerged characterized by greater 
state- sponsored social welfare protections—but channeled through 
“safe,” religiously affiliated, private voluntary organizations. This pro-
duced a “Welfare Partnership pattern” of civil society sector develop-
ment, mostly focused on service activities instead of protest and advocacy, 
heavily subsidized by the state, but safely held in check by conservative 
religious or other institutions. This pattern was most pronounced in the 
Northwestern European countries, especially in Germany and the 
Netherlands, but subsequently adopted by other countries now making 
up the EU.
Yet another pattern emerged where the power of both industrial and 
rural elites had been weakened by a rising working class along with small- 
farmer agrarian elements and urban professionals, creating a favorable 
environment for implementing generous governmental social welfare 
provisions. The upshot here was a social-democratic pattern where social 
welfare services are treated as a “right” of all citizens—not a gift bestowed 
by charitable institutions—and are delivered directly by governmental 
institutions subject to popular control by citizens.18 In Europe, this pat-
tern emerged in the Scandinavian countries and Austria.
Still another pattern of civil society development could emerge where 
pre-modern landed elements retain power into the modern era and pro-
long economic stagnation that threatens a country’s sovereignty. To 
counteract this threat, particularly in the face of foreign pressures, mili-
tary leaders, senior civil servants, urban professionals or modernizing 
elites stage a revolutionary takeover of state institutions in order to push 
18 K. H. Sivesind, and P. Selle (2010) “Civil society in the Nordic countries: Between displacement 
and vitality.” In R. Alapuro and H. Stenius (Eds.), Nordic Associations in a European Perspective 
(pp. 89–120). Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
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through programs of rapid industrialization and modernization. To keep 
popular forces at bay and make it possible to channel whatever surplus is 
produced into modernization rather than consumption, such modern-
izing elites often find it necessary to limit personal freedoms and, par-
ticularly, restrict the growth of civil society organizations that could 
challenge governmental dominance and disrupt the rapid modernization 
agenda through demands for greater political voice and better living 
standards. This results in a “Statist pattern” of third sector development 
characterized by a highly constrained civil society sector operating in a 
narrow range of fields deemed critical for national development. One 
consequence of this constraint on third sector organizational develop-
ment is a shifting of social welfare protections from the organizational to 
the informal social sphere. In Europe, this pattern first emerged in 
Russia, Turkey, Spain and Portugal, but after World War II, was forcibly 
exported to Central and Eastern Europe countries on the bayonets of the 
Red Army.
This social origins theory thus does a better job of explaining the 
regional variations in TSE sector dimensions in Europe than do the alter-
native theories. First, it explains why the size of the organizational com-
ponent of the TSE sector in Eastern European countries is markedly 
smaller than that elsewhere in Europe, while the size of direct voluntary 
action is markedly larger (Fig.  3.7). Until the 1990s, the Central and 
Eastern European countries remained tied to the statist pattern under 
which the organizational component of the TSE sector remained firmly 
in strict state control. As the legitimacy of the political regime waned, so 
did the legitimacy of these state-controlled civic organizations. As a con-
sequence, virtually all spontaneous civic activities were conducted in the 
informal sphere of neighborly self-help activities and unorganized social 
movements. Although the economic and political reforms of the 1990s 
and the subsequent EU accession dramatically changed the environment 
in which civic organizations operate, the norms of social behavior that 
favor direct volunteer action over participation in organized civic action 
still linger.
A similar process took place in the Mediterranean countries, many of 
which fell under the statist regime during modernization. However, 
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unlike in Central and Eastern Europe, the statist regimes in the 
Mediterranean countries were democratized much earlier, in 1945  in 
Italy and in the early 1970s in Spain and Portugal. Also, these countries 
joined the EU much earlier than their Eastern European counterparts. 
Consequently, they enjoyed the benefits of a supportive environment for 
civic organizational development for a considerably longer period than 
the CEE countries. They also had partially Church-inspired cooperative 
institutions operating in financial and related spheres that muted the 
dominance of capitalist institutions and fostered broader cooperative and 
mutual ties. Cooperative institutions also emerged in Central and Eastern 
Europe, but with much greater state involvement and control.
The social origins theory also helps us understand the otherwise puz-
zling dominance of expressive over service activities in the third sector of 
the Scandinavian countries, as contrasted with the countries in north-
western Europe (Fig. 3.8). The social origins theory accounts for this dif-
ference by noting that conservative landed and industrial elements 
retained substantial power well into the late-nineteenth century and 
channeled social welfare provisions for workers through safe, religiously 
affiliated nonprofit organizations, producing a characteristic welfare part-
nership pattern with the religious organizations serving as junior partners 
of governments in delivering publicly funded welfare services. In the 
Scandinavian countries, by contrast, landed elites were weakened and a 
robust small-farmer agrarian class took its place and made common cause 
with the emerging working class to push for a social-democratic regime 
in which public welfare services were expanded and delivered predomi-
nantly by the state. Because the welfare state took care of many tasks such 
as child care and elderly care, the families got more time to participate 
and volunteer in the culture, sports and recreation areas, which grew rap-
idly from the 1960s as the welfare state matured and a leisure society 
emerged
The social origins theory also explains why the government share of 
nonprofit revenue is considerably higher in Northern Europe than 
elsewhere in Europe (Fig.  3.9). Northwestern Europe, especially 
Germany and the Netherlands, pioneered the policies of harnessing 
civic organizations into the provision of publicly funded services. 
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Although the original impulses behind these policies were to counter-
act the radicalization of the working class, they proved to be a very 
effective mechanism of public service delivery that combines the secu-
rity of public funding with the responsiveness of relatively small and 
nonbureaucratic civic organizations. As a result, the welfare partner-
ship pattern continued to develop even after the original motivation 
behind it lost its relevance.
To summarize, the social origins theory of third sector development 
thus carries us considerably far down the road toward explaining the 
diverse size, shape, functions and support structure of the TSE sector in 
Europe, and does so considerably better than the alternative explanations 
that have been deployed up to now. What the analysis here shows is that 
while the TSE sector may be a conduit for altruistic sentiments and per-
sonal preferences, the size of the sector and the shape that it takes depend 
heavily on the broader structures of power relationships in society. 
Restoring considerations of power to the center of analysis of the third 
sector thus emerges as a central imperative if we are to understand the 
path that civil society development takes.
This analysis also suggests a significant connection between the growth 
of the TS and the strength of labor movements and their political exten-
sions. This connection is often missed in public perception, as “civil soci-
ety” and “organized labor” are often seen as two separate social institutions 
pursuing wholly disparate, if not mutually antagonistic, goals. But the 
contribution of the labor movement to the development of the civil 
 society sector is significant and takes two different forms. In the first 
place, organized labor has created a wide array of self-help groups and 
clubs serving the needs of the working class. And second, organized 
labor’s demands have often leveraged government policies that create 
favorable conditions for general civil society sector growth.
The social origins theory can not only explain existing developments, 
but also help forecast the future. This can offer valuable insights into pos-
sible outcomes in rapidly changing parts of the world, and it can offer 
useful insights for the design of public policies facilitative of robust third 
sector development. But for these topics, it is necessary to turn to subse-
quent chapters of this book.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Appendix 2: Methodology for Estimating 
the Size of the Third Sector in Europe
Following the conceptual framework developed by the TSI project, the 
TSE sector consists of the following components: nonprofit institutions, 
cooperatives and mutuals, social enterprises and individual human activi-
ties outside organizations. According to this conceptual framework, all 
nonprofit institutions not controlled by government are in in-scope of 
the TSE sector. However only some cooperatives, mutual associations 
and social enterprises meet the TSE sector’s definitional features, that is, 
those that are not controlled by government and are significantly limited 
by law or widely acknowledged custom from distributing any profits they 
earn to members, investors or other stakeholders. This framework also 
limits the individual activities in scope, as those that constitute work 
without pay performed for public benefit rather than for the benefit of 
the volunteers’ households or families. Data sources therefore had to be 
found that would provide a way to draw these operational distinctions. 
The methodology used in this project to estimate the size and related 
characteristics of the TSE sector’s paid and volunteer workforce therefore 
had to estimate each of these components separately and then add these 
estimates together to arrive at the estimate of the size and related charac-
teristics of FTE employment in the entire TSE sector while avoiding 
potential double counting. The discussion below covers the methodology 
and data sources utilized in estimating these various parameters for each 
of these components in turn.
 Nonprofit Institutions (NPIs)
The existing data sources on employment in NPIs include the Johns 
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (JHU/CNP)(Lester 
M.  Salamon, S.  Wojciech Sokolowski and Megan Haddock (2017), 
Explaining Civil Society Development: A Social Origins Approach, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), NPI Satellite Accounts 
compiled by national statistical agencies, and other semi-official data 
sources. The JHU/CNP data cover both paid and volunteer employment 
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in the in-scope NPIs, as defined in chapter two of this book. These data 
sources cover 18 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK) and Norway. For most of these countries, the data reported in 
these sources were “updated” to 2014 by calculating the ratios of NPI 
employment to total employment for the year for which the data were 
originally reported, and then applying these ratios to the 2014 total 
employment in the respective countries (as reported by Eurostat). This 
approach thus assumes, conservatively, that the NPI share of the total 
employment remained more or less constant over time even though the 
limited time-series data reported above suggests that nonprofit employ-
ment is growing more rapidly than overall employment in all the coun-
tries for which such data are available.
For two of these countries, France and Portugal, however, newer, reli-
able data were published in time to be incorporated into this analysis. For 
France, the data come from the Atlas Commente de l’economie Sociale et 
Solidarie 2014, Observatorie National de L’ESS—CNRES. For Portugal, 
the data come from the satellite account for social economy released by 
Statistics Portugal.19
For the remaining 10 EU countries on which no NPI data are avail-
able, a regression-based estimation methodology was used. This method-
ology used a multivariate linear regression model to estimate the NPI 
share of total employment in the EU and non-EU countries on which 
NPI data are already available, and then applying the regression equation 
to countries for which no NPI data exists. Several predictor variables were 
tested, and the following were selected based on the amount of explained 
variance they accounted for in the base countries: (a) per Capita GDP in 
USD; the services share of GVA; and the revenue of NPISH units as a 
share of GDP.20 This model explains 71.5 percent of variance (66 percent 
19 These data were downloaded from: https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_
destaques&DESTAQUESdest_boui=278817467&DESTAQUESmodo=2&xlang=en
20 NPISH stands for Nonprofit Institutions Serving Households. Prior to revisions of the System of 
National Accounts in 2008, NPISH was the only portion of the entire nonprofit sector visible in 
official economic statistics guided by the System of National Accounts. Formally, NPISH covers 
organizations that receive all or most of their income from philanthropy, though some countries 
apply it more broadly.
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adjusted). For the 12 EU and non-EU countries on which NPISH data 
were not available, the missing data were replaced by averages for Eastern 
and Western Europe, respectively.
The regression equation was used to predict the NPI share of total 
employment in 10 countries for which CNP or NPI satellite account 
statistical data on NPIs were not available. In several of these countries, 
adjustments had to be made to the estimated NPI share values to restrict 
its variability to the actually observed ranges in the countries for which 
solid data were available:
For the five countries where the estimated value of the NPI share was 
lower than the lowest observed value in the 18-country data set, the low-
est observed value (for Romania) was used;
For the two countries where the predicted value was higher than the 
highest observed value in the 18-country data set, the highest observed 
value was applied.
This estimation methodology results in a reasonably accurate estimate 
of NPI employment in the 10 countries as a group, but predictions for 
individual countries may be less reliable and should therefore be viewed 
with caution. These 10 countries as a group account for only about 5 
percent of the NPI workforce (paid and volunteers) covered by this study.
Data for predictor variables come from the national accounts aggre-
gates available at the UN Statistics Division website http://data.un.org/
Explorer.aspx?d=SNAAMA
 Cooperatives and Mutual Societies
The data on employment in cooperatives and mutual societies were 
drawn mostly from a report prepared by José Luis Monzón Campos and 
Rafael Chaves Ávila entitled The Social Economy in the European Union, 
Report drawn up for the European Economic and Social Committee by 
the International Centre of Research and Information on the Public, 
Social and Cooperative Economy (CIRIEC, 2012), covering the year 
2010. The report provides paid employment data on all EU member 
countries covering the following separately identified types of organiza-
tions: cooperatives, mutuals and associations. The CIRIEC team updated 
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these data through 2014 and reported the tentative results in a June 2017 
briefing for the European Economic and Social Committee. However, no 
published version of these estimates was available as of the date the pres-
ent publication went to press, and too little documentation of the sources 
of the tentatively released data were available to judge their validity. The 
2010 data published in 2012 were therefore used as the basis for the esti-
mates used here for most countries. Based on a comparison of these two 
data sets, we have confidence that the overall picture presented in this 
report would not have been affected significantly were we to have used 
the tentatively released newer data.
For a variety of reasons, while the CIRIEC data provided a starting 
point for our estimates of the employment and other features of in-scope 
cooperatives and mutuals for most countries, these data had to be adjusted 
to meet the operational criteria for such in-scope entities identified above. 
There were three reasons for this:
• First, because the CIRIEC data took as given the varying legal defini-
tions of cooperatives, mutuals and associations found in the separate 
countries, rather than the operational criteria specified here. As a 
result, it appears to have included substantial numbers of cooperatives 
and mutual, particularly in the financial services field, that operate 
very much like regular for-profit banks and insurance companies and 
are therefore out-of-scope of the TSE sector as defined in Chap. 2 of 
this book;
• Second, little account seems to have been taken of the fact that a sig-
nificant, but still unknown, number of cooperatives are actually NPIs, 
creating significant potential double counting in the estimates
• Finally, the data available to Monzón and Chaves tended to rely on 
practitioner assessments and unverified administrative registration 
records, both of which tend to overestimate the scope of actual employ-
ment in this field.
Fortunately, to deal with these potential problems, we had available 
four more reliable and rigorous sources of data on cooperative and mutual 
employment: data generated by official statistical agencies or high-level 
research institutions in Portugal, France, Poland and Norway. All four of 
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these sources reported cooperative and mutual employment levels that 
fell well below those reported in the CIRIEC data. Not only did this 
provide better estimates of the actual cooperative and mutual employ-
ment in these countries, but also they provided a statistically persuasive 
basis for estimating the “correction factors” needed to bring the CIRIEC 
estimates into better alignment with the criteria we adopted to identify 
the in-scope cooperatives and mutuals. In particular, to eliminate possi-
ble out-of-scope units, we followed a procedure recommended by 
 statisticians at Statistics Portugal, which identified cooperatives and 
mutual societies operating in the financial sector as most likely to be out-
of-scope of the TSE sector as we defined it.21 Using the resulting Portugal 
data and a more detailed breakdown of cooperatives and mutuals avail-
able in a 2014 French Atlas Commente de l’economie Sociale et Solidarie 
(Tableau 16), we were able to generate an empirically verified estimate of 
the average share of the total cooperative and mutual employment 
reported in the CIRIEC report that was likely to fit our definition of in-
scope cooperative and mutual employment in Europe. Similar adjust-
ments became possible in Poland, where statistical sources put the 
estimate of in-scope cooperative and mutual employment far lower than 
the adjustments found to be necessary In Portugal and France.22 To be 
conservative, we applied the average adjustment factor of the CIRIEC 
estimates found to be appropriate in France and Portugal (53.1 percent) 
to the CIRIEC estimates in all other countries except Poland and Norway. 
In the case of Poland, we used the Polish statistical office figures for 
Poland’s estimate. Since Norway is not an EU member country, the data 
for this country were not included in the CIRIEC publication. However, 
an NPI Satellite Account (NPISA) produced by Statistics Norway in 
accord with the United Nations Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the 
System of National Accounts yielded solid data on NPIs in Norway and the 
Norwegian TSI project research team determined that all cooperatives 
and mutuals that are in-scope of the TSE sector in Norway were included 
21 Email communication from Ms. Cristina Ramos, National Accounts Statistician, Statistics 
Portugal, January 20, 2017 and February 6, 2017.
22 Personal communication, Slawomir Nalecz, national account statistician, Government Statistical 
Office, Poland.
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in the NPI Satellite Account (NPISA) released by Statistics Norway, and 
those not covered by the Norwegian NPISA were likely to be out-of- 
scope of our consensus definition.
To avoid double counting of cooperatives that may be treated as NPIs in 
various countries’ statistics, we developed an estimate of this possible over-
lap using data available in the French Atlas Commente de l’economie Sociale 
et Solidarie 2014, Tableau 16. In particular, in consultation with French 
experts, we took as given that cooperatives and mutuals operating in the 
field of social action were likely to be NPIs. Employment in “social action” 
cooperatives and mutuals in France accounts for about 11 percent of total 
in-scope employment in those two types of institutions (after excluding 
employment in the financial cooperatives and mutuals). We applied this 
rate to the estimated in-scope employment in cooperatives and mutuals in 
the remaining countries covered by this book to determine the approxi-
mate shares of cooperative and mutual employment that also qualify as 
NPI employment. In our discussion of the institutional breakdown of the 
TSE sector workforce in Chap. 3, we included this employment in coop-
eratives and mutuals that are also NPIs with the cooperative and mutual 
employment and subtracted it from the estimate of NPI employment.
 Social Enterprises
Very limited reliable data on social enterprises are available at this time. 
The TSI project country assessments suggested that since most of the in- 
scope social enterprises are already included in the NPI or cooperative 
data, it was not generally possible to separate them out for most coun-
tries. The only clearly identifiable social enterprises are those that have 
been registered as such under the special legal categories that some coun-
tries have recently established for such entities. These categories are vari-
ously identified as “Work Integration Social Enterprises” (WISE), 
“sheltered employment establishments” and, in the case of the UK, 
“Community Interest Companies (CIC).” Only nine European countries 
have established such categories, however. In eight of these countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Spain and Sweden), 
employment in WISEs and sheltered employment establishments could 
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be estimated using information provided in country reports of the 
European Commission’s publication A map of social enterprises and their 
eco-systems in Europe (European Union, 2014).23 Estimates of employ-
ment in CICs in the UK were derived by combining data on the number 
of active social enterprise establishments provided in an official business 
register available at http://download.companieshouse.gov.uk/en_output.
html, with data on average employment per establishment available in 
the UK country report included in the European Commission’s Map of 
social enterprises and their eco-systems in Europe. In the remaining coun-
tries, social enterprises operate mostly as NPIs or cooperatives, making it 
highly likely that they are already included in our data, though it was not 
possible to report on them separately. Using the data on these nine coun-
tries, we estimated that social enterprises accounted for roughly 1 percent 
of TSE sector employment in Europe. To get some sense of the potential 
scale of such enterprises in the other countries, we developed two addi-
tional estimates—one assuming that the share that social enterprise 
employment would represent of total TSE employment in these other 
countries would be on a par with the average in the nine countries on 
which solid data were available, and the other assuming that the social 
enterprise share of TSE sector employment in these other countries would 
likely be on a par with that in the country with the lowest such share 
among countries for which data are available. It turned out that using the 
lower estimate would boost the overall share of social enterprise employ-
ment from 1 percent to 1.3 percent, and that the higher share would 
boost it from 1 percent to 2.3 percent—still well within the range of our 
initial 1 percent estimate.
 Direct Volunteering
The data on direct volunteering come from estimates based on national 
TUSs as reported by OECD. Methodological documentation on national 
TUS used for these estimates is in Miranda V. (2011) “Cooking, Caring 
and Volunteering: Unpaid Work Around the World,” OECD Social, 
23 This publication is accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?pager.offset=0&&
langId=en&mode=advancedSubmit&year=0&country=0&type=0&advSearchKey=socentcntryre
pts&orderBy=docOrder.
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Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 116, OECD 
Publishing. doi: 10.1787/5kghrjm8s142-en.
TUS assigns the time respondents spend on various activities during a 
24-hour period and extrapolates those values to the entire population. 
This allows estimation of the total time spent on these activities by the 
entire adult population of a country during the period of one year, and 
converting that time to FTE employment, assuming 1760 hours per FT 
job, though this latter number may actually vary from country to coun-
try. Time spent on “care for non-household members” reported in TUS 
tabulations was used as a proxy for direct volunteering. This probably 
underestimates direct volunteering that does not involve helping other 
households, such as unorganized community work or protest actions.
Eighteen European countries are covered by the TUS data in the 
OECD report. The countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK. However, 
for Poland, an alternative data source (GUS, Volunteering Through 
Organizations And Other Types Of Unpaid Work Outside Own 
Household—2011, Warsaw, 2012) offers a more accurate estimate based 
on the methodology outlined in the ILO Manual on the Measurement of 
Volunteer Work. The value reported in the latter source is about 5 percent 
lower than that estimated from the TUS data for Poland. For the remain-
ing 11 countries covered by this report, the averages calculated separately 
for Western and Eastern Europe, respectively, were used.
The estimation methodology used the average number of minutes per 
adult spent on caring for nonhousehold members reported in the TUS, 
and multiplied that number by 365 days and by the size of the adult 
population (15-65 years of age) in a respective country to estimate the 
total number of hours spent on these activities during one year. That 
number was then converted to FTE workers by dividing it by 1760 hours.
 Estimation of the TSE Sector Size
Employment in each of the institutional components described above (1 
through 4) was summed up for each of the 29 countries covered by this 
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chapter to arrive at the total size of the workforce (paid and volunteers) 
in the TSE sector. The values presented here are conservative estimates of 
that size due to a limited ability to estimate social enterprises and the 
accurate value of employment in cooperatives.
 Estimation of Service and Expressive Shares 
of the Workforce
The core data for estimating the relative shares of service and expressive 
activities of the TSE sector workforce were collected through the Johns 
Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project for 20 European coun-
tries. Unweighted country averages of these shares were calculated to 
estimate the respective shares of the NPI component of the workforce 
engaged in these respective activities in the remaining EU countries. In 
the case of the cooperative, mutual, social enterprise and direct volun-
teering components of the TSE workforce, it was assumed that these 
workers were entirely involved in service activities. Although it is pos-
sible that some direct volunteering involved expressive activities, this 
kind of direct volunteering was not captured by the TUS data that 
asked only about help for other households. Our estimate therefore 
unavoidably likely underestimates the expressive share of the TSE sec-
tor workforce.
 Estimation of TSE Sector Revenue Shares
The core data for estimating the shares of TSE sector revenue coming from 
government payments (grants, contracts and reimbursements), fees (mar-
ket sales, membership dues and investments), and private philanthropy in 
NPI revenues were collected through the Johns Hopkins Comparative 
Nonprofit Sector Project for 20 European countries. Unweighted country 
averages of these shares were calculated to estimate the respective shares of 
NPI revenue for the remaining countries. Since, in the European context, 
government reimbursements for individual services account for most of 
government support to NPIs, and such reimbursements are reported in 
conventional economic statistics as market sales to individuals, our esti-
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mate of government support of TSE sector organizations will diverge from 
estimates provided in conventional economic statistics.
This NPI estimate of revenue shares from these three main sources was 
then supplemented by data for cooperatives, mutuals and social enter-
prises, which assumed that this revenue comes chiefly from fees and 
 market sales. The value of direct volunteering, estimated at the replace-
ment cost, was counted as private philanthropy and factored in propor-
tionally to the direct volunteering share of the TS workforce.
 Summary of Sources of Data on TSE Sector Average 
Annual Employment Changes by Country
Compiled by Karl Henrik Sivesind, Institute for Social Research, Norway
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account for non-profit institutions. Retrieved from https://ssb.no/orgsat
Poland
FTE paid employment 2012: Wilk, R., Knapp, A., & Borysiak, K. (2014). 
Ekonomiczny wymiar działalności badanych organizacji (The economic 
dimension of the activities of the organizations). In K. Goś-Wójcicka (Ed.), Trzeci 
Sektor w Polsce: Stowarzyszenia, fundacje, społeczne podmioty wyznaniowe, 
organizacje samorządu zawodowego, gospodarczego i pracodawców w 2012 r 
(The third sector in Poland: associations, foundations, faith-based charities, 
professional and business associations, employers’ organizations in 2012). 
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FTE volunteering: Volunteering 1995 for the whole third sector p. 328: 
Salamon, L. M., Anheier, H. K., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolowski, S. W., & 
Associates. (1999). Global civil society. Dimensions of the nonprofit sector, 
Volume I. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
table 5.5.9. p. 209, in Nałęcz, S. & Goś-Wójcicka, K. (Eds). (2012). Wolontariat w 
organizacjach i inne formy pracy niezarobkowej poza gospodarstwem 
domowym—2011 (Volunteering thorough organizations and other types of 
unpaid work outside own household—2011). Warsaw: Central Statistical 
Office of Poland.
Sources of funding 2012: table 4(5) Annex tables in Goś-Wójcicka, K. (Ed.) (2014). 
Trzeci sektor w Polsce: Stowarzyszenia, fundacje, społeczne podmioty 
wyznaniowe, organizacje samorządu zawodowego, gospodarczego i 
pracodawców w 2012 r (The third sector in Poland: Associations, foundations, 
faith-based charities, professional and business associations, employers’ 
organizations in 2012)
Thanks to Sławomir Nałęcz for help with sources and calculations.
Portugal
Number of employees 2002: Salamon, L. M., Sokolowski, S. W., & Associates 
(Eds.). (2004). Portugal: Workforce, expenditures, and revenue data (2002). 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies. Retrieved from: 
http://ccss.jhu.edu/wp-content/plugins/download-monitor/download.
php?id=Portugal_Data_2002.pdf
Number of employees and sources of funding 2006: Salamon, L. M., 
Sokolowski, S. W., Haddock, M., & Tice, H. S. (2012). Portugal: Portugal’s 
nonprofit sector in comparative context, 2006. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 




FTE paid employment 2010: Misericórdias, Fundações, Associações e outras OES 
Quadro 1.1—Principais indicadores por grupos de entidades da Economia 
Social (2010)
Welfare share of employment: (Ensino e Investigação, Saúde e Bem-Estar, Ação 
Social) Gráfico 1.2—Emprego remunerado na ES (ETC)
Instituto Nacional de Estatística. (2013). Conta Satélite da Economia Social 
2010. Estatísticas oficiais. Lisboa: Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 
I.P. Retrieved from: https://www.ine.pt/ngt_server/attachfileu.jsp?look_
parentBoui=157544893&att_display=n&att_download=y
Total FTE employment and welfare employment 2010 is missing in the 
ILOSTAT database. Source: Table A.4.17—Full-time equivalent employ-
ment by industry (N.°; annual), Portuguese National Accounts—
ESA2010, base 2011.
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Spain
Number of employees 2008: Monzón, J. L. Las grandes cifras de la economía 
social en España. Ámbito, entidades y cifras clave. Año 2008. Valencia: 
CIRIEC. Cuadro 2.38. Entidades singulares de la economía social. Año 2008; 
Cuadro 2.41. Asociaciones activas: empleados, voluntarios y gastos por 
actividad; Cuadro 2.46. Fundaciones privadas al servicio de los hogares activas 
por actividad principal. Año 2008
Systeme Innovación y Consultoría. (2015). The third sector of social action in 
2015: Impact of the crisis (Executive summary) Madrid: Plataforma de ONG de 
Acción Social/Plataforma Tercer Sector. Retrieved from: http://www.
plataformaong.org/ciudadaniaactiva/tercersector/executive_summary_TSSA_
in_2015_impact_of_t he_crisis.pdf
There is no data on total nonprofit employment in 2013. It is estimated by 
adding the number of non-welfare employees in 2008 to the welfare 
employees from 2013. The assumption is that non-welfare employment has 
been on the same level in real numbers, while the data shows that the 
welfare employment has increased. This means that Spain has had a decrease 
in non-welfare employment from 1995 to 2013 of −0.53 percentage points 
per year, while total NPO employment has increased by 0.11 percentage 
points per year due to documented welfare growth. If growth had been 
estimated by using 2008 data, the decrease in non-welfare employment 
would have been −0.81 and total NPO employment would have decreased by 
−1.17 percentage points per year. This would seem to be a too strong decline 
given the recent growth in welfare employment. In addition, total 
employment has declined in real numbers from 2008 to 2013, which further 
increases the share of the NPO sector. On the welfare field, the NPO 
employment has increased fast while the total employment has grown 
slightly in health and social services from 2008 to 2013.
Volunteering data for 2008 seem to be not comparable (number of volunteers, 
not FTE?).
Volunteering 1995 for the whole third sector p. 166: Salamon, L. M., Anheier, 
H. K., List, R., Toepler, S., Sokolowski, S. W., & Associates. (1999). Global civil 
society. Dimensions of the nonprofit sector, Volume I. Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies.
Sweden
Number of employees 1992: Lundström, T., & Wijkström, F. (1997). The 
nonprofit sector in Sweden. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Number of employees 2000 for NPO welfare: Sveriges officiella statistik. (2009). 
Table 15. Sysselsatta fördelat på verksamheter och kön år 2007, in Finansiärer 
och utförare inom vård, skola och omsorg 2007 (Sveriges Oficiella Statistik, 
Serie Offentlig ekonomi OE 29 SM 0901): Statistiska centralbyrån. Retrieved 
from: http://www.scb.se/Statistik/OE/OE0112/2007A01/OE0112_2007A01_SM_
OE29SM0901.pdf
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Number of employees 2002 for the nonprofit sector: Wijkström, F., & Einarsson, 
T. (2006). Från nationalstat til näringsliv. Det civila samhällets organisasjonsliv 
i förändring (Rapport. Stockholm: Ekonomiska Forskningsinstitutet, 
Handelshögskolan i Stockholm).
FTE volunteering 2005: Olsson, Lars-Erik, Lars Svedberg & Eva Jeppson 
Grassman (2006), Medborgarnas insatser och engagemang i civilsamhället—
några grundläggande uppgifter från en ny befolkningsstudie. 
Arbetsrapportserie nr 39. Sköndal: Sköndalsinstitutet.
Number of employees 2013 for the nonprofit sector: Statistics Sweden. (2015). 
Tabell 13. Sektorindelad statistik över det civila samhället, 2013. The Civil 
Society 2013—Satellite accounts and surveys. Örebro: Statistics Sweden. 
Retrieved from: http://www.scb.se/Statistik/_Publikationer/NV0117_2013A01_
BR_X105BR1501.pdf
Number of employees 2013 for the nonprofit welfare services: Sveriges 
officiella statistik. (2015). Table 13: Employment within education, health care 
and social services 2000, 2008–2013. Finansiärer och utförare inom vård, skola 
och omsorg 2013: Statistiska centralbyrån. Retrieved from: http://www.scb.se/
Statistik/OE/OE0112/2013A01/OE0112_2013A01_SM_OE29SM1501.pdf
Sources of funding for the nonprofit sector 2007: Sveriges officiella statistik. 
(2009). Table 1-3 in Finansiärer och utförare inom vård, skola och omsorg 
2007: Statistiska centralbyrån. Retrieved from: http://www.scb.se/sv_/Hitta-
statistik/Publiceringskalender/Visa-detaljerad-information/?W=serie&publobji
d=11229There is only information about income for market producing 
nonprofit units.
Sources of funding for the nonprofit sector 2013: Statistics Sweden. (2015). 
Tabell 10. Transfereringsinkomster per verksamhet enligt ICNPO, 2013 in The 




FTE employment and sources of funding for 2005: Helmig, B., Gmür, M., 
Bärlocher, C., von Schnurbein, G., Degen, B., Nollert, M., Salamon, L. M. 
(2011). The Swiss Civil Society sector in a comparative perspective (VMI 
Research Series Volume 6). Fribourg: Institute for Research on Management 
of Associations, Foundations and Cooperatives (VMI), University of Fribourg. 
Retrieved from: http://www.vmi.ch/de/165-vmi_forschungsreihe.html
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The Roles and Impacts of the Third 
Sector in Europe
Bernard Enjolras and Karl Henrik Sivesind
The development of social enterprises, social investment, social finance 
and new philanthropy (Salamon 2014a, b; Nicholls et al. 2010) has trig-
gered an increasing focus on the measurement of the social value and 
social impact of the programs, operations and organizations of the third 
sector. Funders and policymakers want to know whether their funds and 
policies make a difference, and TSOs have been increasingly eager to be 
in a position to respond to these demands. More than that, as a distinc-
tive set of organizations and behaviors, the third sector is regularly called 
upon to demonstrate that it generates social value that is distinctive, both 
in kind and quantity, from the other social sectors. In addition, since, in 
contrast to the corporation sector whose value is measured by market 
prices, the third sector lacks an automatic mechanism to document the 
benefits it generates, an array of valuation tools and measuring devices 
has had to be developed to accomplish this task.
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Most of the scholarly literature relative to the roles and functions of 
TSOs is related to the evaluation of impact at the organizational level, and 
is primarily concerned with the service function of TSOs. By  contrast, sys-
tematic evidences of the impact of the third sector at the macro level and in 
relation to the sector’s supposedly distinctive functions are lacking.
In this chapter, we seek to fill this gap, to shift the focus of impact assess-
ment from the organizational level to the macro-sectoral level, to the third 
sector as a whole, asking, “What difference does the third sector make for 
society?” In doing so, moreover, we focus our attention not on the service 
functions of the sector but on certain distinctive functions of TSOs and vol-
unteering compared to government, corporations and households. Included 
here are: the third sector’s expressive role, allowing individuals and groups to 
freely express their values, interests and concerns in artistic, religious, cultural, 
ethnic, social, recreational and occupational areas; value guardian role, pro-
moting freedom of speech, civil liberties or debates about norms and values 
as society changes; and advocacy role, providing links to the policymaking 
process for individuals, neighborhoods and different kinds of private inter-
ests. This civil society role is an essential part of a democratic society ruled by 
law because the legitimacy of political power relies on public discussions, 
hearings and consultations with affected groups. The TSE sector includes, 
among other things, voluntary associations and civic and advocacy organiza-
tions that have the potential for bridging multiple levels of governance. Given 
an open political culture, it represents an essential democratic infrastructure.
Measuring such impact is challenging, however. To find out if there is 
an impact of the third sector on society, we must answer the question, 
“What would have happened without the activity of third sector enti-
ties?” Many social scientific approaches can be used for this kind of 
counter- factual analysis, such as comparing changes over time before or 
after the third sector activity, comparing groups or countries that have 
experienced a certain third sector activity with those that have not, or 
using statistical methods that make it possible to control for the most 
important factors other than the third sector activity. It is particularly 
important to control for the effect of self-selection. People who volunteer 
for TSOs may already have characteristics that are assumed to be the 
result of their third sector involvement, such as a high level of civic 
engagement and sense of well-being. What is more, it is often difficult to 
differentiate between cause and effect. Countries that allow free expres-
B. Enjolras and K. H. Sivesind
 97
sion may be more conducive to the presence of TSOs. If that is so, it 
would be a mistake to attribute the openness to free expression to the 
third sector’s presence.
Untangling these relationships and assessing the available information 
in light of them is the objective of this chapter. To do so, the chapter 
proceeds as follows. The first section starts by defining what different 
roles the third sector may play in society, and what indicators can poten-
tially be used to tell if this activity results in impacts on other parts of 
society. In the second section, we look at some existing efforts to measure 
certain types of TSIs and assess what they can tell us about the actual 
impact that the third sector has. A third section then examines under 
what circumstances such impacts may be produced and what prevents 
them from emerging. Finally, we try to sum up what can be concluded 
from these various studies and assessments about the socioeconomic 
impact of the European third sector.
1  Impact Areas
The TSE sector has some characteristics that make it different from other 
parts of society consisting of corporations, the government and house-
holds. Based on these characteristics and the way TSOs are supposed to 
behave, we can state some hypotheses about the expected impact of these 
organizations and of the sector as a whole.
TSOs may be seen as fulfilling four functions or roles: economic, social, 
political and communicative. For each of these functions, it is 
also  possible to differentiate the “mainstream” contribution of these 
organizations—that is, what TSO have in common with governmental 
and for-profit organizations—from their specific contribution—that is, 
Third sector impact means, within the context of this chapter, 
direct or indirect, medium- to long-term consequences of the dis-
tinctive features of volunteering or of the third sector organizations 
on individuals or on the community, ranging from neighborhoods 
to society in general.
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the functional features that are especially characteristic or even exclusive 
to these organizations.
From an economic viewpoint, TSOs provide both goods and services, 
but also organize expressive activities in the domains of sport, culture, 
arts and so on. They mobilize voluntary resources—voluntary work and 
donations—that are more difficult to mobilize, if not impossible, for 
other organizational forms. Additionally, they are most often oriented 
toward other ends than economic ends, even if in the pursuit of these 
ends they develop economic activities. From the political and communi-
cative1 perspectives, TSOs have the potential to constitute a counter-
power to the state and economic powers, to act as schools of democracy 
and also constitute a communicative space where value contention is 
made possible. Being a space of associational life, TSOs have the capac-
ity to promote and sustain norms and values of public interests and 
practices of civic engagement. They also have the potential to organize 
different types of identities and interests and to play a mediating and 
representative role in interacting with other societal spheres such as the 
state, the market or the family, influencing policies and attitudes. Being 
a communicative space, they have the capacity to enable debates, con-
frontations and contentions among individuals and organized actors 
animated by different values, interests and identities. By the play of 
these political and communicative functions, they contribute to the 
democratic infrastructure and might instigate social, axiological (value-
based) and political transformations impacting other societal spheres. 
From the social point of view, TSOs constitute a space of value pluralism 
and freedom and contribute to the maintenance of norms and values. 
From this viewpoint, the third sector is fundamental for enhancing and 
protecting the diversity of particular values, cultural practices and citi-
zens’ initiatives in all domains of social life. TSOs are also instrumental 
to the maintenance of norms and value that are more universal, such as 
those of solidarity, inclusion, trust and public interest. For this reason, 
they potentially have the capacity to contribute to the social integration 
of individuals and groups and to foster solidarity across differences.
1 Insofar as third sector organizations are both constitutive and actors of the public sphere. The 
public sphere can be defined as comprising the institutional communicative spaces that facilitate 
public discussion and the formation of public opinion (see: Habermas 1989).
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For each of the roles played by TSOs, it is possible to infer a set of 
expected impacts at the individual, organizational, community and 
societal levels. Some of these impacts are likely to be distinctive (idio-
syncratic) to TSOs, whereas other impacts can be common to those 
of other types of social actors. For example, if there were no TSE orga-
nizations with paid employment in social services funded by the gov-
ernment—such as institutions for elderly care—there probably would 
be public and for-profit providers performing those services. This is 
not to say that the social impacts of for-profit or government organiza-
tions providing the same services would be identical to those resulting 
from third sector provision, as TSOs, because of their distinctive fea-
tures, innovate services in numerous fields, serve a more needy clien-
tele, deliver services at a more human scale, stay in the game when 
government funding declines and so on. Hence, it is possible to dif-
ferentiate the “mainstream” contributions of these organizations—that 
is, what TSOs have in common with governmental and for-profit 
organizations—from their distinctive contributions—that is, the 
functional features that are more characteristic, if not exclusive, to 
these organizations.
Based on reviews of previous research, these functions and roles can 
be translated into five domains of impact (Simsa et al. 2014; Enjolras 
2015a, b):
• Well-being and quality of life
• Innovation
• Civic engagement, empowerment, advocacy and community building
• Economic impacts
• Human resources impacts
In the following section we will present some evidence of TSI based on 
analyses and reviews of research conducted by this project (on the basis of 
available data) related to the impact domains outlined above: civic 
engagement and advocacy; wellbeing and quality of life; human resources; 
and social innovation. However, as already stated, there are methodologi-
cal problems related to previous research on impacts, and we address as 
far as possible these issues in our subsequent analysis.
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2  Selected Evidence of TSIs
2.1  Some Methodological Challenges
A review of the literature on TSIs on human resources and community by 
Kamerāde (2015) reveals the complexity of assessing the impact of the 
third sector at different levels. Indeed, impacts can be, first, assessed in 
terms of the consequences of voluntary participation for individuals 
involved in TSOs. The same literature review (Kamerāde 2015) con-
cludes that evidence from a range of studies in different disciplinary fields 
suggests that the third sector makes an important impact; however, this 
impact is not equally accessible or widespread. The presence of TSOs is 
not an easy or straightforward solution for inequalities in participation 
and representation, or social integration problems, as their effects again 
vary between different social groups and types of organizations. This lit-
erature review highlights the unequal distribution of positive effects on 
individuals of participation in TSOs. More specifically, individuals who 
already have better wellbeing and health, and higher social trust, are more 
likely to be involved in the third sector, which, in turn, contributes to 
better health and wellbeing. In addition, individuals and groups who 
have fewer resources or who are already less advantaged in society are less 
likely to become involved in voluntary associations to promote their 
interests, satisfy their needs or make changes in policy favorable to them. 
Moreover, the effects of voluntary participation are gendered and can 
vary by age, employment status, income, type of association and type of 
involvement. In some cases, for particular groups, involvement in volun-
tary associations can have negative consequences.
This review points toward a major methodological issue plaguing TSI 
studies: many studies rely almost exclusively on analyses of cross-sec-
tional data where volunteering and its hypothesized impact have been 
measured simultaneously. Although these studies provide valuable 
empirical evidence that is an important link in a chain of causal reason-
ing, in many of these studies, the causal relationships often have been 
assumed rather than demonstrated—in important part, because of the 
absence of data enabling the use of adequate methods for demonstrating 
the causal relationships.
B. Enjolras and K. H. Sivesind
 101
Furthermore, most of the studies on TSI have been conducted in a 
selected number of European countries, mainly in the UK, Netherlands, 
Germany, Norway, Belgium and the Czech Republic. Taking into account 
that the functions and extent of third sector involvement vary by social 
and institutional context, this raises the question of how far the impact 
findings from these institutional settings can be generalized across Europe 
and to other cultural and institutional contexts.
In spite of those methodological shortcomings, several studies of 
impact at both the individual and societal levels undertaken within the 
TSI project (based on available existing data) and outside it display mixed 
evidence about the impact of the third sector.
2.2  Impact on Civic Engagement, Empowerment, 
Advocacy and Community Building
Third sector organizations have long been viewed as arenas for civic and 
political participation and as schools for democracy (Almond and Verba 
1963; Tocqueville 2000 [1835]). Closely related to this line of thinking 
is the emphasis recently placed on the third sector as a major contributor 
to social capital, to those bonds of trust and reciprocity without which 
neither democracy nor markets can operate (Putnam 1993, 2000). 
Howard and Gilbert (2008), for example, find empirical support for the 
Tocquevillian argument, according to which those persons with greater 
levels of involvement in voluntary organizations also engage in more 
political acts, have higher life satisfaction and are more trusting of others 
than those who do not. TSOs also are thought to play a central political 
role by channeling, articulating and advocating individuals’ and groups’ 
interests and values (Habermas 1998) and by participating in policy net-
works (Rhodes 1997) or advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1998).
Political engagement and trust. As shown by Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, at the 
national macro-level, cross- national comparisons consistently display a 
correlation between indicators of social capital and of political engage-
ment, on the one hand, and the size of the third sector, on the other 
hand. The Nordic countries and Northern European countries are char-
acterized by high levels of social trust and political engagement, while 
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Eastern European countries display the lowest levels of trust and political 
engagement and the Southern European countries falling in between 
these two. High scores on these indicators coincide with vibrant civil 
societies, absence of corruption, strong trust in institutions, high scores 
on all indices of economic and gender equality and a culture of adherence 
to laws and regulations alongside a critical attitude toward politicians and 
excessive state power.
Robert Putnam’s empirical work on Italy suggests that a vibrant civil 
society sector causes elevated levels of trust in a society (Putnam 1993). 
But to what extent is the result replicated in other countries?
Interestingly, research at the individual level investigating whether 
individuals who participate as volunteers in TSOs have higher levels of 
social trust and political engagement than those who do not volunteer 
has shown that, when corrected for potential self-selection effects, there 
is little evidence of such an effect, at least so far as the level of social trust 
Fig. 4.1 Political engagement by relative size of third sector workforce (20 EU 
countries)
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is concerned (Claibourn and Martin 2000; Freitag 2003; Enjolras 2015a, 
b). At the very least, there is little uniformity in this relationship among 
nations.
Instead of the third sector, other studies attribute high levels of trust to 
the role played by the welfare state and redistribution. While some 
authors emphasize lack of social inequality (Bjørnskov 2006; Delhey and 
Newton 2005; Uslaner 2003), others view institutions of the (welfare) 
state or the rule of law as the crucial force fostering generalized trust in 
society (Rothstein 2001). Rothstein and Stolle (2008) have, for example, 
argued that the welfare state has a particular role in generating trust by 
sustaining values such as impartiality, equality before the law, respect for 
human rights, equality of opportunity and efficiency. According to these 
authors, it is the quality of policy implementation and service delivery by 
the welfare state that has the strongest bearing on generating trust among 
citizens. On this account, the role of the third sector in enhancing trust 
is secondary in comparison to the role of the state.
Fig. 4.2 Social trust by the relative size of the third sector workforce (20 EU 
countries)
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A third explanation of the results portrayed in Figs. 4.1 and 4.2, and 
one favored here, emphasizes the societal externalities created by dense 
networks of TSOs, producing impacts that extend beyond the members 
and volunteers of the individual TSOs, through the production of non-
excludable benefits and resources to broader groups of people. In other 
words, at the societal (macro) level, participation in TSOs is associated 
with a set of “emergent” properties (Kawashi and Berkman 2014) that 
are inherent in the social structure and networks generated by the exis-
tence of dense networks of TSOs. In other words, this means that, at the 
societal level, a high density of TSOs enhances a structure of social inter-
actions that is qualitatively different from the one enhanced by a low 
density of TSOs. Three macro-level mechanisms may help to explain 
such effects: (1) social contagion, (2) informal social control and (3) col-
lective efficacy.
Social contagion refers to the fact that behaviors spread more quickly 
through a tightly knit social network. Behaviors can spread in a network 
through the diffusion of information or through the transmission of 
behavioral norms. The social networks constituted by a dense third sector 
are expected to enhance norms and behaviors that are central to TSOs 
and volunteering, such as trust and civic and political engagement.
Informal social control refers to the ability of individuals in a commu-
nity to maintain social order, that is, to step in and intervene when they 
witness deviant behavior by others. The likelihood of informal policing 
increases with the degree of cohesion of the community, that is, the 
degree to which its members are socially connected to each other. A high 
density of TSOs is expected to entail more cohesive social networks and, 
consequently, a higher likelihood for informal social control, impacting 
on trust, health-related behavior and civic behaviors.
Collective efficacy is the group-level analog of the concept of self- 
efficacy, that is, it refers to the ability of a collective to mobilize to under-
take collective action. When individuals are connected to each other 
through TSOs, mobilizing is made easier and free riding more difficult 
inasmuch as it risks damage to one’s reputation as well as provokes social 
sanctions (i.e. ostracism). Additionally, individuals who are not members 
of a TSO but are connected through social networks to its members will 
be able to draw upon the organizational infrastructure and capacity 
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already established by the organization. Collective efficacy may be a sig-
nificant factor influencing political engagement (Bandura 2000).
The density of the third sector at the societal level, measured by the 
third sector workforce (both volunteers and paid workers) is seen as gen-
erating macro-level socioeconomic impacts, by the play of emergent 
properties, according to the explanatory model displayed in Fig. 4.3.
A way to identify a potential socioeconomic impact, mediated by emer-
gent properties, of the third sector at the macro level consists in assessing 
whether the size of the third sector, measured in terms of its workforce’s 
share in the total workforce of the country, is positively associated with the 
aggregated indicators of social trust and political engagement, when con-
trolling for other aggregated measures that can influence these indicators, 
such as the GDP per capita, the level of inequalities measured by the 
GINI index, the level of social expenditures in the  country and the 
employment rate in the country. The results of the linear regressions of the 
indicators of trust and political engagement in relation to the size of the 
voluntary sector (share of the third sector’ workforce in the total work-
force) and the other control variables are presented in Table 4.1.
The empirical analysis investigates whether the size of the third sector 
approximated by the share of the third sector workforce (including paid and 
volunteer work) in the total workforce of the country is associated with social 
trust, self-reported health, happiness and political engagement. The analyses 
are based on data for 20 countries (European Union countries : Belgium, 
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Fig. 4.3 Macro impact explanatory model
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Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, the UK and non-European Union country: Norway).
For each country, the dependent variables are the means of self-reported 
indices of health, subjective well-being political engagement and social 
trust. The means are calculated using the European Social Survey data 
(European Social Survey, 2012) consisting of a representative sample of 
the population including all persons aged 15 and over resident within 
private households, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, language 
or legal status. The data relative to the independent variables have two 
origins. The data concerning the third sector’s share of the total workforce 
are provided by Salamon and Sokolowski (2016), whereas the other 
macro indicators were extracted from the OECD (2012) database.
For each dependent variable (social trust and political engagement), 
two models are displayed: model 1 shows the association of the dependent 
variable with a set of independent variables (employment rate, GDP per 
capita, Gini index as indicator for inequalities, and social expenditures) 
excluding the third sector share of the workforce, whereas model 2 
includes this last variable. Introducing the third sector share of the work-
force improves the goodness of fit of the model (R-squared) and shows the 
contribution of the third sector to social trust and political engagement.
The size of the third sector is heavily positively associated with the level 
of social trust. Social trust is also negatively associated with the degree of 
inequalities (GINI index). Even if a simple linear regression is not suffi-
cient for inferring a causal relation between third sector size and social 
Table 4.1 Linear regression of social trust index, political engagement index, self-
reported well-being and self- reported health by country
Social trust Political Engagement
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Employment rate .127*** .125*** .008*** .009***
GDP per Capita .000*** .000*** .000*** .000***
Gini Index −3.766*** −3.941*** 1.564*** 1.570***
Social Expenditures .116*** .105*** .032*** .035***
TS share of Workforce – 7.590*** – −2.046***
Constant 2.727*** 2.681*** −1.203*** −1.187***
R-squared .480 .489 .721 .747
Change in R-squared – .009 – .026
*p>0.10, **p>=0.05, ***p>0.001
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trust, and if the possibility of reverse causation cannot not be excluded, the 
data supports our explanatory model when it comes to social trust, in spite 
of a contribution to R-squared being weak. At the same time, the added 
explanatory power attributable to the third sector is quite small, suggesting 
that the other factors in the model carry most of the explanatory power.
The size of the voluntary sector is negatively associated with the level 
of political engagement, and political engagement seems to increase when 
the level of inequality is higher. This reflects the fact that, with the excep-
tion of Sweden, the countries with the highest levels of political engage-
ment are not the ones having the biggest third sector.
The potential macro socioeconomic impact of the degree of develop-
ment of the third sector in different European countries has been concep-
tualized as the result of emergent macro-level properties linked to the 
social structure (social networks) generated by TSOs and their activities. 
From this viewpoint, the more developed the third sector, the greater are 
its emergent properties at the macro level and the higher its impact. 
While at the individual level (Enjolras 2015a, b), when correcting for 
potential selection effects, there is no evidence that active volunteering in 
TSOs has a positive impact on individual social trust, a simple test of this 
impact model at the aggregated level—looking at the associations between 
the size of the third sector in 20 European countries and social trust and 
political engagement—shows some support for the existence of an impact 
of the size of the third sector on social trust.
2.3  Impact on Well-being and Quality of Life
A second range of potential impacts of the third sector relate to citizen 
well-being and quality of life. TSOs have long been associated with the 
provision of human services that contribute to wellbeing and the quality 
of life. In fact, this role of the sector is a principal focus of what has long 
been the dominant economic theory of the third sector, which views the 
existence of this sector as resulting from a demand for services that neither 
the market nor government can provide due to inherent failures of these 
alternative institutions—that is, the “free rider” problem in the case of 
markets and the need for majority support in the case of governments 
(Hansmann 1980; Weisbrod 1977). The Stiglitz report emphasized the 
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need to “shift emphasis from measuring economic production to measur-
ing people’s wellbeing,” (Stiglitz et al. 2009). But well-being involves more 
than concrete services. It also includes subjective factors, such as feelings 
of security, sense of well-being, confidence and a sense of belonging 
(Cummins 2000), all of which have also been associated with TSOs.
As shown in Figs. 4.4 and 4.5, at the societal level, cross-national com-
parisons consistently display a correlation between indicators of health 
and wellbeing, on the one hand, and the size of the third sector, on the 
other hand.2
As we did with the socioeconomic indicators of trust and political 
engagement, we can identify the socioeconomic impact of the third sec-
2 The analyses are based on European Social Survey (2012) data for 20 countries. The self-reported 
health indicator is based on the questions: “How is your health in general?”— “very good, good, 
fair, not very good, poor.” The subjective well-being indicator used in the analyses is a measure of 
people’s evaluations of their lives as a whole, elicited by a widely used generalized single-item ques-
tion: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” on a scale 
from 1 being completely dissatisfied to 10 being completely satisfied.
Fig. 4.4 Self-reported health by relative size of third sector workforce (20 EU 
countries)
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tor at the macro level by assessing whether the size of the third sector 
(measured in terms of its workforce’s share in the total workforce of the 
country) is positively associated with the aggregated indicators of health 
and wellbeing. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.2.
Fig. 4.5 Self-reported wellbeing by third sector workforce (20 EU countries)
Table 4.2 Linear regression of self-reported well-being and self-reported health 
by country
Well-being Health
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Employment rate .043*** .0442*** .000*** .000***
GDP per Capita .000*** .000*** .000*** −1.56e–06***
Gini Index −2.315*** −2.367*** −1.669*** −1.654***
Social Expenditures -.000*** .004*** .004*** .003***
TS share of Workforce – −2.812*** – .841***
Constant 5.028*** 5.064*** .995*** .984***
R-squared .464 .481 .450 .516
Change in R-squared – .017 – .066
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The size of the voluntary sector is negatively associated with the level 
of self-reported well-being after controlling for the other variables that 
might affect well-being. In addition, levels of well-being decrease with 
inequalities. At the aggregated level, the size of the third sector is posi-
tively associated with self-reported health, though the added explanatory 
power of this variable is highly limited compared to the other factors 
identified. In both models, however, the contribution of the third sector 
share of the workforce (measured by the change in R-squared) is rela-
tively weak, meaning that the explanatory power is being carried mostly 
by the other variables. Here, too, the macro socioeconomic impact of the 
third sector on population health in different European countries can be 
understood as the result of emergent macro-level properties linked to the 
social structure (social networks) generated by TSOs and their activities.
2.4  Impact on Human Resources
Another important perspective on the impacts of the third sector relate to 
the impacts these organizations have not on the society at large but on 
those who work in TSOs. This set of impacts has been emphasized most 
explicitly by students of volunteering, but it also applies to paid personnel. 
Thus, for example, Rochester et al. (2010) emphasize the benefits accruing 
to volunteers in terms of increased satisfaction, personal achievement, 
social networks and relations, skills, personal development, enhanced 
employability, improved mental and physical health and wellbeing. 
Similarly, Wilson (2000) identifies four areas where research has pointed 
to the positive consequences of volunteer work for the volunteer: citizen-
ship (volunteers are more politically active and trusting than nonvolun-
teers), antisocial behavior (being a volunteer keeps young people out of 
trouble), health and well-being (volunteers enjoy better health in old age, 
have better self-esteem and self-confidence and higher levels of life satis-
faction) and socioeconomic achievement. Additionally, TSOs offer a space 
for work integration for individuals excluded from the labor market and 
provide job experience to young people, to individuals with disability and 
to the long-term unemployed. Different works have also emphasized the 
positive impacts accruing to paid staff in TSOs, including higher job sat-
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isfaction because of the higher “pro-social” motivations (Benz 2005; 
Borzaga and Tortia 2006; Rose-Ackerman 1996) or greater fairness (Leete 
2000; Tortia 2008). The literature suggests that people who volunteer 
enjoy good health (Moen et al. 1993; Musick et al. 1999; Oman et al. 
1999; Post, 2005; Brooks 2006). They are also more likely to report being 
happy and are less likely to suffer from depression (Musick and Wilson 
2003; Thoits and Hewitt 2001; Wheeler et  al. 1998; Whiteley 2004; 
Borgonovi 2008). There is also evidence that volunteering positively influ-
ences political participation and engagement (Armingeon, 2007).
However, most of the evidence of the positive contribution of volun-
teering for the volunteers is based on established correlations between 
volunteering and measures of individual health, well-being or civic 
engagement. While these correlations are well established, they may be a 
result of selection bias.
Individuals who already have a greater sense of well-being and better 
health, higher social trust or levels of political engagement are more likely 
to be involved in the third sector and are more likely to answer questions 
about their health and well-being. The positive correlation between 
 volunteering and self-reported health, subjective wellbeing and political 
participation may therefore be spurious
To address this issue, a study from the Third Sector Impact Project 
(Enjolras 2015a, b) uses different matching estimation methods (Caliendo 
and Kopeinig 2008; Guo and Fraser 2015) in order to eliminate the effect 
of self-selection by constructing a control group that is as similar as pos-
sible to the treatment group of interest with respect to observable charac-
teristics. This is done by creating matching estimators by modeling the 
probability of participating in the treatment given the observed charac-
teristics of the participants in the “treatment group.” Volunteers are then 
matched on the basis of this probability to nonvolunteers in order to 
compare a “treatment group” (the participants) to a “control group” (the 
nonparticipants), ensuring that the members of both groups have the 
same socioeconomic characteristics (based on the variables used to esti-
mate the probability of participation in those groups). The average treat-
ment effect is then the mean difference in outcomes across these two 
groups. The results, based on the European Social Survey data for 23 
European countries, show that volunteering has a minimal impact on 
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self-reported health, no impact on self-reported wellbeing, but a signifi-
cant impact on political engagement (Enjolras 2015a, b).
Another study from the Third Sector Impact Project (Kamerāde and 
Bennett 2015) focuses on voluntary work during unemployment. It 
investigates whether volunteering can compensate for the loss in manifest 
and latent benefits associated with paid work and thus improve unem-
ployed individuals’ well-being and mental health. Drawing on data from 
29 European countries, and using matching estimators, this study con-
cludes that the impact of volunteering on unemployed individuals’ well- 
being and mental health depends on generous welfare benefits. The 
positive effects of volunteering during unemployment are not uncondi-
tional. Theuy obtain when some environmental conditions relative to the 
level income of unemployed volunnteers are met. In other words, volun-
teering may improve well-being and health if basic needs are met, but 
does not compensate for the lack of satisfaction of these basic needs.
The two surveyed analyses show that neither for people in general, nor 
for more marginalized groups like unemployed individuals, volunteering 
by itself does not significantly improve health and well-being when 
 measured at the individual level. However, we do not presently know 
enough about the potential benefits of volunteering for different groups 
in the population, and the effect may vary with the type of organization, 
the tasks performed, the number of hours volunteered and the frequency 
of volunteering. Only a few community studies make it possible to ana-
lyze some of these variables.
2.5  Impact on Social Innovation
While the economic theories assign a primary role to the state and the 
market and view the third sector as merely a supplement to these other 
two sectors, filling in services that the other two sectors fail to supply, a 
second body of literature views the third sector as a source of pioneering 
social innovations that government and the market subsequently copy or 
support. This view has been conceptually articulated most fully in the 
notion of “interdependence” between the government and the third sec-
tor. Because of the transaction costs involved in mobilizing governments 
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to act and the free rider problems that keep market actors from respond-
ing to many social and economic problems, it is TSOs that frequently 
come forward to identify unattended problems and devise innovative 
solutions to them (Salamon 1987, 1996). Social economy literature has 
also stressed this role of third sector entities, in their case, mutuals, coop-
eratives and social enterprises, as significant sources of social innovation 
and social change, contributing to labor market integration, fighting 
social exclusion and poverty, creating social capital and developing new 
services and ways to address unmet social need (Chaves and Monzón 
2012; J. Defourny and Develtere 1999; Julià and Chaves 2012; Nicholls 
2004). TSOs are spaces of freedom and unforced activities where volun-
teers and professionals in partnership with other stakeholders are in posi-
tion to respond creatively to new challenges, to develop new forms of 
organization and interactions and to respond to social demands that are 
traditionally not addressed by the market or existing institutions. Indeed, 
TSOs are in a position to generate both types of social innovations that 
Greffe (2003) identifies—macro-social innovations such as new forms of 
social organization or networked approaches to addressing public 
 problems, as well as micro-social innovations such as new services that the 
market does not supply, as well as attention to economic or social values 
that market production fails to advantage (such as social integration, 
wellbeing, sustainable development).
The potential contribution of third sector and volunteering to social 
innovations can be seen on different levels. At the micro level, they can be 
an important element affecting the socioeconomic development of soci-
eties by helping individuals in need, enhancing their capabilities and pro-
moting well-being. Changing the form of governance, as well as the 
development of local communities, can be distinctive impacts of third 
sector social innovations on the meso-level. Social innovations at the 
macro level can involve transforming the ways in which society thinks 
and acts. Building new social relations can also be a main component of 
the macro-level impact of third sector social innovations. However, evi-
dence demonstrating the TSI on social innovation remains quite limited 
(Bežovan 2016). Fortunately, some further research supported by the 
FP7 project is actively exploring this topic.3
3 Such as EFESEIIS (http://www.fp7-efeseiis.eu) and ITSSOIN (http://itssoin.eu)
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3  Can the TSE Sector Expand Civil Liberties 
and the Public Sphere?
The socioeconomic impacts of TSOs are contingent on the political and 
institutional context in which the third sector is embedded. Path depen-
dency and social origins theories address both the nature of the civil soci-
ety regime in which these organizations operate and the institutional space 
of freedom that the state grants to these organizations. Both the type of 
civil society regime and the space of freedom are determined by the state 
of identifiable power relationships among key social groupings during 
turning points in the historical evolution of societies (Salamon et al. 
2017). These appear as crucial factors influencing the type and degree of 
impact that the TSE sector can make on society.
This chapter started by defining some areas where potential impacts of 
the TSE sector may be observed. Some of the most important impacts are 
related to the civil society role of TSOs in linking citizens and the 
 policymaking processes; this role is among the most distinctive roles of 
the TSE sector that cannot be substituted by the other sectors of soci-
ety—corporations, government or households. However, it is also very 
difficult to measure this kind of impact. The best option is to observe 
changes in the civil society role over time and what effects this may have 
on democracy and civil liberties over time, or, even better, to compare the 
development in countries with some important common historical char-
acteristics to see what policies and structures may inhibit or promote the 
civil society role of the TSE sector.
A third sector impact project’s study of civil liberties and volunteering 
in six former Soviet bloc countries examines whether volunteering is an 
outcome of democratization rather than a driver of it. It analyzes how 
divergent democratization pathways in six countries of the former Soviet 
Union have led to varied levels of volunteering, using data from the 
European Values Study.
The results show that Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—which followed 
a path toward EU accession—have high and increasing levels of civil lib-
erties and volunteering. In Russia and Belarus, following another path, 
civil liberties have remained low and volunteering has declined. 
Surprisingly, despite the Orange Revolution and increased civil liberties, 
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volunteering rates in Ukraine have also declined. The case of Ukraine 
indicates that the freedom to participate is not always taken up by citi-
zens. The findings suggest it is not volunteering that brings civil liberties, 
but rather that increased civil liberties lead to higher levels of volunteer-
ing (Kamerāde et al. 2016), a finding that is consistent with the social 
origins theory contention that patterns of power shape the space for civil 
society development and hence the scope and scale of civil society orga-
nization development (Salamon et al. 2017).
Another historical and comparative study examines the role and impact 
of the third sector in the transformative processes of post-socialist coun-
tries by comparing Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Croatia, showing 
different paths for the third sector depending on the role played by the 
state (Bežovan 2016).
From the very beginning, civil society initiatives played an important 
role in the changes that occurred in post-socialist countries like the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia and Croatia. They were, in different ways, initiators of 
changes in the late 1980s and an active part of the new overall agenda on 
development in the 1990s and onwards.
It is interesting to compare these countries because there are important 
similarities in their historic background. Before World War I, they were all 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was relatively liberal regard-
ing the expression of the major nationalities and languages. This also 
meant that there was a high level of popular participation in the cultural 
sphere in these countries. During the communist era, civil liberties were 
repressed and there were confrontations between civil society in different 
forms and the authoritarian regime. Dissidents, often with support from 
the west, focused on promoting human rights and political pluralism. A 
multi-party system and parliamentarian democracy were almost synony-
mous with the concept of civil society. During the 1990s, there were fre-
quent confrontations with the authoritarian regime in Croatia, while in 
Slovenia, there was more dialogue, as independent intellectuals and civic 
movements with younger participants played the role of setting up politi-
cal parties (Bežovan 2004). However, there were different political under-
standings of the role of civil society. In Czechoslovakia, President Vaclav 
Havel saw civil society and public debate as essential for the creation of 
good citizens, and promoted decentralization of state responsibilities. 
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After the split into the two sovereign states in 1993, Vaclav Klaus, presi-
dent of the Czech Republic, had different views. He supported the intro-
duction of a competitive party system, but saw the market as the central 
instrument to promote human freedom and creativity. He was very suspi-
cious of the term civil society and preferred the indirect participation of 
citizens rather than giving nonprofit organizations a privileged role as 
mediators between citizens and the government. These different views 
became paradigmatic for the development of civil society in the advanced 
Central Eastern European countries.
In political debates, civil society was often recognized as a revolution-
ary force and as part of the opposition. NGOs were under political 
attack from the ruling parties and governmental organizations, and there 
was no support for tax incentives or increased organizational participa-
tion in policymaking. They have even been accused of being agents of 
foreign powers or officially characterized as a “self-proclaimed civil soci-
ety” (Bežovan 2004). On the other hand, there was a “parochial” struc-
ture of organizations often divided on the same issues as political parties, 
and often seen as mostly interested in securing government and other 
grants. The concept of civil society was associated with a struggle against 
the ruling regime and the dominant political culture, in which the old 
Soviet era mass organizations (related to the Communist party) were an 
integral part.
However, the process toward EU accession was important for strength-
ening the legitimacy of the civil society organizations and giving them a 
role as stakeholders in policymaking and policy implementation (Frič 
2009). Crucial influences in the recent development of the sector came 
from the EU in the form of membership, financial support and technical 
help.
In the last 25 years, it is evident that civil society has become a respected 
stakeholder in all three countries, with certain differences that can be 
attributed to path dependency, the role of international donors, and the 
speed of accession to the EU. Thus, for example, in the 1990s, the coun-
tries were in different positions in relation to the dissolution of the for-
mer states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Croatian and to a lesser 
extent Slovenian development was marked by the Balkan war, which 
made a long-lasting impact on society. The legacy of dissident culture and 
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the financial aid of foreign donors increased the gap between citizens and 
civil society organizations in the Czech Republic and Croatia. Civil soci-
ety is weak in engaging citizens in the Czech Republic and Croatia, while 
civil society appears to enjoy more space and legitimacy in corporatist 
Slovenia.
This comparison shows that the impact of TSOs depends on the policy 
environment for the third sector, political openness of the government 
for cooperation, and on the capacity developed by the TSOs. The institu-
tional infrastructure for sector’s development (resource centers, funding 
programs, pilot projects) is important for sustainable development and 
for innovative third sector practices (Bežovan 2016).
4  Does the European Third Sector make 
a Socioeconomic Impact?
The previous chapter shows that the TSE organizations and volunteers 
are a significant economic sector of activity in Europe. In this chapter, we 
have assessed the available evidence about the contribution of this TSE 
sector to the socioeconomic development and democratic governance of 
European societies through systematic reviews of research and new analy-
ses of data. This indicates that the impact of the TSE sector is significant 
albeit difficult to assess empirically. This is because the activities of orga-
nizations and volunteers can have impacts in different social domains and 
on different levels, from individuals to local communities and society in 
general, and the research front is less advanced in some of these areas than 
others are. However, there is no support for unconditional and general 
claims about the third sector’s contribution to improvement of health, 
well-being, innovation, social capital, empowerment or economic 
development.
There is a potential for individual benefits of membership or volun-
teering in TSOs. However, these positive impacts are not equally acces-
sible or do not spread among the population. Individuals who already 
have better wellbeing, health and social trust are more likely to be active 
as members or volunteers in the third sector. Groups and individuals with 
fewer resources or who are already less advantaged are less likely to become 
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members or volunteers in voluntary organizations to promote their 
interests, satisfy their needs or make changes in policy favorable to 
them. This seriously complicates the task of sorting out cause and 
effect. Moreover, the effects of voluntary participation are gendered 
and can also vary by age, employment status, income, type of associa-
tion and type of involvement (Kamerāde 2015). In short, third sector 
activity is not a simple solution to individual or social problems. 
Those that have the largest potential benefits from TSIs are less likely 
to be involved, which represents a challenge for how to design third 
sector activities and support programs (Kamerāde 2015).
Our research shows that better health and well-being may be a result 
of who decides to volunteer, rather than an effect of volunteering for the 
general population. However, political engagement may increase as a 
result of volunteering. Among the unemployed, volunteering may 
improve mental health and well-being, but only when there are generous 
welfare benefits. These findings indicate that the impacts of the third sec-
tor depend not only on the activities that take place, but also on the kind 
of support and conditions the governments provide.
At the macro level, assessing the socioeconomic impact of the third 
sector confronts much of the same difficulties encountered at the micro 
level. In the absence of a unified data collection apparatus on the third 
sector at the European level, reliable longitudinal data on the third sector 
are difficult to obtain. Methodologically, the same difficulties related to 
identifying a causal link between a given feature of the third sector and 
expected impacts apply, given the potential existence of confounding fac-
tors not accounted for in the statistical models. Additionally, when aggre-
gating individual behaviors at the macro-level, potential emergent 
properties—such as social contagion, informal social control and collec-
tive efficacy—that may lead to divergent results at the micro and macro 
levels, have to be taken into account. Our results show that participating 
in volunteering activities does not have an impact on individual well- 
being, health and level of social trust when correcting for potential self- 
selection. However, that does not mean that the same pattern applies at 
the macro level. Indeed, the size of the third sector seems to be positively 
correlated with social trust and health. This is in line with the assumption 
that the third sector is important as an infrastructure, even in areas where 
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individual experience with volunteering does not have an effect. A vital 
civil society can contribute to breaking the vicious circle of distrust, cor-
ruption and bad government because people see that there are organiza-
tional structures they can work through to promote change.
When we compare the role of the third sector in the transformation of 
the post-communist countries during the last 25 years in Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic and Croatia, we also see the importance of the relations 
with the government. In all three countries, the TSOs have tried to play 
a civil society role, expand the public sphere, and promote civic liberties. 
However, there are significant differences in how they succeeded depend-
ing on what the social origins theory would suggest are the prevailing 
structures of power and the resulting institutional infrastructure enabling 
citizens to work for changes in policies. This, in turn, depends on previ-
ous history, but also on the present political circumstances.
Knowledge about the impacts of the third sector on other parts of 
society is scattered and inconclusive. Measurement of the third sector’s 
size, structure and composition can take advantage of standardized pro-
cedures, definitions and typologies, such as the ILO Manual on the 
Measurement of Volunteer Work4, and the UN Handbook on Nonprofit 
Organizations in the System of National Accounts5, soon to be issued in a 
revised, expanded version that covers the third sector as conceptualized in 
this report. Most important for this present chapter, the resulting newly 
revised UN handbook, entitled Satellite Account on Nonprofit and Related 
Institutions and Volunteer Work, contains a new chapter that lays out a 
comprehensive strategy keyed to the new UN Sustainable Development 
Goals for measuring systematically and comparatively the impact of the 
TSE sector on the achievement of these goals. Unfortunately, these pro-
cedures are not fully implemented across Europe, a consequence being 
the poor quality of available data about the third sector and volunteering. 
Whereas a theoretical understanding of the functions, roles and specific 
features of TSOs points in the direction of a wide array of potential socio-
4 Manual on the Measurement of Volunteer Work, International Labour Organization 2011 (ILO 
Manual).
5 UN Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts, 2003 (UN 
Handbook).
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economic impacts at different levels of analysis, the scarcity and limited 
quality of the available data means that the empirical validation of these 
theoretical insights is only possible to a limited extent. Research on the 
impact of the third sector is in an early phase, and we need to further 
develop impact indicators and methods that can reliably identify causal 
links between third sector activities and micro and macro impacts. 
Hopefully, as the new UN TSE Satellite Account document comes 
online, countries, with the encouragement of the European Commission 
and Eurostat, will take measures to implement it across Europe.
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5
Barriers to Third Sector Development
Annette Zimmer and Benedikt Pahl
1  Introduction: A Success Story 
and a Clouded Horizon
There are many reasons why the third sector throughout Europe looks 
back upon a remarkable success story in terms of economic growth, coop-
eration with governments and civic engagement. Firstly, the unique posi-
tion of third sector organizations (TSOs) in between “the market” and “the 
state” allows TSOs to combine the best of these two worlds: the entrepre-
neurial spirit and energy of the market with the common weal and public 
good orientation that is generally associated with the state. When govern-
ments started to modernize the public sector and looked for partners in the 
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provision of public and social services, statist countries, in particular, opted 
in favor of welfare partnerships with TSOs (Freise and Zimmer 2004; 
Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Secondly, very often, TSOs are offspring of 
the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s, such as the ecological and 
the women’s self-help movements. When these movements were succes-
sively institutionalized, they gave way to the establishment of numerous 
TSOs in many Western European countries (Staggenborg 2013; Johnston 
and Noakes 2005; Roth and Rucht 2008). Thirdly, in many countries of 
the Western world, the shift from an  industrial to a service economy was 
accompanied by increased societal affluence. Blue- and white-collar work-
ers had increasingly more leisure time at their disposal that was at least 
partly invested in activities affiliated with TSOs. As a result, the popularity 
of expressive TSOs, such as sport or hobby clubs, increased significantly 
and translated into a remarkable growth of the sector in terms of the num-
ber of organizations. In this vein, foundations became more and more 
popular in many countries, since private wealth had been growing due to 
Europe’s peaceful development after World War II.
Moreover, TSOs in Europe were part of the “third wave of democrati-
zation” (Huntington 1991). In Spain and Portugal, repressive authoritar-
ian regimes, which had lasted more than 40 years, finally came to an end 
in the mid-1970s, giving way to a reintegration of the Mediterranean 
countries into a democratic Europe. Both countries joined the European 
Union in 1986 (Dedman 2010). Furthermore, the end of the Soviet 
Union and the ensuing breakdown of socialist rule in Eastern Europe 
constituted a further milestone and a remarkable window of opportunity 
for civic engagement and third sector development. The new and unex-
pected freedom to organize and to form social groups was heavily used 
and put to work by social activists and former dissidents all over Eastern 
Europe. As documented by the work of John Keane (1998) and others 
(e.g. Mansfeldova et al. 2004; Havel and Keane 1985), the impact of the 
historic change was reflected in the remarkable growth rate of associa-
tions throughout the region. In other words, the third sector can look 
back upon a remarkable development all over Europe that brought the 
region full-force into what one scholar termed “a global associational 
revolution” (Salamon 1994), a significant upsurge of organized voluntary 
activity not only in Europe, but throughout the world.
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Compared to the 1990s and 2000s, the general picture facing the 
third sector in Europe is currently less encouraging. Two decades ago, 
the future looked bright for the European Union. Central and Eastern 
European countries, cut off from the dynamic social and economic 
developments in the West since World War II, were integrated into the 
European Union, enlarging it to 28 member states. Covering a territory 
of more 1,600,000 square miles and with a population of over 510 mil-
lion, the European Union developed into a major political entity. Today, 
Europe no longer serves as a role model for a harmonic reconciliation of 
democracy and economic growth. In many European countries, politi-
cal stability and the reputation of the Union have been put into ques-
tion. Unemployment rates are stuck at unacceptable levels in many 
European countries, particularly in the Mediterranean and in Eastern 
Europe. The Euro hardly managed to survive the economic crisis of 
2008. Among the affluent countries in central and northern Europe, 
tendencies to leave the so-called Euro-Zone are increasingly gaining 
popularity. Indeed, as opinion polls show, the European Union as a con-
cept has suffered a significant loss of support. Also, civil society, the third 
sector and its organizations are no longer perceived as key problem solv-
ers by the European Commission. Jacques Delors had a mission and 
vision regarding the role and function of TSOs in Europe (Delors 2004; 
Kendall et  al. 2009: 347). The Commission under Romano Prodi 
focused on the “voice function” of TSOs, which was particularly high-
lighted in the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance of 
2001 (European Commission 2001). Today, the sector does not enjoy a 
top priority on the Commission’s agenda. If at all, TSOs play a certain 
role as social enterprises providing public social services (European 
Commission 2014; Defourny 2014).
Despite these caveats, Europe’s third sector is remarkable in terms of 
size and scope, as clearly shown in Chap. 3. However, several develop-
ments have accrued to dim the prospects of Europe’s third sector. Before 
going into detail by focusing on the barriers and hurdles TSOs in Europe 
are currently confronted with, we will first draw the attention to the 
enormous variety of the third sector in Europe. In a second step, we will 
allude to general societal and political trends that might impact on the 
sector. Among those also is the European Commission as a key actor 
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providing funds for TSO activities and, at the same time, supporting 
fierce competition between for-profit and TSOs in the welfare domain. 
Against this background, common barriers and problems, almost every 
country in Europe is confronted with, will be highlighted. The chapter 
will be concluded by a more facetted picture of how the third sector tries 
and manages to cope with the identified hurdles in the different European 
countries.
2  Third Sector Impact Country Clusters
There is no question the third sector stands out for its variety in terms of 
fields of activity, traditions, relationships with government and organiza-
tional/legal forms. As Chap. 2 of this report noted, there is no single 
European law on any of the manifestations of the third sector in Europe. 
Some countries have no law, others have one or two references embracing 
the totality of the sector’s operations, and others have multiple legal 
structures pertaining to each of a dozen or more types of third sector enti-
ties. As Chap. 3 has shown, the European countries are highly different 
with respect to the size and scope of the sector.
Under the umbrella of the Third Sector Impact (TSI) project, we 
undertook a substantial body of research analyzing key barriers for third 
sector development in the countries under study: Austria, Croatia, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain. The countries were 
grouped regionally and in accordance to their proximity to a specific pat-
tern of civil society development. Thus, as outlined in Chap. 3 and sum-
marized in Table  5.1, a number of countries in Northern or North 
Central Europe exhibit a pattern that has been identified as a “welfare 
Table 5.1 Grouping of TSI Countries by Pattern of Third Sector Development
Model Countries
Liberal UK
Welfare partnership Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria (rural areas)
Social democratic Norway, Austria (urban areas)
Statist Poland, Croatia, Spain*
Source: Salamon et al. (2017)
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partnership.” Included here among our TSI project countries are the 
Netherlands, Germany, France and the rural areas of Austria. These coun-
tries or regions look back upon a tradition of close cooperation in human 
service delivery between the third sector and the welfare state. In all, 
religious politics and strong conservative as well as social-democratic 
elites kept social welfare provision in the hands of party or religiously 
affiliated TSOs. In these countries, TSOs have traditionally served a part-
nership role vis-à-vis the state, particularly in the welfare domain. TSOs 
in welfare partnership countries used to be protected from commercial 
competitors, and hence enjoyed privileged access to funding through 
government protection or, more specifically, through legal regulations. 
Their TSO sectors have consequently had unusually high levels of gov-
ernment support and a dominance of paid staff in their workforces.
A considerably different pattern emerged in the UK. Here, state sup-
port for the third sector, and indeed for social welfare services, has long 
been far less pronounced than in the welfare partnership countries, a resi-
due of the power of commercial and industrial elites and the historic 
weakness of labor elements. The mobilization of labor in World War II 
opened the country to elements of the welfare partnership model, but 
only partly, leaving behind a third sector more reliant on private than on 
public resources.
Two of our project countries exhibit a social-democratic model of civil 
society development, though in one of them (Austria) this reflects a bi- 
furcation of the country’s social welfare system between urban—in par-
ticular Vienna—and rural areas, with the urban areas displaying a 
social-democratic model characterized by direct delivery of social welfare 
services and a third sector much more strongly focused on sports, recre-
ation and expressive activities, while the rural areas exhibit a welfare part-
nership pattern with the heavy involvement of Church-sponsored 
organizations.
Finally, three of our countries—Poland, Croatia and Spain—retain 
distinctive elements of a statist pattern fastened on the countries by mod-
ernizing elites in the military or authoritarian parties that restrained third 
sector development. One of these countries, Spain, is clearly in transition 
from a statist past to a welfare partnership future, and the other two are 
on a similar path, but a decade behind.
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As Chap. 3 also notes, and as Salamon and colleagues have pointed out 
(Salamon et al. 1999; Salamon and Anheier 1998; Salamon et al. 2017), 
these patterns have not emerged by magic. Rather, they are embedded in 
historically shaped power relationships among various social forces and 
governmental institutions that retain influence over extended periods due 
to the phenomenon of “path dependence.” Inevitably, therefore, while 
TSOs all over Europe are unanimously affected by certain changes in 
their organizational environment, they can be expected to react differ-
ently given the path-dependent course they happen to be on. Hence, 
although there are broad common trends in how TSOs in Europe are 
hindered to live up to their potentials, there are also nuances and even 
exceptions from country to country, and country cluster to country clus-
ter, in how TSOs are affected by the circumstances they face, and we will 
need to be sensitive to these variations even while documenting whatever 
general patterns are evident.
To achieve this balance between regional specificity and Europe-wide 
commonality, each country team of the TSI project conducted an in- 
depth analysis of the country-specific situation of the sector and its orga-
nizations. Each team used a mixed-methods approach involving a review 
of the literature, expert interviews with key stakeholders and an online 
survey with questions addressed to policy experts and leading third sector 
practitioners. The findings for each country were summarized in “county 
reports,”1 brought to the research team as a whole to identify commonali-
ties as well as regional differences that emerged from the regional inqui-
ries. However, before depicting those barriers and hurdles that are a 
common problem in almost each of the project countries, we will first 
provide an assessment of general economic and societal trends that have 
occurred during the last decades and that have a significant impact on the 
environment of the sector and its organizations. One of these environ-
mental factors which has to be taken into account is closely related to the 
European Union and its financial support for the sector in certain regions, 
as well as to the Union’s overall support of a zeitgeist of marketization and 
competitiveness.
1 See National Reports of the TSI countries: http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/the-project/working-
areas/barriers/.
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3  Third Sector Environment
3.1  Societal and Economic Trends
Although the sector looks back on a story of remarkable growth, there are 
some indicators that might hinder further success. One of these is related 
to the 2008 financial crisis, which still lingers. Although it originated in 
the business sector, this crisis fixed on the continent a belief in the recu-
perative potentials of the market as the engine to get Europe out of its 
economic doldrums. Governmental austerity became the medicine of 
choice, starving the public sector and cutting heavily into the financial 
support to TSOs both nationally and at the EU level.
A second development is related to the impact of the worldwide trend 
commonly referred to as individualization on TSOs. More, perhaps, than 
in other regions of the world, European societies used to be drawn to 
concepts of solidarity and belonging that had not only familial, but also 
religious and political components. For a long time, citizens in Europe 
considered themselves born not only into a family and a religion, but also 
into a broad social group with a shared worldview and sense of mutual 
obligation. In many European countries such as Austria, Germany or 
Italy, there were either people of the “right” or people of the “left.” And 
these colorations carried over into the structure of the third sector, which 
functioned as a transmission belt and central carrier of these respective 
group concepts. Against this background of normatively divided societ-
ies, the notion of “membership” emerged as a synonym for belongingness 
and lifelong commitment to a specific social camp. Now, however, times 
have changed and citizens are increasingly less inclined to sign up for 
lifelong membership and commitment to a specific TSO. This trend is 
particularly pronounced among the younger generations in Europe. They 
are no longer interested in membership per se; instead, they prefer to 
volunteer on a temporary basis and to get engaged in short term activi-
ties, or “episodic volunteering” (Beck 1997; Brudney 2010: 1525).
Finally, neoliberalism (Steger and Roy 2010) and its more tangible 
manifestation in the form of market-oriented reform policies, put in 
place by the public sector (Wijkström 2011; Zimmer 2014; Maier et al. 
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2016; Salamon 1993), had an impact on the sector. Indeed, the first 
boost of neoliberal thinking and specifically the privatization of social 
service production opened windows of opportunity for TSOs. In many 
European countries, particularly in the UK and in the still-developing 
welfare states of the Mediterranean and post-socialist countries in the 
South and East of Europe, TSOs became core partners of governments in 
social service production (Gidron et al. 1992; Salamon 1995). However, 
nowadays, in the midst of the second wave of privatization, governments 
are no longer opting in favor of TSOs; on the contrary, the private com-
mercial provision of public services is increasingly challenging service 
provision through TSOs (Henriksen et al. 2012; Salamon 1993).
This is not to say that the third sector is of rapidly decreasing impor-
tance in Europe. However, the distinctiveness of TSOs might be at risk. 
Also, the societal function of the sector might increasingly be jeopar-
dized. Because of their organizational culture, governance and revenue 
sources, TSOs belong neither to the efficiency-driven market nor to the 
authority-driven state. To be part of this sector is to be different from the 
market and the state in terms of governance, resources, organizational 
culture as well as mission and vision. It also means to be based signifi-
cantly on sentiments of solidarity. If TSOs are losing these very special 
qualities due to external pressures, Europe would be very different from 
today, without the broad and encompassing variety of TSOs and their 
contribution to democratic governance, improved service provision and 
the quality of everyday life of the European people. Whether and to what 
extent officials in Brussels are aware that an important cornerstone of 
Europe’s identity might be jeopardized if TSOs are hindered from getting 
the most out of their potentials is difficult to assess. The findings of our 
research indicate that there is rather limited awareness of the sector’s 
capacity and its potentials.
3.2  European Union as a Key Actor?
The question whether the European Union constitutes a key actor for the 
further advancement of the third sector in Europe has to be answered 
with a straightforward “yes” and “no.” In a nutshell, Whenever TSOs are 
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asked about the relevance of Brussels for their daily work, the importance 
of the European Union is judged as being nonrelevant. But the EU has 
an impact on the sector and its TSOs in various ways, and the relevance 
of the EU has been growing over the last decades.
Most obviously, the EU has an impact on the sector in monetary terms 
through grants and contracts. The relevance for the build-up of the sector 
in the new member states before accession is without any question. In the 
accession states, the PHARE program of the EU with its focus on 
 supporting social cohesion paved the way for grassroots initiatives such as 
small and local TSOs. Currently, in particular TSOs, active in post- 
socialist countries and in the South of Europe, are profiting from the 
EU’s cohesion policy, specifically from monetary transfers paid out of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social 
Fund (ESF) or Structural Fund (Venables 2014). As clearly shown in 
Chap. 2, public funding continues to be a very important source of rev-
enue for TSOs all over Europe. In structurally deprived areas, such as East 
Europe, or in regions hit hard by the recession, such as the Mediterranean 
countries in the South, European money plays a significant role for TSOs, 
particularly for those that are active in the area of social services, health 
and education. But, as recent studies also reveal, the EU money goes 
primarily to larger organizations that are in a position to fulfill the bur-
densome requirements of EU-grants with respect to application, moni-
toring and evaluating. This means that EU-funding is heavily biased and 
supports primarily those TSOs in Europe that are already fairly estab-
lished. In other words, the EU works in favor of the more business prone 
TSOs while simultaneously being disadvantageous for small and com-
munity oriented ones.2
A further impact on the sector is closely related to the EU’s overall 
political agenda of fostering competition between different providers of 
goods and services within the European Union. In this respect, the EU is 
indeed a driving force. Since the early beginnings of the Common 
Market, the EU has pushed into the direction of competiveness and has 
worked in favor of a primarily market-driven integration process (Boje 
2 See National Reports of the TSI countries: http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/the-project/working-
areas/barriers/.
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and Potucek 2011). A textbook example constitutes the Directive on 
Services of General Economic Interest that was highly disputed about 
two decades ago (Zimmer et al. 2009: 33; Kendall et al. 2009: 358). In 
its original contours, the Directive directly jeopardized the model of third 
sector embeddedness in the welfare partnership countries. TSOs active in 
core welfare domains in social and health services were supposed to be 
treated on equal footing with commercial providers. Furthermore, public 
grants as well as sponsorships of companies supporting TSOs—most 
likely in sports—were considered to be subsidies that cause market dis-
ruption and therefore should be significantly restricted or totally banned 
by European law. Hence, the directive designed by the DG for Internal 
Market originally treated any human service like a commodity that was 
to become subject to similar regulations than any other marketable good. 
In the end, the directive was watered down in such a way that the speci-
ficity of TSOs active in human services was finally acknowledged. TSOs 
successfully argued that they are distinct from for-profit providers because 
they are working close to their communities, which is evidenced by the 
many volunteers who are engaged locally in the provision of social ser-
vices delivered by TSOs.
But despite the EU’s concession, the majority of European govern-
ments enacted the directive in very much the way it was originally 
intended by the European Union (2012). Hence, the EU’s impact on 
TSOs in Europe is rather implicit but, nevertheless, the EU strongly 
influences the environment of the sector, specifically, in terms of fostering 
an overall culture of competiveness that downsizes the relevance of other 
mechanisms of co-ordination such as solidarity or community orienta-
tion. In parallel to the enactment of the Directive, instruments of NPM 
were introduced in the EU member states that had a deep and lasting 
influence on third sector government relationships. Key features of NPM 
instruments such as competitive tendering and contract management go 
along with encompassing and time-consuming procurement procedures, 
which are difficult to handle, specifically for small TSOs, since the orga-
nizations have to devote a considerable amount of time for administra-
tion, reporting and book-keeping. All in all, the decisive change of third 
sector government relationships, at least partly inaugurated by the EU, 
resulted in the increased bureaucratization of the TSO governance.
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Finally and controversially discussed is the impact of the so-called 
European third sector community that consists of encompassing third 
sector umbrella organizations operating in Brussels (Kendall et al. 2009). 
The so-called European TSOs are working as lobbyists on behalf of the 
sector in Brussels in close contact with the EU policy machinery, the 
Commission, the Parliament and the various interdepartmental groups 
(Kendall et al. 2009). Partly funded and sometimes even founded by EU 
institutions, the so-called community of European TSOs operating in 
Brussels is somehow in a position of dependency. It has a low profile and 
seems to serve a useful function for the EU’s policy machine by providing 
expertise and also legitimacy for selected policies, initiated by the 
Commission. TSOs active in Brussels are not at all in a position of being 
able to significantly influence the agenda or addressing major topics that 
are key concerns of the EU and directly and indirectly impinge TSOs’ 
fortunes in the European member states such as the liberalization of 
social service provision, the introduction of rigid and highly bureaucratic 
procurement procedures, the neglect of the added value of TSO activity 
in terms of community building and civicness, just to name a few 
(Zimmer and Hoemke 2016).
In sum: Although the EU does not have a direct impact on TSOs in 
Europe, the EU exercises a remarkable influence on the environment of 
European TSOs by both neglecting the third sector as a valuable under-
pinning of the social fabric of Europe and exclusively supporting third 
sector activities that are business-like and favorable for the economy. 
Moreover, the “cultural shift” toward marketization in third sector gov-
ernment relationships as well as the increase in bureaucratic control 
mechanisms, on which we will focus in the following chapter, has been 
promoted and significantly supported by the European Union. Therefore, 
the impact of the European Union translates into a homogenization of 
the barriers TSOs have to cope with; however, these barriers play out very 
differently in the countries due to the heterogeneity and diversity of TSO 
embeddedness in the European regions.
In the following, we will draw heavily on the results of country reports 
of the TSI team.3 Thanks to the reports, we were able to identify both 
3 See National Reports of the TSI countries: http://thirdsectorimpact.eu/the-project/working-
areas/barriers/.
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common problems with which TSOs in all the European countries are 
confronted and difficulties that are region- or country-specific. We will 
firstly depict the common problems and secondly turn to barriers and 
hurdles that are an outcome of the legacy of history and belongingness of 
the sector to a particular pattern and/or country cluster.
4  Barriers to Third Sector Development
4.1  Common Barriers
Despite the variety of developmental trajectories of the sector in Europe, 
we identified common barriers standing in the way of TSOs in almost 
every project country. Graphs and tables presented in the following are 
based on the results of online surveys conducted in the project countries. 
Representatives of TSO umbrellas, high profile managers and experts in 
the field were invited to fill out an online questionnaire. Our intention 
was to conduct a “stakeholder survey,” the goal of which was to find out 
what stakeholders working at the organizational level of the sector think 
about general trends within the sector, indicating which barriers and dif-
ficulties they perceive as the most salient regarding the current situation 
and the development of the sector in the future (see Appendix on the data 
gathering process).
The results of the surveys show that the sector in Europe is confronted 
with a serious set of problems that translate into:
 – financial barriers,
 – human resource/governance barriers, and
 – external relation barriers/overload of bureaucratic requirements 
(Zimmer and Pahl 2016).
As the graphs indicate, the identified barriers play out differently in the 
project countries, thus reflecting and underlining the embeddedness of 
TSOs in different environments. Although TSOs are confronted with 
financial barriers all over Europe, the lack of public funding is perceived 
as a very serious barrier, particularly in the post-communist countries 
(Fig. 5.1).
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Asked to assess the financial situation of the sector and to indicate the 
financial difficulties with which TSOs in the country are currently strug-
gling the most, it turned out that “public sector underfunding” consti-
tutes a major barrier and hence a serious or even very serious problem. 
However, as outlined in the country reports, the reasons why stakehold-
ers are concerned about the lack of public resources are different. In the 
case of Croatia and Poland, there are hardly any alternative sources of 
financing available and the countries are significantly hit by the crisis. 
This is also true for France and Spain. The situation is different in Austria 
and Germany. Here, the modes of public financing have changed signifi-
cantly in the last decades. TSOs are working primarily on grant money, 
which constitutes a “commodity” and not a monetary support for the 
sector. TSOs, particularly those working in the social domain, are paid on 
a per capita basis. For each service delivery, TSOs receive a fixed amount 
of money that is agreed upon in a process of competitive tendering among 
various service providers—for-profit and nonprofit organizations. Hence, 
TSOs in these countries are struggling with difficulties in financing their 
infrastructure because they almost exclusively work with contract money 
(Fig. 5.2).
Asked to assess which are the most serious difficulties related to human 






























Fig. 5.1 Financial Barrier: Lack of Public Funding. Source: Zimmer and Pahl 
(2016: 10)
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as a serious or even very serious problem in particular by stakeholders 
from Austria and Germany, countries which belong to the welfare part-
nership cluster. The reasons for this rating might be linked to trends of 
individualization and societal pluralization that have a deep impact on 
German and Austrian society, with the effect that volunteer engagement 
in a specific TSO, either positioned in the conservative or the more lib-
eral camp, does no longer correspond to the Zeitgeist in these countries. 
In particular, Austria and Germany look back upon a legacy of divided 
societies, structured into social camps of “the left” and “the right” that 
carried over into the structure of the sector. In France and Croatia, vol-
unteering has never been very popular. This might be the reason why 
stakeholders perceive the recruitment problem as less serious than their 
counterparts in the welfare partnership countries. The reason why, on the 
contrary, Spanish stakeholders are concerned about volunteer recruit-
ment might mirror the current situation of a sector that is in a state of 
transition, in which the impact of former state dominance is more and 
more on the retreat (Fig. 5.3).
Responses to the question concerning the governance of TSOs, specifi-
cally, whether there are difficulties in recruiting board members and 
hence attracting citizens to take on positions of authority on a voluntary 
basis, turns out to provide a very clear picture. With the only exception 











France Croaa Spain Germany Austria
Fig. 5.2 Human Resource Barrier: Difficulties Recruiting Volunteers. Source: 
Zimmer and Pahl (2016: 6)
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even crucial problem in the majority of the project countries. There are 
many reasons why this is the case. Serving on a board and being a trustee 
of a TSO is hard work, time-consuming and demanding in terms of 
required qualities and responsibilities, which come with the position. As 
an effect of the generalization of quasi-markets, particularly in the social 
service domain, managing TSOs has become more demanding. 
Simultaneously, control mechanisms have been intensified, which trans-
lates into a transformation of TSOs in far more bureaucratic organiza-
tions with the outcome that expertise in business administration is needed 
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Fig. 5.3 Human Resource Barrier: Difficulties Recruiting Board Members. Source: 














Fig. 5.4 External Relations Barrier: Increasing Bureaucracy. Source: Zimmer and 
Pahl (2016: 8)
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Asked which aspect, from their point of view, constitutes the most pressing 
problem as regards the external relations of TSOs, “increasing bureaucracy” 
was named first. Again, the assessment of the stakeholders reflects the signifi-
cant changes of the sector’s environment in Europe. Today, TSOs in the 
majority of European countries are treated on par with for-profit providers, 
in particular, in the area of social service provision where they almost exclu-
sively work on contracts. The new policy environment impacts significantly 
on third sector government relations. These used to be trust based at eye level 
and changed to a customer- supplier relationship. Nowadays, TSOs have to 
prove that they are thoroughly in compliance with their contracts. Today, this 
results in a situation where a significant amount of time, which in former 
times was available for the “real work,” has to be allocated to record keeping 
and documentation of costs. This is specifically the case in Germany, France 
and partly also in Spain. In contrast, TSOs in Croatia are still perceived as 
somehow untrustworthy partners of governments, which simultaneously 
reflects the statist tradition of the country. The reason why TSOs in Croatia 
are faced with increased demands for documentation and control are slightly 
different form the situation in the “welfare partnership countries”, as we will 
outline in the following chapter (Fig. 5.5).
Marketization might come at a price for TSOs. Social service provision 
is under rigid cost-containment strategies enforced by government. TSOs 













Fig. 5.5 External Relations Barrier: Low Pay of Employees. Source: Zimmer and 
Pahl (2016: 11)
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are challenged by efficiency-driven for-profits. In order not to lose 
ground, TSOs have to bring production costs down. Reducing the costs 
of labor might offer a way to be competitive. Against this background, 
our stakeholders indicated that TSOs in some areas are not able to pay 
decent wages. Participants in our survey rated “low pay of employees” as 
a key issue with which TSOs in their countries are struggling. This might 
not come as a surprise in countries where TSO-government relationships 
are still in a developmental stage. However, it is worrisome that stake-
holders of the welfare partnership countries Germany, Austria and France 
perceive low pay of employees as a major barrier, which might decrease 
the attractiveness of TSOs on the labor market in the long run, even if 
this is not yet the case. As stressed by the TSI teams and clearly under-
lined by the UK report, “it is noteworthy that very few respondents 
pointed to problems with their paid workforce, in terms of recruitment, 
quality, training or motivation” (Kendall et al. 2016a, b). However, the 
attractiveness of the sector, which up until now has been a central reason 
for its remarkable growth, might not be durable. Asked to assess how they 
see the future of the sector, the majority of stakeholders is reluctant and 
prefers a conservative and careful view into the future, indicating that 
they strongly or rather disagree (70 percent) with an overall optimistic 
preview that “the next ten years might be easier for TSOs than the previ-
ous ten” (Hoemke et al. 2016: 15). Although skepticism turned out to be 
a general trend all over Europe, the TSI research team also unfolded vari-
ant trajectories of third sector development as well as significant differ-
ences between the European countries as they are affected by the 
afore-described changes of the environment.
4.2  Regional Diversity and Regime-specific Barriers 
to TSO Development
4.2.1  From Liberal to Welfare Partnership to Liberal Again—
The UK
In the UK, TSOs see their environment as increasingly market-driven in 
terms of resources and governance practices, the result of a shift in the 
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political climate and ideological discourses from an incipient welfare 
partnership model back to an earlier liberal, now neoliberal, market- 
oriented model (Kendall et al. 2016a, b; Mohan et al. 2016; Kendall and 
Knapp 1996).
After moving from a historically liberal pattern of third sector develop-
ment, until the expansion of the British welfare state in the aftermath of 
World War II and the adoption of key features of a social-democratic 
model, the UK third sector became a beneficiary of the Third Way politi-
cal philosophy of the post-Thatcher Labour government, which adopted 
key features of the welfare partnership model involving the increased reli-
ance of government on TSOs to deliver social welfare services. The state 
was assigned a more passive role as an enabler and not as a provider of 
welfare activities. The third sector policies were meant to be achieved via 
enabling the emergence of a quasi-market with preferences for standard-
ization and large-scale provision. Thus, large organizations were able to 
deal with the challenges regarding procurement, commissioning and 
contracting to the detriment of more specialized responses to needs.
Furthermore, the Labour government made major investments into a 
third sector infrastructure and into the organizational capacity of TSOs. 
As one reflection of this, following the advice of a special commission on 
the third sector created by a group of foundations (the Deakin 
Commission) a concordat or compact between the government and third 
sector was initiated. However, against the background of the required 
marketization and professionalization that was also pursued, many orga-
nizations were not able to, or did not wish to, work with government as 
a partner in such a marketized climate of operations.
With the entry of the Cameron coalition government, the philosophy 
of “Big Society” provided the ideological backbone for a return to the 
traditional UK Liberal Model featuring an independently financed third 
sector and hostility toward state involvement in terms of public spend-
ing. In a nutshell, the government program envisaged scaling back public 
expenses, which were to be replaced by volunteers, or in other words, the 
“Big Society” substituting for “Big Government.” In practice, quasi- 
markets were extended and welfare services were opened to market forces 
as far as possible. For-profit agencies were granted (market) access to all 
policy fields, including voluntarism and work with vulnerable groups. 
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Besides quasi-market approaches, the UK governments, mostly with the 
new legislation in 2016, have fostered financing models that follow a 
social investment logic, such as loan and bond finance initiatives. Hence, 
these sorts of schemes have gained relevance among British TSOs.
Extensive budgetary cuts went hand-in-hand with market promotion in 
all areas of welfare spending, with the financial crisis providing the legiti-
macy to far-reaching austerity policies. In particular, the budgets of local 
authorities, which are a core source for third sector funding in the UK, were 
massively reduced. Additionally, the third sector infrastructure, which the 
Labour government had set up or substantially supported—like the Charity 
Commission and the Office for Civil Society—was cut back. As the sectoral 
infrastructure has collapsed and the financial support from local authorities 
has been cut, TSOs face difficulties to function properly. Especially the 
capacity to mobilize and encourage volunteer contribution is severely dimin-
ished. The case of the UK provides an example that volunteering does not 
work properly if an appropriate infrastructure is lacking. Furthermore, the 
Cameron government took a hostile stance toward the campaigning and 
advocacy work of TSOs, stating that the use of public grants for campaign-
ing activities would be prohibited. Generally, the British Third Sector’s abil-
ity to perform its multiple roles seems to be increasingly constrained because 
its organizations are facing the double challenge of reduced public funding 
(austerity) and intensifying scrutiny through statutory bodies and an increas-
ingly critical national media (Kendall et al. 2016a, b). Summarizing the gen-
eral picture, the UK report underlines that “significant numbers of 
organizations experience their environment as increasingly market and 
quasi-market driven in terms of resource origins and governance practices, 
and experience the current political climate as unconducive to non-service 
provision roles” (Kendall et al. 2016).
4.2.2  Welfare Partnership Countries: Adjustment 
to a Changed Social Policy Environment—Germany, 
the Netherlands, Austria
Unrivaled welfare partnership in the social domain used to be the central 
feature of the third sector in these countries (Brandsen and Pape 2016; 
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Simsa et al. 2015, b; Hoemke et al. 2016). Deeply embedded in the insti-
tutional design of the welfare state, TSOs enjoyed a privileged position as 
providers of social services. However, in response to the neoliberal surge, 
the policy environment in this cluster of countries has changed signifi-
cantly in the last decades. The welfare partnership, based on secured pub-
lic funding for TSOs, which were legally protected from competition of 
alternative providers, was modified in such a way that today TSOs are 
treated on par with commercial providers. Secured public funding for 
TSOs is a story of the past. Alongside the introduction of NPM, com-
petitive tendering and contract management have become ubiquitous in 
the social domain. Furthermore, commercial providers successfully made 
inroads into areas of social service provision that used to be core domains 
of TSOs—such as hospitals or child-care facilities. Indeed, TSOs are 
nowadays confronted with increased competition from for-profit provid-
ers in every field of social service provision. The changed policy environ-
ment has a deep impact on the governance and organizational culture of 
TSOs. In order to survive in these by now highly competitive markets for 
social and health services, TSOs have to be efficiently managed. Hence, 
the “marketization” of the social domain translates into a situation in 
which TSOs turn to “managerialism” as a business-like way of gover-
nance and management.
From an economic point of view, many TSOs accomplished the shift 
toward a professionally managed nonprofit enterprise successfully. 
Despite the mounting cost and efficiency pressures, TSOs in this cluster 
of countries have defended their positions as core providers of social ser-
vices. The market share of TSOs in the social domain is relatively stable 
compared to the share of for-profit competitors. As TSOs look back upon 
a long tradition and expertise in service provision in many fields of human 
service delivery, such as health care or child care, they are able to compete 
successfully with commercial providers in competitive tendering proce-
dures. Also, TSOs are able to communicate their professionalism to the 
general public. Compared to the UK, where the media increasingly looks 
upon TSOs with skepticism, in particular, the religiously affiliated “big 
players” among the third sector service providers, such as the Caritas in 
Austria and Germany, enjoy a good reputation among the general public. 
Against this background, TSOs can rely on an established brand as a 
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social service provider that constitutes an asset compared to new com-
mercial competitors that have to create awareness among customers. 
Moreover, TSOs can count on good relations with local politicians and 
administrators, which enable TSOs to improve their position in negotia-
tions for service contracts. However, the successful adaptation of TSOs in 
competitive markets comes at a price: there are indicators that TSOs 
might lose some of the specific qualities that are commonly attributed to 
the sector. The “winds of change,” which might endanger the core values 
of TSOs in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, are the change of the 
legal form toward a limited liability company, the preference for profes-
sional managers with a background in business administration instead of, 
for example, social work, and the decreasing attractiveness of TSOs for 
volunteers.
TSOs are still providing important avenues for civic engagement and 
volunteering in the countries of this cluster. However, they seem to lose 
their pole position as the key terrain for volunteer engagement. As out-
lined earlier, Europeans have long considered themselves born not only 
into a family and a religion, but also into a broad social group with a 
shared worldview and a sense of mutual obligation. Being an active mem-
ber in terms of both volunteering on a regular basis and serving on a 
board of a TSO used to be key ingredients of the way of life for the 
majority of citizens in these countries. The reason for the steady volunteer 
influx into the sector was that the societies of this country cluster used to 
be highly structured and organized into religious or ideological commu-
nities, of which TSOs served as the organizational underpinning and 
infrastructure. For describing this phenomenon, “pillarization” is used in 
the Netherlands, while in Germany and Austria, the “social milieu” is 
referred to frequently (Brandsen 2011; Golbeck 2011: 92; Zimmer 
2013). However, both the societal pillars of the Netherlands and the 
social milieus of Austria and Germany—of which the catholic and the 
social democratic used to be the most important ones—are no longer 
strongly in place. Citizens born into these pillars and/or social milieus 
used to constitute a stable resource base of volunteers for TSOs of a 
respective pillar or milieu. Since the pillars and milieus are almost gone, 
the religious and ideological bonds to TSOs have significantly eroded. 
Citizens are no longer born into a pillar or milieu that used to pave the 
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way for lifelong engagement for a particular TSO. Accordingly, nowa-
days, TSOs have to actively recruit volunteers. With respect to voluntary 
contributions, such as donations, volunteering and serving on boards, 
TSOs are faced with a competitive environment, similar to the one they 
encounter on the market for government grants and contracts. 
Additionally, a growing share of volunteering takes place independently 
and without the framing of TSOs.
As regards the key topic of our inquiry, the Austrian report summa-
rized, “One of the biggest barriers of TSOs stems from the lack of finan-
cial resources (Simsa et al. 2015, b).” The combined lack of public funding 
and private donations as well as the decreasing profit margins from TSOs’ 
market activities result in an ongoing trend toward marketization and 
professionalization, which will most likely impact negatively on the social 
and civic mission of the sector. TSOs in the welfare partnership countries 
are confronted with problems of identity and legitimacy since they are 
becoming more and more business-like in order to hold their central 
position in the market domain of social service provision.
4.2.3  The Social-Democratic Model on the Retreat
Scandinavian countries like Norway exhibit a “social-democratic” pattern 
of third sector development in which the sector is heavily focused on 
expressive functions such as sports, recreation and culture, with high lev-
els of volunteer involvement and relatively little government support 
(Lundström and Wijkström 1997; Wijkström and Zimmer 2011). Social 
service provision is not perceived as a function of TSOs; instead, the 
social domain is generally acknowledged to be a core area of welfare state 
activity. For decades, social services used to be government-regulated, 
generously financed through tax money and, with very few exceptions, 
delivered by government entities.
However, in line with the trends in other European regions, the 
Scandinavian countries have begun to implement NPM tools to regulate 
relations between public contracting authorities and providers of welfare 
services. Local governments made an internal separation between con-
tracting authorities and providers of services in the beginning of the nine-
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ties in Sweden (Erlandsson et  al. 2013: 27) and late in the nineties in 
Denmark and Norway (Vabø et al. 2013: 171). Since then, contract nego-
tiations or competitive tendering have replaced agreements between pub-
lic purchasers and service providers, which otherwise would have been 
renewed almost automatically. The reason why this is the case is closely 
linked to the overall assessment of public policy and, particularly, social 
policy. In a nutshell, public institutions are no longer perceived to be 
capable of responding to social needs adequately; instead, in line with 
neoliberal thinking, the market and hence competition between different 
providers—for-profit and nonprofit—is supposed to provide social ser-
vices efficiently, appropriately and in accordance with the needs and pref-
erences of the clients. The roll back of the state in social service provision 
is still very much in its infancy in Scandinavia. However, at least in Sweden 
and Denmark, the share of for-profit providers in the welfare domain is 
slightly increasing, while employment in the public sector has started to 
decrease. In Norway, with no need for austerity measures because of the 
income from oil production, all three sectors still grow in real numbers, 
although the public sector’s share is decreasing (Sivesind 2017).
What might work against the sector and in the long run might impact 
negatively on TSOs is related to the overall image of the sector in the 
Scandinavian countries. It is reported that in Norway public authorities 
are not particularly interested in the distinctive profiles of TSOs 
(Trætteberg and Sivesind 2015). Furthermore, if we look at the expressive 
TSOs in Norway, there is a decline in formal membership, indicating an 
erosion of bonds between TSOs and their members. At the same time, 
surveys report an increase in volunteering. In Norway, 61 percent of the 
adult population volunteer at least once a year. However, volunteers are 
not necessarily members of TSOs, and if so, they tend to move from one 
TSO to another. Very similar to the pluralization of the societies in the 
“welfare partnership countries,” the collective identities on which volun-
teering in Scandinavia used to be based are no longer strongly in place. 
These identities were closely connected to the traditional Scandinavian 
popular movements, such as consumer cooperative movements (Hilson 
2010). Today, similar to other European regions in the Scandinavian 
countries, volunteering is first and foremost connected with conceptions 
of self-expression and self-realization. This may indicate that the sector’s 
 Barriers to Third Sector Development 
148 
role as part of the democratic infrastructure of the country has dimin-
ished with the decline of the traditional popular movements. 
Simultaneously, TSOs have not managed to make inroads into the mar-
kets of social service delivery, which have just started to develop due to 
the most recent social policy changes.
4.2.4  Struggling with the Past and Catching up on the Edge: 
Croatia and Poland
Poland and Croatia exemplify the power of path dependence in shaping a 
pattern of third sector development highly influenced by past realities (Leś 
et al. 2016; Bežovan et al. 2016). Like other third sectors exhibiting the 
classic features of the statist pattern of civil society development, Eastern 
European third sectors were subject to an authoritarian state that pursued 
modernization and social control from the top, and was eager to avoid 
disruptive third sector elements raising objections from below. TSOs in 
the realm of the church, sports and TSOs in the social economy, such as 
cooperatives, were partly able to survive. In addition, the state organized 
its own third sector-type entities, particularly in the professions and labor, 
but these were most likely controlled by the state and therefore outside the 
kind of definition of the third sector identified in Chap. 2 of this report. 
Conjointly, support structures for the third sector were brought under 
state control. Reflecting this, the third sector in Poland and Croatia 
remains fragmented and relatively small compared to the third sector par-
ticularly in the welfare partnership countries. Also, the societal embedded-
ness of the sector in terms of volunteering and giving is still very limited 
compared to Western European standards. The majority of TSOs are 
expressive organizations working in the areas of leisure and sports. In both 
countries, cooperation with government in the social service domain is 
still in its infancy. Funding continues to be a difficult issue for TSOs in the 
region and has deteriorated due to the financial crises and austerity mea-
sures put in place by government. If there were no EU-support, many 
TSOs in Poland and Croatia would probably be forced to stop operating.
Although the two countries share many commonalities, there are also 
striking differences that again are linked to history. It is worthwhile to 
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stress that Poland was the pioneer among the countries in Eastern Europe 
to stand up against Soviet rule and to develop under the leadership of a 
third society organization—the trade union Solidarnosc—a societal and 
political alternative that facilitated peaceful transition and democratiza-
tion all over the region. Although the Catholic Church in Poland has 
always been traditional and quite conservative, the charismatic Pope John 
Paul II, born as Karol Józef Wojtyła, supported the process of transforma-
tion. However, even today, there is a divide between the rural, conserva-
tive and very catholic countryside and the more liberal, open-minded 
and somehow even rebellious urban Poland. In particular, in Warsaw, but 
also in other major cities, TSOs are very active addressing societal issues 
and problems that are not taken up by government (Siemieńska et  al. 
2016). In addition, TSOs are of increasing importance in the field of 
education (schools) in Poland (Leś et al. 2016: 14). When the govern-
ment, due to fiscal difficulties, began to close down schools in urban 
neighborhoods as well as in the country side, TSOs—set up and financed 
by citizens—stepped in with the goal of providing an educational infra-
structure that is easily accessible and nearby (Siemieńska et  al. 2011). 
These examples indicate that TSOs in Poland enjoy the backing of local 
communities and case-related constituencies.
Compared to Poland, the development of the sector in Croatia did not 
start from below. Instead, as the authors of the country report outline, 
third sector activities were activated from “outside” (Bežovan et al. 2016). 
The atrocities of the civil war resulted in an influx of many TSOs, which 
were and, partly, still are funded and supported by foreign money. A large 
part of the sector in Croatia still consists of humanitarian TSOs. This, in 
turn, has nurtured general skepticism toward the sector as being a prod-
uct of Western intervention in Croatian society. Lack of trust combined 
with the low profile of the sector in Croatian society continues to be a 
significant hurdle, which impacts negatively on the sector’s further devel-
opment. Moreover, in Croatia and partly also in Poland, government was 
and still is reluctant to partner with TSOs in the provision of social ser-
vices. It took more than ten years to clarify legal issues and to set up a 
framework for cooperation between public institutions and TSOs in the 
two countries (Rymsza 2013; Bežovan et  al. 2016). Even today, social 
service providing TSOs play a very minor role in both countries. A lack 
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of public awareness and a lack of trust on the part of both citizens and 
state authorities in the professionalism and capacity of TSOs are reported 
to be crucial barriers for the flourishing of TSOs in the social service 
domain. Furthermore, contracting with public authorities is troublesome 
and TSOs are partly discriminated against by public providers by prac-
tices of clientelism and the opaque nature of contracting procedures. As 
already mentioned, the low social anchorage of TSOs is reflected in the 
limited degree of private giving. Additionally, public funds are increas-
ingly limited due to cost-containment strategies as well as policies of aus-
terity in both countries. On the grounds that alternative financial sources 
are missing to compensate for the tense situation of the public purse, EU 
funds are of particular significance for TSOs in Poland and Croatia, as 
well as all over Eastern Europe. In fact, EU funds have been crucial to the 
growth of the sector in the region (Zimmer and Hoemke 2016). As EU 
funds are very complex and bureaucratic, highly professionalized organi-
zations have evolved around EU-funded themes. However, rigid control 
and an overload of bureaucracy are not restricted to EU funding; public 
support also increasingly comes with the high prize of intensified control 
procedures and book-keeping requirements. As the national report of the 
Croatian TSI team neatly summarized, the key barriers to the develop-
ment of TSOs in the region are “the path-dependent problem of lacking 
awareness, the government quasi-monopoly of providing social services, 
the deficient implementation of policies advancing welfare partnerships 
between government and TSOs and finally the low levels of citizen 
engagement in terms of volunteering and private giving” (Bežovan et al. 
2016; Leś et al. 2016).
4.2.5  In between Statism and Welfare Partnership: France 
and Spain
Until the 1970s, with the demise of the Franco regime, Spain had most 
of the features of the statist model of civil society development, with lim-
ited third sector institutions and little government support for them 
(Chanial and Laville 2014; Petrella et  al. 2016; Chaves et  al. 2016). 
During the dictatorship, large parts of the sector were suppressed and the 
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Spanish third sector is still underdeveloped compared to France or 
Central Europe. France is a slightly different case, though its historic 
opposition to third society organizations reflecting Rousseau-ist senti-
ments born out of the French Revolution and the etatist nature of its 
social welfare system well into the post-World War II era gave it many of 
the features of the statist model as well (Archambault 1997). Volunteering 
is low in both countries. Particularly in Spain, volunteering is more 
directed toward one’s next of kin. Both countries, but particularly Spain, 
also featured substantial social economy units in the form of cooperatives 
and mutuals, though these are heavily commercial in orientation and 
only a small segment of the cooperative sector operates under the binding 
limitation on the distribution of profits stipulated in the in-scope defini-
tion of the TSE sector formulated in this project.
Current scholarly discourse as well as policy development are focusing 
on the Social and Solidarity Economy (SSE), in particular, in France. 
Faced with a difficult economic situation, social economy might provide 
tools for reforming social service delivery in a way that citizens might get 
the same quantity and quality of services while government spends less. 
France’s welfare state is highly developed and, according to OECD data, 
ranks among the top spenders (Chabanet 2016). Alongside policies of 
decentralization, the sector has developed into a prime partner of govern-
ment with respect to social service delivery. The embracement of the sec-
tor by the welfare state resulted in a success story and in the remarkable 
growth of the third sector in France. In accordance with the welfare part-
nership mode, France’s third sector today constitutes a highly integrated 
component of the country’s welfare state (Archambault et  al. 2013). 
However, similar to Spain, France is severely hit by the crisis. As a reac-
tion, government provides incentives for TSOs to become more business- 
like and for for-profits to get active in those areas and fields, which used 
to be earmarked for TSO engagement, such as social services. As a result, 
relationships between TSOs and public authorities are deeply affected. 
According to the French national report, TSOs are increasingly perceived 
just as “service providers” instead of co-producers of public policies. Since 
French authorities acknowledge the civic values of the sector far less than 
previously, the advocacy and social integration functions of the sector 
might be jeopardized.
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In this respect, the current state of affairs of the sector in France and 
the barriers the sector currently is confronted with are quite similar to 
those that are encountered by the sector in the classical welfare partner-
ship countries Germany, Austria and the Netherlands.
Beginning in the mid-1970s in Spain and in the 1980s in France, sig-
nificant elements of the welfare partnership model have emerged. In 
Spain, this transformation has been significantly aided by an influx of EU 
funds as national funding of social welfare activity remains relatively low 
and concentrated on old age pensions. Locally financed social services are 
rather underdeveloped and the extended family still compensates for the 
lack of welfare institutions. A few privileged “quango” organizations ben-
efited from a moderate welfare expansion since the democratization of 
Spain in 1978 and the majority of public funds toward the sector concen-
trate on these organizations. In France, a major shift in social welfare 
policy in the 1980s helped usher in key elements of the welfare partner-
ship pattern as the state decentralized welfare services and local govern-
ments turned extensively toward newly strengthened TSOs to deliver the 
services. In both counties, however, the sector is fragmented and divided 
along societal cleavages between secular and religious as well as left wing 
and right wing organizations. Against this background, the support 
structure is scattered and underdeveloped. With the financial crisis in 
Spain, new organizations have emerged in the course of the anti-austerity 
protests in 2008. These new organizations are not linked to the estab-
lished “quango” organizations.
Particularly Spain was hit hard by the financial crisis. Public funding 
was cut due to vast austerity measures. Additionally, private donations 
decreased mostly due to the collapse of savings banks. Likewise, the social 
needs of the population escalated due to mass unemployment and social 
deprivation. Thus, TSOs in Spain have to survive in a particularly hostile 
environment “having to address more needs with fewer resources” 
(Chaves et al. 2016).
TSOs have reacted to the crisis by lowering the working hours and 
extending part time work. Despite the fact that it is difficult for TSOs to 
recruit volunteers in light of a relatively low social embeddedness of the 
sector and the increasingly resource-intensive management of volunteers, 
paid employment is substituted by volunteers. Thus, working hours per 
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volunteer have been rising. Furthermore, since TSOs have to manage an 
increasing deficit, debts are increasing (Chaves et al. 2016; Petrella et al. 
2016). TSOs are struggling in Spain to make ends meet; however, com-
pared to Poland and particularly Croatia, the sector enjoys a favorable 
public image, TSOs active in the social domain are linked to powerful 
umbrellas, specifically, to ONCE, Red Cross and Caritas (Chaves et al. 
2016), and recently, a major support infrastructure was set up—the 
Spanish Social Third Sector Platform. On the other hand, the sector in 
Spain is also confronted with significant difficulties in developing further 
into the direction of the welfare partnership model. There is a lack of 
awareness of the social and economic impact of the sector; politicians and 
government officials tend to overlook the sector while designing public 
policies. Finally, clearly indicated in the Spanish national report on the 
sector are the difficulties firstly to assess and secondly to work with EU 
funds. Also, in Spain, working with public funds comes along with 
increased requirements for control, and hence bureaucracy.
In summary, the third sector struggles with a scarcity of resources and 
increasing difficulties to cope with those administrative demands that are 
most likely a side effect of the introduction of NPM instruments in 
Europe. It seems that TSOs have to invest time and organizational capac-
ity to comply with administrative and monitoring requirements of funders 
and/or contracting partners. Furthermore, due to changes in their envi-
ronment, TSOs are forced to act more and more business-like. If we per-
ceive working with volunteers as a special ingredient of TSOs, during the 
last decades, it has become more difficult for TSOs to be volunteer- based 
in terms of both their labor force and their governance structures. In 
order to be competitive, TSOs tend to reduce the cost of their labor force. 
However, the organizations are aware that in the future this might cause 
problems, since the low-pay jobs offered by TSOs might be less attractive 
for highly qualified personnel. “To get the right person for the job” also 
constitutes a big problem for the governance of TSOs that look upon a 
tradition of being managed and/or supervised by board members serving 
in honorary positions. Nowadays, there is a decreasing interest in taking 
over these positions. In the next chapter, we will turn to the topic of how 
to address the identified barriers appropriately and to develop a policy 
agenda that indicates “the way ahead” for the third sector in Europe.




An online survey was conducted with the aim of prioritizing the barriers, 
which were identified through interviews and focus groups realized with 
stakeholders in the project countries. With a special eye on the identified 
barriers, the design of the survey (items) paralleled the manual for the 
interviews. It is noteworthy to underline that the outcome of the survey 
is not representative. Instead, it constitutes an evaluation and personal 
assessment of those who participated in the survey. We addressed stake-
holders, such as managers, heads of departments, and board members of 
TSOs, to take part in the survey. The number of respondents was 250 in 
Germany, 171 in Croatia and 102 in Austria. The response rate was very 
low in Spain (28 responses), France (24) and Poland (8). For these coun-
tries, the results of the survey are merely illustrative.
In the UK and the Netherlands, the questionnaire of the online survey 
was adapted to better reflect the national situations. Therefore, the results 
of the surveys conducted in these two countries are not included in the 
analysis. However, the outcome of the surveys in the UK and the 
Netherlands point in the same direction, that is, indicating the same bar-
riers. The response rate was 1200 in the UK, 372 in the Netherlands.
The outcome of the online survey reflects the priorization of the 
respondents as to which barriers and hurdles they perceive as the most 
important and salient ones for the TSOs they are either representing 
(board members) or working for. The results of the survey and the inter-
views were published in individual working papers per project country 
and made available on the website of the project.
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for the Third Sector in Europe
Bernard Enjolras
As the previous chapters made clear, the third sector in Europe is under 
the strain of various forces—individualization, bureaucratization and 
marketization—endangering third sector organizations’ (TSOs’) distinc-
tive features and sustainability. The third sector has the third largest 
workforce in Europe and yet is invisible and lacks recognition as an eco-
nomic and social force and as an interlocutor in policymaking at the 
European level. Our research shows that changes in the social, economic 
and political environment in which TSOs operate—mostly due to 
increased financial pressures and the introduction of market-based financ-
ing and regulatory mechanisms—are jeopardizing the sustainability of 
the third sector in Europe and, more importantly, increasingly under-
mining the distinctiveness and civic character of TSOs. Our comparative 
research has also uncovered innovative strategies of resilience that have 
enabled TSOs to tackle and cope with these challenges, though often 
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with consequences that threaten the distinctiveness that has long made 
the third sector a positive force on the continent.
The market and bureaucratic impulses appear to be gaining the upper 
hand across Europe—and significantly displacing the voluntaristic and 
civic ones that have historically characterized this sector. Although there 
are significant differences across countries and civil society models depend-
ing on their institutional arrangements and public policies, this develop-
mental trend is evident to some extent everywhere and is of importance 
since it puts TSOs under a survival watch, privileging adaptation strate-
gies that pay primary attention to what has to be done in order to survive. 
Survival strategies may be detrimental to these organizations’ distinctive-
ness and civic character, that is, what makes TSOs special. To be sure, 
these two orientations, survival and distinctiveness, are not necessarily in 
conflict, as illustrated by innovative resilience strategies developed by 
TSOs that have managed to adapt to a more competitive and market-
oriented environment while retaining their distinctiveness and civic orien-
tation. Whether such innovative resilience strategies will prevail is, to a 
large extent, dependent on the political environment of the third sector.1
1  Three Scenarios
Given the tendencies and the changes characterizing the environment of 
TSOs in Europe, how should the sector and its stakeholders respond and 
what supports will be needed? Fundamentally, three main scenarios are 
possible.
In the first scenario—the return to the golden age scenario—TSOs would 
prioritize the imperative of maintaining their distinctiveness and civic 
character when facing financial pressures and the increased marketization 
of the fields in which they operate. They would turn their backs on the 
government funding that is pulling them away from their distinctive 
character and rely more heavily on volunteering and philanthropic giving 
to sustain and protect their civic orientation. However, TSOs may lose 
1 This paragraph, and the section that follows, draw heavily on a similar diagnostic set of scenarios 
outlined in Lester M.  Salamon, The Resilient Sector Revisited: The New Challenge to Nonprofit 
America. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2015.
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ground and be increasingly out-performed by for-profit actors delivering 
public services in a market-based regulatory environment.
In a second scenario—the drift or commercialization of the third sector 
scenario—TSOs would prioritize the survival imperative, adapting to 
their increasingly marketized environment, even if this costs losing their 
distinctiveness and civic character. They may rely increasingly on market 
resources and redesign their activities in order to serve the profitable part 
of the market and secure public procurement contracts in competition 
with for-profit actors. By doing so, they may become increasingly iso-
morphic with their for-profit competitors and abandon their mission- 
critical functions, acting as any other commercial actors.
In a third scenario, the civic economy scenario, TSOs would adapt to 
their transformed environment without losing their distinctiveness. They 
would strive to balance the imperatives of survival and distinctiveness by 
finding innovative solutions. In this scenario, TSOs would rethink and 
redesign their roles and activities in light of the economic and institu-
tional transformations of their environment, sustaining their economic 
sustainability without sacrificing their mission orientation.
2  The Civic Economy Strategy: A Policy 
Agenda for Europe
Which of these scenarios will prevail depends to a great extent on the 
nature of the policy environment created by the EU, the national govern-
ments and the regional and local authorities in each European country. A 
strategy for fostering the development of a civic economy that is adapted 
to the realities of public finances in Europe and preserves the distinctive-
ness and socioeconomic contribution of the third sector in Europe needs 
to act on the following dimensions.
2.1  Improving the Legitimacy and Visibility 
of the Third Sector in Europe
Despite the third sector’s remarkable contribution to the well-being of 
European citizens in terms of social service provision, opportunities and 
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space for leisure activities, and despite the sector’s voice function and its 
significant importance as a transmitter of interests and needs of the citi-
zens, the third sector in Europe is still an unknown entity, almost  invisible 
in the national statistics and hardly acknowledged by Eurostat. What is 
needed throughout Europe and in Brussels is to get the third sector out 
of the shadows and into the limelight of public awareness. TSOs and the 
sector have to be appreciated as a vital element of Europe’s cultural heri-
tage and diversity. Also, the sector’s impact as a growing economic force 
outdistancing most major European industries in the scale of its work-
force has finally to be appreciated. And the sector’s political and commu-
nicative potentials, its voice function as well as its capacity to serve as an 
activator and incubator of citizens’ engagement and volunteering, have to 
finally to be put up front.
However, how is this to be accomplished? How is the awareness for the 
achievements and potentials of the sector and its organizations to be 
increased? We put forward the following policy recommendations with 
the aim of structurally enhancing the visibility of the third sector and its 
organizations all over Europe and in Brussels.
2.1.1  Improvement of the Sector’s Knowledge Base
As a crucial first step, a solid database of European third sector activity is 
necessary for assessing the societal, economic and political impact of the 
sector within the European Union. There is a decisive lack of solid statis-
tical information on the sector and its organizations at the European level 
and throughout Europe. In some countries, there has been significant 
progress in this respect over the last decades. However, there is no con-
certed action across Europe. Fortunately, the United Nations Statistics 
Division, which oversees the System of National Accounts, the guidance 
system for economic data gathering around the world, has just completed 
work on a new handbook designed to stimulate precisely this—a com-
prehensive, official body of comparative statistical data on the third sector 
as conceptualized by this project, embracing carefully defined in-scope 
nonprofit organizations, cooperatives, mutuals, social enterprises and 
volunteer activities. We need a European task force working with the aim 
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of convincing the national statistical offices and Eurostat to implement 
this Satellite Account on Nonprofit and Related Institutions and Volunteer 
Work on a priority basis to bring the European third sector out of the 
shadows. And we need the European Commission to provide the resources 
needed to underwrite the costs of the initial integration of this handbook 
into the statistical systems of member states. Furthermore, there are some 
areas of TSO activity that are worse off than others. One of these is the 
area of arts and culture that is also closely linked to identity building and 
hence to the spirit or soul of Europe. As the results of the third sector 
impact (TSI) project reveal, research on the impact of the third sector 
and its organizations is still in its infancy, and some areas of third sector 
activity, most prominently arts and culture, are thoroughly neglected and 
overlooked. To make the impact of the sector visible, the European 
Community has to invest in research and data gathering with a focus on 
third sector activities. It might be advisable for the European Commission 
to establish a Third Sector Research Fund to finance a robust program of 
research as a follow-up to the Third Sector Impact Project.
2.1.2  Enhance Visibility through European Statutes for TSOs
European legal stipulations for third sector activities would significantly 
contribute to the growth of the sector in Europe. Currently, there is not 
a commonly shared understanding of the third sector in Europe. In some 
countries, reflecting the Mediterranean and French social economy tradi-
tion, third sector activities are perceived as being commensurate with 
business endeavors; in other European regions, the third sector is looked 
upon as a synonym for voluntary activity based on the principle of reci-
procity. Still today, legal stipulations strongly reflect the regional tradi-
tions and legacies of history of the various European countries. But 
diversity and variation with respect to the legal forms definitely stand in 
the way of the development of a European third sector identity. In addi-
tion, the variety of legal forms translates into a significant hurdle for data 
gathering. Finally, umbrellas of TSOs working in Brussels are faced with 
significant difficulties in speaking with just one voice when they stand for 
legally very different constituencies. Introducing European Statutes for 
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third sector service providers, voluntary associations and foundations 
would definitely be a big step ahead in the direction of the Europeanization 
of the sector.
2.1.3  Make the Voice of the Sector Heard
A decisive lack of infrastructural backing in terms of support organiza-
tions as well as “umbrellas” that are able to give a voice to the needs of 
TSOs and volunteers at the various levels of European governance, in 
Brussels and in the capitals of Europe, turned out to be a significant defi-
ciency of the sector throughout Europe. There are many reasons why it is 
necessary to facilitate the establishment of third sector support infrastruc-
tures. In countries without a long tradition of third sector social service 
provision, TSOs operating in close cooperation with the government are 
perceived as semi-public organizations that sometimes are prone to clien-
telism or even corruption. Umbrellas of the sector are necessary to help 
TSOs in these countries escape the legitimacy gap. In countries looking 
back upon a long tradition of partnership with the government, it is 
increasingly necessary to draw attention to the distinctiveness of TSOs. 
These organizations are major employers; they speak to the needs of 
increasingly heterogeneous communities, and due to their economic 
strength, they are in a position to voice the negative side of neoliberal 
marketization. However, even the big players of the third sector need 
umbrellas, in particular in Brussels, in order to make their claims heard. 
Therefore, beyond setting up and supporting “umbrellas,” stakeholders 
suggested establishing ombudsmen and/or ombudswomen for the third 
sector and its organizations inside key political institutions, such as the 
European and National Parliaments. Furthermore, public awareness 
nowadays constitutes an outcome of media coverage. Here, the sector 
and its organizations are significantly overlooked. There is some notice of 
the sector and its achievements when major humanitarian or ecological 
disasters happen throughout the world. However, the media thoroughly 
falls short in providing a realistic and simultaneously appealing picture of 
the sector and its organizations. Instead, the media looks out for cases of 
embezzlement and cases of corruption. If there is no broker in terms of 
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umbrella organizations working on behalf of the sector, there is little 
chance that lack of awareness of the sector does not change into skepti-
cism or even mistrust.
2.1.4  Help TSOs to Market Themselves
TSOs not only need “umbrellas” to make their voice heard in the wider 
public and in the political arena; they also need support to adapt to a 
significantly changed environment. They need help to modernize them-
selves, particularly with respect to both public relations and marketing. 
Although new web-based technologies carry enormous potentials, TSOs 
are limited in their capacity to adapt to technological change. Particularly 
small- and medium-sized TSOs embedded in  local communities and 
working primarily with volunteers face difficulties in addressing the pub-
lic with the help of new technology. They are, as our stakeholders indi-
cate, simply not accustomed and also not well equipped to address all 
these new publics that are of increasing importance for both the visibility 
of the organization and the new modes of acquiring resources or organiz-
ing constituencies. For sure, civic actions are increasingly organized on 
the net (e.g. flash mobs); with the support of the net, citizens also increas-
ingly arrange ad-hoc sporting activities; additionally, campaigns are pro-
gressively formed within social media, and volunteers gather on social 
platforms for joint community action. The success story of crowd fund-
ing was primarily made possible by the World Wide Web. Furthermore, 
many of the activities organized via the web take place outside formal 
organizations. This trend might result in a situation in which TSOs are 
losing relevance to European citizens. Doubtlessly, modern communica-
tion technology is providing new ways of organizing support and of 
informing and empowering people and therefore constitutes a valuable 
asset for the third sector. Consequently, TSOs should increasingly make 
use of technological and communication tools in order to develop their 
potential as social impact generators. However, the technological know- 
how of TSOs is by and large rather limited, primarily used by larger 
TSOs and furthermore restrained by either the nonexistence of or limited 
access to TSO-support organizations. The need for help and assistance is 
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particularly prominent in areas of TSO activity beyond social service pro-
vision, such as the arts and culture. There is urgency for building up 
infrastructural support organizations and intermediaries to facilitate 
access to modern communication technology. Philanthropy, but also 
public funders, should invest in infrastructural support organizations 
that address the needs of TSOs active in certain fields and areas. This 
could serve as a structural backbone for those new demands that come 
with technological change.
2.1.5  Get the Public Back In—Provide Space for Third 
Sector Activities
Small TSOs engaged in sports, arts and culture or other community- 
based areas are increasingly facing the difficulty of finding “space” and 
facilities for their activities all over Europe. In metropolitan areas with 
rising shortages of residential space, it also has become increasingly diffi-
cult for TSOs that are active in interest representation to find places for 
encounters and gatherings. Due to gentrification, areas and locations that 
used to be public spaces are converted into upscale real estate or com-
mercial centers. In municipalities under austerity regimes, public facili-
ties such as gyms, auditoriums, exhibitions or concert halls are often in 
very poor condition and in urgent need of renovation. Since municipali-
ties have to make money, renting these spaces has turned into a costly 
affair. On the other hand, the majority of small and middle-sized TSOs 
are not able to afford operating their own venues and facilities. 
Consequently, compared with commercial providers, many TSOs, in 
particular, sport clubs, but also those who are active in the arts and cul-
ture, have lost attractiveness, and they are limited in pursuing their spe-
cific activities. This has a decisive effect on local community life, as arts 
and culture, as well as sports, are the most popular areas of volunteer 
commitment; the venues of these TSOs serve as points of crystallization 
for social life in neighborhoods. Local governments should be aware that 
there is an urgent need for public spaces and facilities in order to enrich 
and sustain community life. Simultaneously, national governments and 
the European Union should finally recognize that the provision and 
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maintenance of public facilities and public spaces constitute a solid 
investment into the future of Europe. And finally, TSOs could also help 
get the public back by pooling their resources and cooperating in acquir-
ing and maintaining facilities.
2.2  Improving Third Sector Finances 
and Government-Third Sector Partnership
In addition to improving TSO legitimacy and visibility, a second broad 
set of strategies is needed to address third sector finances and government- 
third sector partnerships. All over Europe, TSOs are struggling to make 
ends meet. The reasons why TSOs are facing a hard time are manifold. As 
the results of the TSI project indicate, acquisition of resources, finances 
and personnel, has changed significantly for TSOs during the last decades. 
Partly, this constitutes an outcome of modified TSO-government rela-
tions caused by the neoliberal-inspired introduction of competitive mar-
kets for social services and instruments of new public management 
(NPM), such as competitive tendering or contract management. But 
other factors are also at work, and several steps will be needed to address 
this strategic priority.
2.2.1  Get Structural Funds Back In
In the first place, there is an urgent need for structural funds all over 
Europe in order to safeguard the durability and sustainability of both 
TSOs and government-third sector cooperation. All over Europe, public 
funding nowadays is by and large based on temporary contracts. 
Furthermore, governments have generally shifted from so-called institu-
tional or structural funding to temporary funding related to specified 
projects. Therefore, TSOs that bounce from one project to another have 
less and less capacity for building up and maintaining an organizational 
infrastructure that safeguards stability and allows quick responses to new 
challenges. The need for more sustainable funding is very acute in those 
regions where TSOs are not accepted partners of public service delivery, 
such as in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region. Furthermore, 
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TSOs that are active in leisure and community-oriented areas such as arts 
and culture or sports, where the sector consists of myriads of small orga-
nizations, small structural funds would significantly contribute to a more 
sustainable development of the sector. European foundations also have a 
role to play in providing such core support. There is no way that those 
TSOs can exclusively live on so-called project money. They are in need of 
long-term structural public and private support that constitutes a bot-
tom- up approach and an investment into sustainable community 
development.
2.2.2  Lift up the Burden of Procurement Procedures
The introduction of NPM has had a decisive impact on third sector- 
government relations, and particularly on the modes of financing. 
Funding for TSOs is increasingly acquired through competitive grants 
and contracts. As a result of the new funding environment, third sector 
bureaucratization has developed into a major obstacle impacting nega-
tively on TSOs. The accountability requirements accompanying pro-
curement have increased significantly during the last decades all over 
Europe. This translates into a situation in which TSOs have to allocate 
more and more resources to complying with the administrative require-
ments of applying, reporting and evaluating grants and contracts instead 
of devoting time and energy for “doing the right thing” and supporting 
the community. Urgently needed at every level of governance in Europe 
are new modes of procurement that take the specificity of TSOs into 
account. Again, TSOs are not proxies for commercial enterprises. Modes 
of procurement have to be reevaluated and ideally homogenized through-
out Europe. They should also incorporate a so-called social clause—giv-
ing priority in public procurement to TSOs having a social impact—that 
will ease competition between TSOs and for-profits; they should provide 
modes for cooperation between governments and TSOs that are tailored 
toward the needs of TSOs; they should specify tasks and functions for 
both sides in order to enhance cooperation instead of creating a culture 
of surveillance; and finally, without losing attention to accountability, 
they should simplify monitoring and evaluation procedures. The need to 
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reduce the complexity of procurement procedures is especially necessary 
at the European level. EU-procurement and funding procedures are far 
too complicated for the majority of European TSOs. There is a decisive 
need to adapt the European directive on public procurement to the needs 
of TSOs and, in particular, to those active in interest representation and 
lobbying. In addition, the European directive on VAT needs to be altered. 
A more favorable tax framework has to be introduced that envisages a 
reduction of VAT for TSOs and that makes tax reimbursement for TSOs 
possible. Moreover, the policies of matching funds for EU-grants have to 
be changed. It should be made possible to use specific third sector 
resources, for example, voluntary work, as an equivalent to money, in 
order to pave the way for smaller organizations to get access to 
EU-support.
2.2.3  Facilitate Access to Capital Markets and to Alternative 
Sources of Financing
As the results of the TSI project clearly show, public money is no longer 
the prime source of income for TSOs in several fields of activities. Despite 
increasingly competitive environments, the economic success story of the 
sector has been impressive in Europe. Nevertheless, TSOs are not yet 
treated on an equal footing with for-profit enterprises. This is particularly 
the case with respect to their access to capital markets. Banks and other 
financing institutions are very reluctant to do business with TSOs. 
Additionally, most TSOs cannot access equity finance due to their non-
profit distribution constraint and legal inability to share ownership with 
shareholders. A change of culture is needed as well as an empowerment 
strategy for TSOs supporting them in getting access to capital markets 
and in experimenting with new modes of financing such as crowd fund-
ing, social loans and cooperation with ethical banks.2
2 For a discussion of how this can be done, see Lester M. Salamon, Leverage for Good: An Introduction 
to the New Frontiers of Philanthropy and Social Investment. New York: Oxford University Press, 
2014a; and Lester M. Salamon, ed. The New Frontiers of Philanthropy: A Guide to the New Actos and 
Tools Reshaping Global Philanthropy and Social Investment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014b.
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3  Fostering Foundations’ Supportive Role 
of the Third Sector in Europe
Philanthropic institutions and especially foundations have the potential 
to become the backbone of the third sector; they should play a critical 
role in canalizing private funds to value-oriented projects emanating 
from third sector initiatives and as supporters of the entire European 
third sector by helping building up its visibility and capacity. As of now, 
most foundations in Europe assume no responsibility for the sector as a 
whole. Yet, they are the only source of alternative funding (to public 
funding) for these sector-wide objectives.
Because foundations have limited resources, they need to act strategically 
orienting the use of their limited funds to activities to maximize leverage and 
impact. Paul Brest and Hal Harvey capture the basic issues and motivation 
of strategic philanthropy: “Accomplishing philanthropic goals requires hav-
ing great clarity about what those goals are and specifying indicators of suc-
cess before beginning a philanthropic project. (…) This, in turn, requires an 
empirical, evidence-based understanding of the external world in which the 
plan will operate” (Brest and Harvey 2008: 7). Supporting the third sector 
as a whole by helping TSOs to build their capacity constitutes a prioritized 
avenue for European foundations to maximize their impact. By helping 
build the capacity of the third sector as a whole, they will generate broader 
socioeconomic impacts than by just focusing on particular projects.
4  Improving the Attractiveness of TSOs
A third broad strategy needed to sustain the core capabilities and values of 
the third sector in Europe is to improve the overall attractiveness of TSOs 
to their fundamental constituencies. The new culture of volunteering, 
which is characterized by a high degree of volatility, significantly affects 
membership affiliation and the concept of the voluntary association that 
used to be the nucleus and core concept of European TSOs. Indeed, there 
is a real danger that the third sector in its current contours and how it has 
developed in Europe over the years will not be capable of continuing to be 
a thriving societal force in Europe that gives people a voice, provides oppor-
tunities for community and leisure activities and, last but not least, consti-
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tutes an important provider of social services, contributing to the 
community life and well-being of European citizens. The environment of 
TSOs needs to be enhanced in order to increase the attractiveness of these 
organizations for volunteers and paid staff. However, TSOs need to improve 
awareness of their values and distinctive features.
4.1  Renewing the Third Sector’s Values
At the center of the civic economy scenario must be a clarification of the 
third sector’s values, the distinctive qualities and attributes that TSOs 
bring to society in Europe. The third sector’s distinctive contribution is 
closely related to a set of values such as equity, openness, empowerment, 
participation, responsiveness and commitment to the enrichment of 
human life. The marketization of the sector, accompanied by an emphasis 
on metrics that privileges the service function of TSOs, contributes to the 
downplaying of these values. Making these values visible and clearly 
articulated for the sector as a whole and for particular organizations will 
be crucial for the success of the civic economy renewal of the third sector 
and the sustainability of its specific contribution to society in Europe.
4.2  Increase the Attractiveness of TSOs 
as Employers
Despite high qualifications and outstanding commitment, TSO- 
employees are faced with deteriorating working conditions. Low salaries, 
which are not comparable with those paid in the commercial sector, con-
stitute a further outcome of the changed environment and funding situ-
ation of TSOs in several parts of the third sector. Consequently, working 
in the third sector becomes increasingly unattractive. Particularly in areas 
where the mental and physical stress is high, TSOs face serious problems 
to recruit highly qualified personnel. Hence, it is most likely that in the 
near future the quality of services will deteriorate as TSOs have to employ 
less professional personnel and reduce personnel costs per service unit. 
Women are particularly hit hard by the degraded working conditions in 
the sector, as they account for the largest part of the sector’s labor force. 
Introduction of collective wage agreements in prominent areas of the 
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 sector, for example, social services, provide an effective tool for stopping 
the ruinous competition for contracts. TSOs are called upon to agree 
with their employees on fair labor standards throughout the sector. In 
addition, the specificity of third sector management and governance has 
hardly been recognized by institutions of higher education throughout 
Europe. Our stakeholders time and again indicated that there is a decisive 
lack of training facilities and courses tailored to the needs of third sector 
managers who have to get along with a broad spectrum of very different 
constituencies and who also should never lose track of the mission and 
vision of the respective TSO.
4.3  Increase the Attractiveness of TSOs 
for Volunteers
Volunteers are a pivotal source of legitimacy, community orientation and 
embeddedness for TSOs. However, volunteer engagement is not free. All 
over Europe, there is a trend for more flexible, fluid and tailor-made forms 
of volunteering. Life-long commitment to a specific TSO, as used to be the 
case in former times, no longer reflects the reality of volunteering in Europe 
today. The modernized culture of volunteering is also characterized by a 
new expressiveness of volunteers. They have become more vocal about their 
voluntary commitment. Nowadays, volunteers want to decide how they 
become active, how long they volunteer and where they specifically get 
engaged. This new voluntarism forces TSOs to install procedures of con-
tinuing infrastructural support, indeed, volunteer management. It also 
requires further training of volunteers as well as of the TSO-personnel who 
are in charge of coordinating and monitoring volunteer work.
4.4  Increase the Attractiveness of TSOs 
for Honorary Board Members
A dual governance structure that encompasses honorary board members or 
trustees and full-time professional managers still seems to be an appropriate 
governance model for many TSOs in Europe. However, as indicated by our 
research and by many of our stakeholders, there are escalating problems 
around recruitment for governance roles, particularly with respect to the 
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honorary positions of board members. Again, the reasons for this develop-
ment are manifold and closely related to the increased responsibilities of 
board members, which are partly a result of the changed procurement pro-
cedures. In addition, in  local communities, there nowadays are many 
opportunities to get involved and to serve in prestigious positions without 
being responsible for hundreds of employees or millions of Euros. In order 
to safeguard the local embeddedness of TSOs through community trustee-
ship and honorary board members, those who are willing to be engaged 
have to be supported and provided with task- oriented training programs 
and courses that indeed speak to their needs.
5  Conclusion
In a time when Europe faces economic and social developments charac-
terized by accelerated technological changes, increased globalization of 
world markets, increased migration flows and a shift in the economic 
opportunity structure creating rising inequalities among individuals and 
national communities, the collective capacity embedded in the third sec-
tor constitutes a major factor of social resilience (Hall and Lamont 2013) 
of Europe.
Indeed, when facing the challenges posed by rapid socioeconomic 
transformations, entailing economic reorganization, social dislocation 
and redistributive effects, the capacity of groups and communities to 
adapt to transformations and to secure their well-being in spite of these 
transformations—their degree of resilience—is dependent upon their 
collective capacities. Individuals’ social resilience, their capacity to mobi-
lize resources and solidarities, is enhanced by social organization. TSOs 
and the third sector in its entirety, in interplay with the state, play a cru-
cial role in enhancing social resilience by fostering  social solidarities, 
social capital, capacities for collective action, and the provision of collec-
tive goods.
The third sector and volunteering truly represent a unique “renewable 
resource for social and environmental problem-solving” for Europe. The 
results of our research have provided evidence supporting this claim. 
They have also shown that the third sector in Europe is subject to major 
changes and challenges. The future developmental path of Europe 
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depends not only on its economy and polity, but also on the dynamism 
of its third sector. Policy adjustments are needed in order to support a 
dynamic third sector in Europe and preserve the distinctiveness of the 
organizations that compose it. However, these policy adjustments will 
not take place without a better public understanding of the state of the 
third sector in Europe. Hopefully, the analysis developed in this report 
will contribute to such an understanding.
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